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Abstract 
The current research activity in the nuclear field focuses on the development of 
nuclear facilities able to satisfy the four objectives identified by the Generation IV 
International Forum (GIF IV) in its Technological Roadmap in order to advance 
nuclear energy in its next generation: sustainability, safety and reliability, economic 
competitiveness, proliferation resistance and physical protection. The nuclear en-
ergy systems must be designed so that, during normal operation or anticipated tran-
sients, safety margins are adequate, accidents are prevented and off-normal situa-
tions do not deteriorate into severe plant conditions. Therefore, safety assessment 
and risk analysis are recognized as an essential priority in the development of these 
advanced systems.  
My research activity aims at the definition and the application of an innovative 
approach to the risk analysis of next generation nuclear systems. The advanced 
technologies and the preliminary design of these concepts claim for a moderniza-
tion of the traditional safety assessment, posing numerous safety-related challenges 
to be overcome in order to develop a holistic and comprehensive safety demonstra-
tion, therefore an efficient licensing framework.  
For this purpose, the Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology (ISAM) pro-
posed by the Risk and Safety Working Group (RSWG) in 2011 was selected as the 
basis methodology: it is constituted by several risk analysis tools to be applied in 
sequence and iteratively, in order to support the PSA, the final objective of the 
methodology. The ISAM was reviewed to better reflect the International stand-
ards/rules and to suit the peculiar case of new generation reactors. An inspirational 
philosophy was found in the IEC EN 61508, which constitutes a milestone for 
safety-driven design in the many engineering fields. Its major idea is that the sys-
tems safety must be studied and pursued from the early design by risk analysis tools 
through the definition of Safety Instrumented Functions to be analyzed in order to 
understand the effective risk reduction needed in terms of safety systems and addi-
tional safety requirements. Well-established practices to apply this functional safety 
approach to conceptual and innovative nuclear systems do not exist, therefore the 
idea is to enrich the ISAM with other risk analysis tools in order to select a list of 
 hazards as complete as possible and improve the efficiency of the analysis and the 
detailed design definition. After a bibliographic survey on risk analysis operational 
tools, nuclear international standards, including also the process industry standards 
and best practices, three of them were integrated in the ISAM: Functional Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FFMEA), Master Logic Diagram (MLD) and Lines 
of Defense (LOD).  
Along with five other concepts, the Molten Salt Fast Reactor (MSFR) was se-
lected by the GIF IV due to its promising design and safety characteristics and it is 
studied in the framework of the European project SAMOFAR, with the objective 
to advance its design and perform its safety demonstration. MSFR consists of a 
cylindrical vessel with diameter and height of 2.25m filled with a circulating liquid 
fuel salt under ambient pressure at operating temperature of 750°C. Its peculiarities 
mostly derive from the circulating molten salt, acting as fuel and coolant contem-
porarily, and the fast neutron spectrum. Some consequences are the possibility of a 
passive reconfiguration of the core geometry in case of incident/accident, the fre-
quent adjustments of the fuel composition allowing low reactivity reserves in core, 
a higher risk of reactivity insertion accident during loading and the fact that a sig-
nificant part of the fissile matter is outside the core. Moreover, the design is still 
on-going, therefore a safety assessment performed at the components level is not 
useful since their architecture will evolve; instead, a functional approach allows to 
identify, since the early design, the functional deviations challenging the system 
and, consequently, to include safety features in a holistic framework. 
The implementation of the defined methodology started from the identification 
of deviations able to compromise system safety (in terms of Postulated Initiating 
Events PIEs, the most challenging conditions for plant safety), through two ap-
proaches implanted at the same time: the FFMEA, a bottom-up approach, focused 
on the identification of the functions of the system and the analysis of the conse-
quences of the loss of each of them, and the MLD, a top-down approach, that after 
the selection of a top event identifies its possible elementary causes. A list of PIEs 
was produced and for each of them a brief description of plausible causes, conse-
quences, involved components and preventive and mitigation actions was sup-
posed. In addition to the identification of PIEs, the FFMEA and the MLD allowed 
to highlight the lack of information on some systems, procedures or phenomena, to 
point out potential limitations of the design and make suggestions to enhance the 
safety of the concept. A list of some open points was produced.  
 Successively, for selected accidental scenarios the LOD method was applied to 
ensure that every accidental evolution of the reactor state was always prevented by 
a minimum set of homogenous (in number and quality) safety features before a 
situation with potentially unacceptable consequences might arise. Each event was 
briefly characterized, identifying also plausible prevention measures. During the 
application of the LOD method, some input data regarding natural behaviour of the 
plant following the initiating events, with a preliminary evaluation of expected ra-
diological consequences, were fundamental in order to define the number of safety 
provisions. While describing the plant natural behavior, all the protection systems 
were not considered, therefore could not influence the evolution of the transient; 
consequently, physical phenomena, such as the feedback reactions and fuel salt vol-
ume variations, completely drove the scenario definition. Successively, possible 
provisions able to cope with the event were identified and the preliminary outcomes 
of this method were analyzed. The LOD helped to realize that additional provisions 
could be necessary to ensure the complete management of the accident (e.g. the 
addition of a core catcher or equivalent) or recognize the importance of ensuring 
the availability of some existing components: in particular, from the analysis of the 
overcooling accident, the availability of the free levels to allow the fuel salt expan-
sion resulted absolutely necessary. This point deserves to be deeply studied: a de-
tailed analysis of all scenarios that might lead to free level unavailability (e.g. too 
much initial fuel salt pouring, blockages, salt pouring from the intermediate circuit 
through an intermediate heat exchanger leak…) would be worthwhile, in order to 
ensure a very high reliability of the components and appropriate design measures.  
Part of the defined methodology was applied to some systems of the full-scale 
fusion reactor EU DEMO, in the framework of the EuroFUSION program for the 
safety assessment of the DEMO auxiliary systems. The FFMEA was performed for 
the Primary Heat Transfer System (PHTS) and the Balance of Plant (BoP) of the 
Dual Coolant Lithium-Lead (DCLL) blanket option. The analysis started from the 
study of the system components, materials and plausible physical phenomena that 
could challenge the system (especially chemical characteristics of the present flu-
ids); it provided a list of 24 PIEs, analogously to the list of 27 PIEs provided for the 
similar study about the Water Cooled Lithium-Lead (WCLL) blanket option.  
The risk assessment process for an advanced nuclear plant is proposed to be 
iterative rather than serial: as the design matures and more design details become 
available, the set of accident initiators will be updated and broadened to gradually 
address other systems and operational states. At the same time, the selected events 
will be studied through deterministic analyses in order to define more accurate 
 events sequences. When the deterministic inputs are modified, the design changes 
and the risk assessment model evolves as well.  
In parallel, a critical evaluation of the nuclear safety assessment procedure was 
carried on: the majority of current safety regulatory requirements is based on LWRs 
technology and necessitates changes to suit to a new spectrum of advanced nuclear 
plants that present a much larger range of risks variability (due to different physical 
phenomena, plant responses associated with the reactor transients/accidents, use of 
different materials for the reactor fuel, moderator and coolant and to different safety 
design approaches for the implementation of radionuclides barriers). Moreover, 
methodological and conceptual open points were identified: for example, the LWR 
risk metrics (Core Damage Frequency –CDF- and Large Early Release Frequency 
–LERF-), are neither relevant nor useful for many advanced nuclear reactors; as 
well, concepts as physical barrier, the severe accident definition or the PSA role 
need to be reconsidered and represent important safety challenges for the accepta-
bility of new generation plants.  
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1 Introduction 
Nuclear power is recognized as an outstanding source for base load low-carbon 
electricity production and it is included in all energy scenarios in the European En-
ergy Roadmap 2050. In particular, the development of new technologies and asso-
ciated fuel cycles results fundamental to improve the utilization of nuclear fuel. 
After Fukushima-Daiichi accident, all European nuclear power plants underwent 
stress test and peer reviews and new generation nuclear reactors are expected to be 
designed with the highest safety standards from the beginning. The ultimate aim is 
to develop nuclear energy, which is inherently safe and does not produce nuclear 
waste other than fission products. In 2002 Generation IV International Forum (GIF 
IV) selected six systems from nearly 100 concepts as the Generation-IV fission nu-
clear plants: the Gas-cooled Fast Reactor (GFR), Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor 
(SFR), Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (LFR), Molten Salt Reactor (MSR), Very-High-
Temperature Reactor (VHTR), Supercritical-Water-cooled Reactor (SCWR) (GIF, 
2014); on the other hand the DEMOnstration fusion power reactor (DEMO) is fore-
seen to follow the advancements of ITER (International Thermonuclear Experi-
mental Reactor) by 2050 (EUROfusion website). 
The current research activity in the nuclear field focuses on the development of 
nuclear facilities able to satisfy the eight objectives identified by the GIF IV in its 
Technological Roadmap in order to advance nuclear energy in its next generation. 
They are divided into four goal areas: sustainability, safety and reliability, economic 
competitiveness, proliferation resistance and physical protection (GIF, 2014).  
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In particular:  
• The sustainability goals aim at enhancing the effective fuel utilization, 
the long-term availability/reliability of the systems and the waste man-
agement, in order to conserve resources, preserve population and envi-
ronment health, without jeopardizing the ability of the next generations 
to satisfy their own necessities (Sustainability 1 and Sustainability 2 
goals) (GIF, 2002).  
•  The Economics goals aim at realizing competitive life cycle, cost of 
energy production and financial risk with respect to the other energy 
sources (Economics 1 and Economics 2 goals) (GIF, 2002).  
• The Safety and Reliability goals aim at safe and reliable operation, 
minimizing the frequency and consequences of severe accident with the 
consequent reduction of off-site radioactive release and serious plant 
damage. The objective is to zero the necessity for an off-site emergency 
response, no matter the new technologies and physical conditions char-
acterizing the innovative systems (Safety and Reliability 1, Safety and 
Reliability 2, Safety and Reliability 3 goals) (GIF, 2002).  
• The Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection goal aims at 
controlling and protecting nuclear materials and facilities and protecting 
them against terrorism acts (Proliferation Resistance and Physical Pro-
tection 1 goal) (GIF, 2002).  
The attempt to answer this request with a fully innovative technology is the 
rationale associating all Generation-IV reactor designs and also the proposed con-
cepts for a full-scale fusion reactor (DEMO). In particular, according to the Safety 
and Reliability goal area, innovative reactors have to be designed so that, during 
every operational mode (normal operation, start-up, shut-down, maintenance or an-
ticipated transients), safety margins are appropriate, accidents are prevented and 
off-normal situations do not degenerate into more severe plant conditions. Moreo-
ver, all the major contributors to availability, reliability, inspectability, and main-
tainability have to be identified (GIF, 2002). Therefore, safety assessment and risk 
analysis are recognized as a priority in the development of these advanced systems. 
 The unique and various characteristics of new generation nuclear installations, 
the preliminary stage of the design, the incomplete knowledge of the physical be-
havior of the systems, the safety role widely accepted in other industrial fields chal-
lenge the traditional safety demonstration and ask for innovations. The innovative 
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systems call for a new safety approach based on technological neutral methodolo-
gies, always relying on the IAEA fundamental safety principles (IAEA, 2006): in 
particular, the definition of an integral safety assessment methodology and the 
demonstration of its applicability and efficacy. In addition, as a general engineering 
trend, the safety demonstration should proceed in parallel with the design evolution, 
aiming at influencing it since the earliest stages by giving useful feedbacks and 
guidance to the designer in order to achieve a safety that is “built in” rather than 
“added on” (GIF, 2008; IEC 61508, 2005).  
Chapter 2 explains the context of this work; in particular, after a brief overview 
on the general concepts of the nuclear safety, it focuses on the limits of the current 
regulatory structure and on the safety challenges of new generation systems. This 
chapter focuses on the reason why a reconsideration, a modernization and an adap-
tation of the safety philosophy currently applied to the existing nuclear stations is 
necessary to properly fit the needs of non-traditional nuclear systems.  
Chapter 3 proposes an overview on some safety assessment methodologies and 
standards that drive the safety demonstration of the traditional plants. In this chap-
ter, it is presented a brief summary on the IAEA safety standards and on US NRC 
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission) regulations, focusing on what is directly appli-
cable to new generation systems and what is specifically deduced for traditional 
plants. Successively, is presented the IEC EN 61508, a non-compulsory but widely 
accepted approach in many sectors (process industry, transportations, manufactur-
ing industry, etc.): it constitutes a milestone for functional safety driving the design. 
Its philosophy inspired the IEC EN 61513, for the sketch of I&C architecture in 
nuclear power plants, even if the rigid traditional nuclear safety makes the 61513 
misrepresenting the nature of the 61508. In the end, two methodologies, the ISAM 
(Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology) and the INPRO (International Project 
on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles), proposed by IAEA are presented. 
The two approaches take inspiration from the IAEA principles and aim at imple-
menting the concept of safety driven design. This section focuses on their limits, 
mainly due to the fact that these approaches are inspiring philosophies that must be 
reviewed, completed and adapted, also using traditional risk analysis tools to suit 
the unique case of new generation installations.  
Chapter 4 presents the methodology developed for supporting the safety assess-
ment of new generation nuclear systems. It is based on a completely reviewed ver-
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sion of the ISAM, taking into account all the inputs presented in the previous para-
graphs and using some risk analysis operational methods traditionally accepted. 
This methodology constitutes a part of a potential operational framework for safety 
demonstration, which needs to be completed trough tailored criteria, requirements 
and consolidated safety assessment methods. This activity is a part of the European 
project SAMOFAR of the Horizon2020 program, which aims at furnishing the ex-
perimental proof of concept of the Molten Salt Fast Reactor (MSFR) and providing 
a complete safety assessment of the reactor (Flauw et al., 2018). 
Chapter 5 presents the first application of the methodology to the case study of 
the Molten Salt Fast Reactor (MSFR). The outputs of this work are not only the 
expected results of the methodology, but also some open points to be properly eval-
uated and solved to allow the design to evolve (Appendix A and B). Also this ac-
tivity is a part of the SAMOFAR project.  
Chapter 6 presents the application of part of this methodology to several options 
of the DEMO blanket cooling systems. The methodology has been used to prepare 
a comparison between several solutions. The activity provided a support to the Eu-
roFUSION program for the safety assessment of the DEMO auxiliary systems.  
Chapter 7 summarizes the conclusions of this work. 
 Aim of the thesis 
This work contributes to highlight the main safety challenges of new generation 
nuclear installations to be overcome to allow a safety demonstration of innovative 
installations.  
The definition of a methodology suiting the innovative but preliminary design, 
based on functional analyses, is fundamental to guarantee a systematic and as com-
plete as possible analysis, which can be useful also for other innovative installa-
tions.    
One main objective of the safety assessment methodology is to give feedbacks 
on the design, and the proposed method also contributes to this purpose by high-
lighting some open options in the design and giving some indications on their po-
tential impact from the safety point of view. The safety demonstration has to be 
pursued along the design development, in a risk-informed point of view. The pre-
defined risk tolerability criteria have to be guaranteed during all the phases of the 
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project of the reactor and its auxiliary/protection systems. On the other hand the 
residual risk, which cannot be eliminated during the project, will be managed during 
the operational life with opportune O&M actions and procedures (according to the 
inspiring philosophy of the IEC 61508).   
The methodology is applied to MSFR and to some parts of DEMO reactors to 
identify hazards and needed safety provisions and to help the enhancement of the 
design.  
 

 
 
  
2 Context: Safety challenges for new 
generation nuclear plants  
 Nuclear reactor safety  
The IAEA fundamental safety objective is “to protect people and the environ-
ment from harmful effects of ionizing radiations” (IAEA, 2006) and it applies to all 
circumstances that could represent a source of radiations risks in all the nuclear 
installations. The nuclear safety regulation is the operative translation of this 
safety principle and its role is to permit the authority independent verification that 
a given nuclear design can safely operate with reasonable guarantees to safeguard 
public health and safety, and the environment.  
Notwithstanding significant cultural, social and political differences existing 
between countries with a program for nuclear energy production, the regulatory 
agencies around the world have adopted basic principles similar to those described 
by IAEA and US NRC regulations. Therefore, the fundamental basis for demon-
strating nuclear safety results sufficiently uniform among the different countries. It 
depends on the accomplishment of a set of safety functions that guarantee the con-
trol of the reactor during normal operation conditions with adequate safety margins; 
moreover, safety functions ensure that accidents are prevented, consequences are 
minimized, off-normal transients do not deteriorate into severe plant conditions (no 
domino effect) and the residual heat is removed during the reactor shutdown.  
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The safety functions to be guaranteed for all the nuclear systems include: 
• The control of the reactor reactivity during all operational modes 
(startup, operation and shutdown); 
• The control of heat removal to an ultimate heat sink;  
• The control of coolant inventory;  
• The control of any chemically reactive or radiological materials; 
• The guarantee of an ultimate confinement.   
The achievement of these safety functions aims at preventing or limiting to ac-
ceptable levels the radiological releases.  
Nuclear installations must install safety systems and implement procedures 
with the objective to realize these safety functions: this means also to take into ac-
count all the life phases of the support systems (design, operation, maintenance and 
dismantling). If needed, the reactor design must ensure physical separation, inde-
pendence, diversity and redundancy for protection systems in order to reduce the 
frequency of Common-Cause Failures (CCFs) or single point failures that could 
lead to dissatisfy a safety function. Finally, defence in depth (DiD) and safety 
margins reduce the possibility that an incomplete understanding of the reactor be-
havior can challenge the safety functions (MIT, 2018). 
The worldwide park of the currently operating commercial nuclear reactors con-
sists of 85% LWRs (IAEA, 2017), where the satisfaction of critical safety functions 
is ensured by a combination of active and passive systems and operator actions. 
Consequently, the regulatory and licensing structure properly suits the LWRs tech-
nology, physics and procedures.  
For safely operating, advanced reactors must ensure the accomplishment of 
the safety functions: to fulfill this objective, a great importance is given to inherent 
and passive protection systems directly integrated in the design. The unique and 
innovative characteristics of the new generation nuclear installation, a wide range 
of different technologies, the preliminary stage of their design, the new safety role 
widely accepted in other industrial field, and the feedbacks from occurred accidents 
(in particular Fukushima Daiichi) challenge the traditional nuclear safety demon-
stration and demand renovations. The aim is to better suit a new spectrum of novel 
and advanced plants (Southern Company, 2017). 
The following paragraphs present a panorama on the main intrinsic challenges 
of the safety assessment of new generation installations.  
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 Safety challenges  
The majority of current nuclear safety regulatory requirements is based on 
LWRs technology and necessitates adaptations for the new generation installations. 
A brief overview of the traditional regulatory framework is presented in Chapter 3.  
Several authorities highlight the limits of the application of the current regula-
tory structure and propose updates for specific elements of the traditional safety 
assessment.  
The Southern Company, sponsored by the Department of Energy (DoE) of the 
US government and other industry participants, led a project for the modernization 
of the licensing process based on the development and the use of a technology-
independent and risk-based PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) for new gener-
ation installation. The proposed methodology is intended to be firstly introduced at 
a very early stage of the design and to be repeatedly applied during the entire design 
definition (Southern Company, 2017).  
An interdisciplinary MIT study reviewed the regulatory structure for nuclear 
facilities to assess its ability to drive the licensing process of advanced nuclear in-
stallations. It focused on best practices and possibilities of improvements for the 
licensing and regulating US framework (MIT, 2018).  
The IAEA standards suit perfectly to traditional installations, nonetheless op-
portune standards for innovative systems, always derived from the fundamental 
safety principles (see paragraph 3.1), must be still developed.   
Some design-specific safety elements, which were developed for safety assess-
ment of LWRs, must be fundamentally different for advanced reactors: functional 
barriers for the retention of radioactive materials, risk metrics for risk quantifica-
tion, success criteria, SSCs (Structures, Systems and Components) available for the 
implementation of the safety functions, final state of the event sequences, radioac-
tive source terms, frequency calculation of multi-module plants, Design Basis Ac-
cidents (DBAs), etc. For example, the inconsistency of the design safety margins 
required by standards and good practices can result in underestimation or overesti-
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mation of SSCs. The traditional safety margins do not take into account the peculi-
arities of the specific analyzed technology, which may be extremely different from 
the LWRs. Since these margins guide the implementation of the safety provisions, 
their adequacy results fundamental for the safety demonstration of a system. The 
new generation installations necessitate appropriate criteria, derived from the anal-
ysis of the major physical-chemical phenomena driving their behavior during tran-
sients (e.g. the distance from the boiling temperature for Liquid Metals -LM- cooled 
reactors) in order to efficiently direct the sketch of their safety architecture.  
Another example is given by the traditional structure of PSA; the classical Level 
1, 2, 3 structure can need substantial changes for several new generation nuclear 
installations: the design of some advanced reactors does not foresee a plant status 
equivalent to the one described in Level 1 and 2 PSA of LWRs; in fact, specific 
design characteristics preclude core damage states that have been defined for 
LWRs. For example, for the molten salt reactors the core melting accident is mean-
ingless, being the fissile and fertile salt at the liquid state. Moreover, the advanced 
reactor PSA will manage also radioactive sources outside the reactor.  
It results evident the importance of harmonizing the regulatory framework to 
provide prompt and timely licensing process. In the following paragraph there is a 
systematic description of some of the main issues for the safety demonstration of 
advanced reactors (Carpignano et al., 2018).    
2.2.1 New materials, new technologies and design in development  
The PSA is highly design, plant and site specific; this is true for any kind of 
reactor. In particular, dealing with advanced nuclear systems with very different 
technologies implies a much larger range of risks variability with respect to a 
LWR (Carpignano et al., 2018): physical phenomena and processes are different, 
as well as the plant responses to reactor transients and accidents. This is due to the 
use of different materials for the reactor fuel, moderator and coolant, to innovative 
technologies for energy production and to different safety design approaches for the 
implementation of radionuclides barriers (Southern Company, 2017). For example, 
in the view of the sustainability, advanced reactors plan to use thorium based fissile 
and fertile salts, different from the traditional uranium based fuel cycle of LWRs. 
Moreover, the fast reactors will not include moderator (whose main function is to 
slow down the neutrons energy from fast to thermal spectrum). Finally, while 
LWRs are cooled by pressurized water (Pressurized Water Reactors –PWRs- at 
~155 bar and Boiling Water Reactors –BWRs- at ~70 bar), generation IV concepts 
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present a wide range of coolant, from liquid metals (lead and sodium) to supercriti-
cal water, from gas to molten salt. On the other hand, the fusion devices exploit 
completely different technologies. The use of generic models and approaches, es-
pecially if developed for LWRs, risks neglecting the design and technology specific 
safety issues.  
Dealing with the safety assessment of an advanced reactor means to investigate 
all the potential sources of radioactive materials (in core, in the fertile blanket, 
in the cooling circuit, in the protection and control systems, in fuel handling and 
storage systems). The analysis should be performed in all the planned operation 
conditions (normal operation, start-up, shut down, maintenance, refueling, etc.), ex-
ploring all the combinations of components failures causing the non-fulfilment of a 
safety function. Furthermore, the quantification of the frequencies and conse-
quences must be modeled, including systematic sensitivity analyses in order to 
study the risk as a function of the characteristics of SSCs and set appropriate re-
quirements, therefore design and operational safety margins. 
It is worth highlighting that many of the designs of the new generation installa-
tions, including fusion machines, are very preliminary and still in evolution. A 
safety assessment at the component level is not useful since the architecture will 
mature in time and the risk evaluation can be only preliminary. Moreover, the 
operational phases are not completely defined. Hence, a non-LWR PSA can be con-
sidered not as a punctual methodology but as an iterative process expanding the 
purpose and the detail level of the PSA with the advancement of the design defini-
tion and the knowledge of the physics and the behavior of the system.      
The lack of knowledge on the plant increases the uncertainties in the estimation 
of accident frequencies and consequences. The sources of uncertainties should be 
identified, treated through available data, expert opinions and other objective evi-
dences and, in the end, their impact on the risk results should be quantified to be 
used for the implementation of the DiD evaluations (Southern Company, 2017).  
2.2.2 Risk metrics  
Because of these differences (see paragraph 2.2.1), the LWR risk metrics, for 
instance the Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and the Large Early Release Fre-
quency (LERF), directly linked to the core melting phenomenon, are neither rele-
vant nor useful for many advanced nuclear reactors. Some plants, in fact, may not 
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involve the core damage state that was defined for LWR and, even in the case, its 
meaning and risk framework can be fundamentally different from LWR (INL, 
2011). For example, the MSFR major characteristic is the liquid state of its core, 
playing at the same time the role of fuel and coolant; it is clear that the previously 
mentioned risk metrics and the core melting itself result inappropriate to this sys-
tem. As well, the fuel for the fusion machines is gaseous and the completely differ-
ent physics claim for completely different risk metrics, detached from the idea of 
solid fueled reactors.  
It is important to highlight that the traditional classification of PSA Level 1, 2 
and 3 starts from the concept of core melting and CDF and LERF; therefore, the 
update of the risk metrics involves a new modernized PSA concept. Consequently, 
PSA for advanced reactors may be structured differently than the traditional Level 
1, 2 and 3 model for LWR PSA: it is expected to include out of core sources of 
radioactive material (especially in the case of online refuel, as for the MSFR and 
GFR) and to adopt adequate and more general risk metrics (INL, 2011). The latter 
may lead to an appropriate definition of severe accident, disconnected from the core 
melting concept (see paragraph 2.2.3).  
The regulatory framework and the risk metrics, as its operative instrument, can 
be described in terms of technology (are the requirements generic or specific?), 
risk (how is it taken into consideration?), prescriptive or performance based. 
Nonetheless, the final purpose of the entire regulatory processes is always the same: 
the satisfaction of the fundamental safety objective (MIT, 2018).  
Technology 
The risk metrics can be specific for a certain nuclear technology or can be ap-
plied to any kind of technology.  
The advantage of technology-specific risk metrics is that it is developed for a 
specific system and perfectly suits it. It is simple to be used by operators/appli-
cants/regulator bodies along the licensing process. Therefore, it reduces the licens-
ing efforts, using the lessons learned from previous experiences and smoothing the 
process; moreover, it aids the verification of the consistent application of the rules, 
with less uncertainties (Walker & Mazuzan, 1992). The main disadvantage of this 
typology of requirements is the inertia opposed to innovation: a stiff regulatory 
framework may discourage the introduction of updated or novel reactor concepts, 
especially if they present major modifications with respect to traditional plants (e.g. 
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MSFR). The natural consequence is that the innovative concept will face important 
challenges to adapt to the regulatory framework.  
The main advantage of technology-neutral risk metrics, and, more generally, 
regulations apparatus, (MIT, 2018) is the facilitated arrangement of any innovative 
technology of new systems. As a drawback, the requirements often lack of specific 
indications to guarantee consistent, uniform and unique interpretation of rules 
(NRC, 2007). Consequently, the licensing process is slowed down.  
A mixed framework can be evaluated (NRC, 2007): the technology neutral re-
quirements/objectives can provide a guidance for developing and applying the nec-
essary technology specific criteria. In this way, the licensing process for all the 
technologies can be properly supported, giving value to the previous licensing ex-
periences and optimizing the process (MIT, 2018).        
The definition of technology neutral risk metrics particularly suits the genera-
tion IV systems for several reasons: the preliminary design of some of the systems, 
the lack of information about the reactor behavior during transients (especially 
about the major driving phenomena) and the wide range of different proposed tech-
nologies do not allow, at this moment, for technology specific risk metrics. The 
latter ones may be developed in a later stage of the technology evolution.  
The Risk  
The risk evaluation implies the answer to three questions: “What can go 
wrong?” (Scenario), “How likely is it?” (Probability + uncertainties) and “What are 
the consequences?” (Damage + uncertainties).  
In the regulatory framework, these aspects can be managed in three ways:  
• The deterministic approach; 
• The risk based approach;  
• The risk informed approach. 
The Deterministic approach focuses only on two of these questions: in fact, a 
set of design basis accidents (DBAs) is defined to answer the question “What can 
go wrong?”; then, the consequences of these events are deterministically evaluated 
in order to answer the question “What are the consequences?” and to include pro-
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visions to prevent or mitigate the consequences. This approach establishes require-
ments for engineering margins and components quality, without proper quantitative 
evaluations of probabilities. This is the traditional regulations structure, largely 
used in the past.  
The Risk Based approach focuses on the numerical results of the risk assess-
ment, based on the evaluation of the scenarios probabilities and the consequences 
using best estimate values. The uncertainties are evaluated but there are not con-
servative assumptions. It is worth highlighting that this approach has never been 
completely authorized by regulatory body, even if some specific applications are 
recognized, e.g. the dose limits. For example, during the application of the IEC 
61508 (see paragraph 3.3), both probabilistic requirements (component availabil-
ity/reliability) and architectonic criteria (prescriptive criteria such as redundancies) 
must be guaranteed for the correct classification of the SSCs (SIL assignment, for 
major details see paragraph 3.3). Especially in case of publically available data uti-
lization, the probabilistic assessment is not sufficient. An exception is the case when 
the analyst can demonstrate the quality of the used statistical data (e.g. classified 
internal data): in that case only probabilistic methods can be used for the assessment 
without any additional prescriptive requirements.   
The Risk-Informed approach represents a compromise between the purely de-
terministic approach and the risk-based approach: sometimes it reduces the exces-
sive and unjustified conservatism of the deterministic approach, other times it high-
lights the necessity of additional requirements or provisions. The safety require-
ments are based on deterministic requirements derived from a wider set of scenarios 
challenging the reactor. The sequences of interest are determined through a proba-
bilistic approach and are prioritized through their risk importance. Then, the uncer-
tainties are quantified and/or conservative hypotheses are made, coherently with the 
defence in depth concept (Vietti-Cook, 1999). This approach results the most suit-
able for innovative reactors whose design is still preliminary because it helps un-
derstanding the different scenarios’ risk contributors, identifying criticalities. More-
over, it can drive design evolution, additional safety analyses, definition of suitable 
safety criteria, especially thanks to the insights obtained from the PSA and proper 
management of the uncertainties.  
It is worth noting that the consequences of an accidental sequence are accepta-
ble according to the deterministic approach only if their severity is sufficiently low, 
no matter the frequency of the event. On the other hand, if the safety demonstration 
is based on probabilistic analyses (risk-based or risk-informed approach), a higher 
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severity of the accidental sequence can be acceptable, if the associated frequency is 
sufficiently low (the base philosophy of the risk matrices).  
Prescriptive or Performance Based requirements  
The prescriptive/proscriptive (or rule-based) technical requirements indicate 
what to do and what to avoid doing to satisfy a safety objective (how to satisfy a 
specific objective). Conversely, the performance-based requirements present an 
objective to be pursued (which objective must be pursed) and the operator/applicant 
can decide the systems, procedures, techniques, good practices to reach the goal 
(Kadamabi, 2002).  
The prescriptive/proscriptive requirements are simpler to be applied and reduce 
the uncertainties: in fact, the licensing criteria are clear for both applicants and reg-
ulators. Nonetheless, the attention is focused on the way to reach the objective ra-
ther than on the objective itself. This stiffness implies that innovations are disheart-
ened and all the efforts are concentrated on the implementation of the method while 
less energy is put on guaranteeing that the final objective is actually reached. 
The added value of the performance-based requirements is that all the efforts 
are focused on the fulfilment of the final goal. It is flexible and suitable to all the 
new technologies; it encourages innovation in safety, good practices and continuous 
enhancement and supports new technologies. On the contrary, it can result in un-
certainties, needs the engineering judgement for the verification of the objective 
achievement, is not univocal and may slow down the safety demonstration.  
Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) traditional design is very standardized (see para-
graph 2.2.6), in fact the 85% of the existing and operating reactors are LWRs, for 
the major part designed and built by Westinghouse and General Electric according 
to the American licensing structure (see paragraph 3.2). Consequently, their safety 
demonstration is tailored on the used technology, with prescriptive and proscriptive 
requirements, improving the efficiency and velocity of the entire safety assessment 
process. With the proliferation of a wide range of new technologies, the prescriptive 
approach loses its main advantage. On the other hand, the risk analysis nature is 
essentially performance-based and its primary objective is the safety demonstration 
of a specific (also unique) technology in a specific site, with specific procedures, 
management, etc. (see paragraph 6.3 on IEC 61508). In this sense, performance-
16 Errore. Per applicare Heading 1 al testo da visualizzare in questo punto, 
utilizzare la scheda Home. 
 
based requirements result the most adequate for new technologies, driving their de-
sign development and compensating the lack of information.     
A mixed approach results complicated to be realized: the nuclear safety present 
framework is rigid and the addition of external elements (e.g. goal-based require-
ments) is misrepresenting, difficult and always limited to small parts of the entire 
system. The IEC 61513 is an attempt to realize a mix framework (prescriptive and 
goal-based at the same time) for LWRs I&C architecture. The specific case is ana-
lyzed in paragraph 6.4.  
The update risk measures  
Since the inadequacy of the CDF and LERF to represent the non-LWR reactors, 
ASME/ANS PRA Standards (ASME/ANS, 2013) suggested the use of technology 
neutral risk measures, listed below.  
a) Frequencies of event sequences individually and grouped into accident 
families having the same or similar plant response and offsite radiolog-
ical consequences. Consequences generally are calculated in terms of 
offsite health effects (immediate or delayed) and/or site boundary doses. 
The accidents belong to the same family because their consequences are 
ranged in the same category or because the accident initiator, the plant re-
sponse and end state, and offsite radiological impact are similar.  
b) Integrated risks of a given consequence metric (e.g. site boundary dose, 
number of early or latent health effects, etc.). It can be obtained by summing 
risk (calculated as the product of the frequency and damage) of each events 
sequence over the full set of events sequences.  
c) Integrated risks of individual fatalities: it is an individual risk mapping to 
be calculated in the proper way to be easily comparable to the Quantitative 
Health Objectives (QHOs).  
d) Cumulative frequency of exceeding consequences (e.g. large release, 
early or latent health effects, specific site boundary dose). This criterion fol-
lows the logic of the FN curve for social risk: F is the cumulative frequency 
of events whose consequences affect at least N people (Bedford, 2004). In 
order to build this curve, for each accidental event, judged reasonably pos-
sible, the number of affected people (e.g. fatalities) must be evaluated. From 
this calculation it is possible to find the cumulative frequency of a generic 
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accident able to cause N fatalities. Finally, the obtained results must be com-
pared to the risk acceptability criteria.  
It is interesting to notice that criterion a) is similar to acceptability risk criteria 
reported in the Seveso legislation, in particular in the DM 9/5/01 (Ministero dei 
lavori pubblici, 2001), about the compatibility of territorial categories with the op-
eration of a plant involving major accident hazards. It is an accepted industrial prac-
tice (e.g. see reference (Canevaro & Cevrero, 2014)) to sum the frequencies of the 
sequences leading to a specific damage (e.g. high lethality, irreversible injuries, 
etc.) with a correspondent damage area and compare the obtained results with the 
compatibility criteria reported in the norm. Moreover, criterion d), and in particular 
the FN curve, is widely accepted in the industrial practice for the evaluation of the 
social risk (Carpignano & Tuninetti, 2004), and its use is suggested in the Italian 
transposition of the European offshore directive 2013/30/EU. 
In addition to these general criteria, reactor-specific parameters will be defined. 
It is important to define the parameters that describe better the behavior and the 
criticalities of each specific technology: if only general metrics are used, the possi-
bility to neglect important issues during the analysis is significant. For example, for 
the Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs), the frequency of the Sodium boiling rep-
resents a specific issue of the system to be evaluated.  
In the definition and in the calculation of the risk metrics, the multi-modules 
and multi-reactors plant must be properly modeled. In fact, the parameters associ-
ated both to a single module/reactor and to the entire plant must be evaluated. More-
over, possible common cause failures and dependencies must be assessed, for ex-
ample in case of shared systems or structures.  
The most common way to evaluate the acceptability of a certain analyzed sce-
nario is the frequency-consequence curve criterion (the Farmer curve, see fig. 2-1, 
proposed by INL in 2011). This is a plausible application of criterion a). The fre-
quency and consequence of the specific scenario (expressed as a certain measure, 
e.g. a specific site boundary dose) are calculated in the form of mean values and 
uncertainties percentiles (5th and 95th percentiles) and compared to the frequency-
consequence evaluation criteria. 
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Figure 2-1 Frequency-Consequence Evaluation Criteria (INL, 2017) 
According to the “Basis for the Safety Approach for Design & Assessment of 
Generation IV Nuclear Systems” (RSWG of the GIF, 2008), the rationalization of 
the advanced design should be pursued through the implementation of the ALARP 
(As Low As Reasonably Practicable) principle applicable to the full spectrum of 
design conditions. The ALARP region is defined by the UK Health and Safety Ex-
ecutive (HSE) as the tolerability zone between the acceptable and unacceptable risk 
regions. In order to define if a risk reduction measure is “reasonably practicable”, a 
comparison between the benefits of the analyzed measure, in terms of risk reduc-
tion, and its implementation cost (comparison between advantages and drawbacks) 
has to be carried on a quantitative or qualitative basis (UK HSE, 2001). This optimal 
risk reduction is translated in the implementation of innovative provisions looking 
for further risk reduction (prevention of the initiators and consequences mitigation) 
on a cost-benefit basis (RSWG of the GIF, 2008).  
It is worth to note that the curve represented in fig. 2-1 is not definitive, because 
the ALARP area is not represented. In a frequency-consequence graph, as the one 
represented in fig. 2-1, a range of values forms the ALARP zone, which in this case 
degenerates into a line. Because of the uncertainties due to the design still in devel-
opment, the predictability of the reactor behavior, the knowledge of the main phys-
ical phenomena and the safety demonstration itself, the ALARP criteria, together 
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with the defence in depth, should constitute a cornerstone for the definition of the 
acceptability criteria (Carpignano et al., 2018).    
Furthermore, the integrated risk evaluation of the entire plant is performed tak-
ing into account four evaluation criteria (INL, 2017):  
• The total frequency of exceeding a site boundary dose of 100 mrem shall 
not exceed 1/plant-year according to the annual exposure limits in 10 CFR 
20;  
• The total frequency of a site boundary dose exceeding 750 rem shall not 
exceed 10-6/plant-year according to NRC Safety Goal Policy Statement on 
limiting the frequency of a large release;  
• The average individual risk of early fatality within 1 mile of the Exclusion 
Area Boundary (EAB) shall not exceed 5×10-7/plant-year according to the 
NRC Safety Goal QHO for early fatality risk;  
• The average individual risk of latent cancer fatalities within 10 miles of the 
EAB shall not exceed 2×10-6/plant-year according to NRC safety goal 
QHO for latent cancer fatality risk.   
 
At the end of this section, it is important to remember that the traditional clas-
sification of PSA Level 1, 2 and 3 starts from the concept of CDF and LERF, there-
fore the update of the risk metrics implies a modernized PSA concept (Carpignano 
et al., 2018). 
2.2.3 Severe accident   
The term ‘severe accident’ or ‘core melt accident’ for a LWR refers to an ac-
cident where the reactor fuel is significantly degraded, even melt. After Fukushima 
accident, the severe accident is not related only to the reactor core, but also to other 
systems, e.g. the pools used for spent fuel storage. This expanded definition (for 
example including fuel storage facilities) suits well LWRs, but may become prob-
lematic when applied to other reactor concepts. For example in the MSFR, the core 
state is at the liquid state during normal operation, making the notion of fuel degra-
dation difficult to define. The concept of severe accident must therefore be ex-
panded.  
The definition given by the French institute for Radiological protection and Nu-
clear Safety (IRSN) in its review of generation IV nuclear energy systems (IRSN, 
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2014) may be of interest: “A severe accident in a nuclear reactor is an accident 
during which the nuclear fuel radioelement confinement function is significantly 
degraded, regardless whether the fuel is inside the reactor, being handled or in a 
storage area”. This is only a definition reported in the previously mentioned report 
and it is not considered a general reference definition. Moreover, the notion of “sig-
nificantly degraded” should be deepened with additional research activities (precise 
criteria). For example, for the EPR, a severe accident is considered to be initiated 
by a core outlet temperature in excess of 650°C or by a high dose rate measurement 
inside the containment. On PWR or SFR, the severe accident is also associated with 
loadings on the confinement. There is thus the notion of an accident potentially 
challenging the confinement. 
Correlated to the notion of the severe accidents there is the notion of “practical 
elimination”. It was introduced at the beginning of the 90’s during the definition 
of the general safety objectives for the future PWR to be built in France and Ger-
many. At the international level, in 1999, (IAEA, 1999) it was indicated: “[…] An-
other objective for these future plants is the practical elimination of accident se-
quences that could lead to large early radioactive releases, whereas severe acci-
dents that could imply late containment failure would be considered in the design 
process with realistic assumptions and best estimate analyses so that their conse-
quences would necessitate only protective measures limited in area and in time”. 
In this definition there is a clear distinction between severe accident scenarios 
which can lead to an early containment failure which have to be “practically elimi-
nated” and severe accidents leading to a late containment failure for which the im-
plementation of design provisions to limit their consequences is possible. The latest 
international texts state that “practical elimination” should be applied to situations 
likely to lead to early or large releases (WENRA, 2013; IAEA, 2016), thus widen-
ing the range of situations potentially concerned. As of today, the “practical elimi-
nation” concept is a subject of on-going discussions at an international level, where 
a consensus has not been reached.  
In the framework of this analysis, the severe accidents are considered as the 
situations potentially leading to large early radiological releases, e.g. situations 
where it seems impossible to define realistic and demonstrable measures to limit 
their consequences given the current knowledge and available techniques (e.g. fast 
and very energetic phenomena). This allows to identify and to pay a specific atten-
tion to the severe accident situations bearing the highest risk. 
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The decision to consider these situations or not in the design is very structuring 
for a new reactor concept. In fact, they have to be identified and analyzed from the 
initial design stages of a new reactor type. From a safety point of view, the practi-
cally eliminated accidents can lead to an early failure of the containment, therefore 
their occurrence must be prevented through sufficient protection measures. Since 
these sequences constitute a weak point of the system, for innovative concepts, the 
need for practical elimination by dedicated safety provisions should be strongly 
limited. 
2.2.4 The cumulative frequency  
While the traditional LWR risk assessment was developed following the “one-
reactor-at-a-time” approach, in next generation nuclear plants the risk associated to 
multi-unit sites becomes certainly relevant and, especially after the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident, even dominant (Fleming, 2017). Advanced non-LWRs are ex-
pected to be constituted by several modules, located in the same site: this increases 
the possibility of common cause failures/domino effects, due to the sharing of sys-
tems and structures among several modules or hazards involving more than one 
reactor (e.g. external hazards) or human actions. The multiple modules structure 
augments the probability of scenarios affecting only one module and creates poten-
tial scenarios involving more than one module, and consequently potential release 
sources from more than one reactor. Therefore, integrated risks for advanced non-
LWRs include event sequences involving two or more modules or radionuclides 
sources especially when the design includes a modular reactor concept. This influ-
ences the traditional frequency-consequence tolerability criteria (see paragraph 
2.2.2).  
One of the main challenges of new generation nuclear plants safety demonstra-
tion is a properly modelling of multi-units and multi-modules plants, quantifying 
all the radiological sources.  
2.2.5 The role of PSA  
A major difference between LWRs and next generation nuclear plants regula-
tory framework is the role played by risk assessment methodologies (e.g. PSA). For 
traditional installations, the safety analyses and the PSA are performed only after 
the definition of the detailed design and of the site and licensing process: in this 
case, if the tolerability criteria are not fulfilled, it could be necessary to modify also 
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the preliminary design. Therefore, the risk-informed applications are limited to ad-
ditional systems or provisions for installations already built (for example in US, 
plants can be built even if the licensing process is not completed, see paragraph 3.2) 
and maybe operated. On the other hand, for advanced systems, the risk assessment 
tools aim at supporting and driving the design evolution and at widening the domain 
of the risk-informed choices (Southern Company, 2017). The safety tools will be 
applied at various discrete points of the design process. Moreover, their early ap-
plication provides input for the development of reactor-specific design criteria and 
for the design of SSCs performing safety functions. As the design evolves and more 
details and data become available, the PSA purpose will expand as well in order to 
demonstrate the capability of the plant to meet the safety requirements. The analy-
sis’ scope is accomplished only when all the design information, the experimental 
data and tests are included and confirmed and a plant, site, design specific PSA is 
performed. The early introduction of the PSA pursues the objective to minimize the 
successive and expensive design updating.  
2.2.6 No pre-defined methodologies  
In the 1950s and 1960s, in US a huge number of nuclear systems were designed 
and built, due to the enormous government and population’s support to the nuclear 
energy. The regulatory authority, which during those years coincided with the body 
enhancing and developing nuclear energy, the AEC (Atomic Energy Commission), 
licensed one by one all the technologies, basing on few experimental data, very 
limited practical experience and engineering judgement. The safety demonstration 
was based on four strategies:  
• Remote siting: the reactor had to be located far away from populated areas;  
• Containment: the structures had to contain the consequences of accidents, 
especially accidental release;  
• Low reactor power: each reactor could represent a smaller source of radio-
active materials;   
• Engineering margins: the uncertainties were taken into account through ad-
ditional engineering margins during the design (Mazuzan & Walker, 1985). 
In 1971, the first general design criteria were formalized. In the meanwhile, the 
LWRs started their first commercialization. From this moment on, the general cri-
teria became more and more specific and optimized for the LWRs peculiar case, 
with the aim of reducing uncertainties and improving the licensing process. As a 
side effect, also the size of the reactor increased (MIT, 2018).  
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Similar processes occurred all around the world, except for Canada and United 
Kingdom, whose main technologies are Heavy Water Cooled Reactors (CANDU) 
and Carbon Dioxide Cooled Reactors; therefore, their regulatory frameworks were 
optimized for these technologies.    
Due to their standardization, the LWRs safety assessment, and consequently 
their safety architecture, are stiff and should be modernized and adapted to allow 
efficient safety assessment for new generations nuclear reactors. In fact, the use of 
models developed for LWRs may lead to neglect specific safety issues caused by 
the innovative design and technology of new generation installations. 
Additionally, the LWRs’ regulation framework is prescriptive (what to do) and 
proscriptive (what to avoid doing), since historically the safety process standards 
are rules-based. The variegate nature of the next generation nuclear facilities im-
poses safety process standards to be simple and based on stable, general principles. 
Risk informed and performance-based standards focus on the final objective of the 
safety assessment (what is necessary to achieve) and suits to new technologies (not 
only nuclear ones) better and more cost-effectively, by exploiting all the potential-
ities and the versatilities of the risk analysis. Certainly, gaps must be fulfilled in this 
updating process, as well as revisions of technical language and approach and a 
major flexibility.    
 
2.2.7 Licensing’s burden  
It is well known that one of the main difficulties of licensing is its cost and the 
associated time (Finan, 2016). Historically, licensing costs (i.e. the fees billed to 
NRC in US) “have been in the order of $100 million for a complete design certifi-
cation review and $25-$50 million for a site-specific combined operating license” 
(US NRC, 2015). Moreover, it is important to add the costs of eventual design work 
required for license application or to answer the questions of the regulatory body. 
Consequently, the licensing’s burden must be considered a criticality for the 
new advanced systems.  
The current licensing process (see paragraph 3.2) is not suitable for next gener-
ation plants. It must be tested for this new purpose in order to promptly identify 
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licensing criticalities, to trace a pathway and to train the operative staff. Several 
issues are highlighted:  
• The regulatory readiness for many typologies of different reactors;  
• How to assess the quality and completeness of the applications, when to 
require additional tests or analyses; 
• The cost, the duration, the uncertainties of the process (maybe a long and 
expensive process is carried on for a reactor that will never be built);  
• The training of the regulatory staff to appropriately review the applications 
and to solve technical questions during the process and appropriate manage-
ment, taking into account the unavoidable gap of knowledge;  
• The improvement of the efficiency of regulators/applicants interactions;  
• Etc.  
All the additional issues may increase the cost and the time consumption. 
The regulatory body should define a more rapid licensing process for prototype 
reactors, which nowadays have to provide several additional safety features with 
respect to traditional reactors. For example, several experimental tests and data to 
be provided can be agreed in advance in order to speed the process. Moreover, a 
phased licensing approach should be evaluated with a costs-benefits analysis.  
The renewed prototype licensing process must suit to all the reactor technolo-
gies.    
 
2.2.8 Considerations   
The regulatory agencies around the world agreed on IAEA basic principles (see 
paragraph 3.1) (IAEA, 2006). The implementation of these principles in the na-
tional regulations led to some differences, both philosophical and practical. From a 
philosophical point of view, the requirements can be technology specific (e.g. US) 
or technology neutral (e.g. Canada), deterministic (e.g. China, even if probabilistic 
evaluations may be required to support the results) or risk-based/informed (e.g. 
Canada), prescriptive (e.g. China) or performance-based (e.g. United Kingdom, 
Canada). From a practical point of view, there are also issues on the frequency of 
review of the licenses: 5 years in Canada, 10 years in France, 20 years in US (MIT, 
2018).  
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For new generation systems, it is highly recommended (MIT, 2018) “to stand-
ardize and ensure a high level of safety worldwide”. The environmental and socio-
political effects of the operation of nuclear systems should ensure certain basic 
standards, nevertheless national differences on safety framework and culture. Since 
the harmful effects of nuclear plants malfunctions cross the national boundaries and 
are experienced physically and psychologically all around the world, it is desirable 
an international agreement on the updating of nuclear safety regulations, in partic-
ular, on peculiar issues (e.g. the blackout protection systems) and shared methodol-
ogies for defining design criteria and for licensing evaluations.

 
 
  
3 Overview of safety assessment 
methodologies and standards  
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate a panorama on the prior activities, 
policies, standards, and requirements supporting the design and the licensing on 
nuclear reactors. The chapter starts from the IAEA safety standards (that inspire the 
national nuclear safety regulatory frameworks) and the NRC regulations (see para-
graph 3.1 and 3.2), which constitute the milestone of the traditional NPPs safety 
demonstration all around the world. Nuclear safety assessment results a rigid and 
prescriptive process, tailored on LWRs; several processes are on-going to update 
the current framework for the innovative systems, but the process is only at the 
beginning. In this sense, the functional safety, the key concept of the IEC 61508 
(developed for non-nuclear technical applications, see paragraph 3.3) could be in-
spiring and help the accomplishment of Generation IV requirements (see Chapter 
1). The IEC 61513 (see paragraph 6.4) is a first example of a very specific applica-
tion of the 61508 for nuclear purposes; nonetheless, it applies to a very small portion 
of the total domain, while the rest of the safety evaluation in not influenced by its 
presence. Finally, are presented two methodologies specifically developed for in-
novative concepts in the IAEA framework, the ISAM (Integrated Safety Assess-
ment Methodology, see paragraph 3.5) and the INPRO (International Project on 
Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, see paragraph 3.6). They are not ad-
aptations of already existing standards developed for other purposes, but are 
thought to help the innovative concepts design, while performing the safety demon-
stration of the analyzed systems. Their application is not always trivial; as well, the 
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interpretations of the included requirements is not always unique. Nonetheless, the 
ISAM has been chosen as the basis methodology for this work, after an adaptation 
process including some functional safety key concepts.    
 IAEA Safety Standards   
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) standards are considered the 
global reference for protecting people and environment from the harmful effects 
of radiations. They constitute an integrated comprehensive and consistent structure 
that provides the fundamental principles, requirements and recommendations to en-
sure high –level nuclear safety (IAEA, 2006). 
The purpose of the Safety Standards is clearly expressed in fundamental safety 
principle (IAEA, 2006), “The fundamental safety objective is to protect people and 
the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation”.  
The IAEA standards must be clear, logical, harmonised and based on a unified 
safety philosophy. They must ensure transparency, an efficient feedback mecha-
nism and user-friendliness, and always promote the safety culture. They are hierar-
chically organised, as shown in fig. 3-1.   
 
Figure 3-1 Hierarchical structure of IAEA safety standards 
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The fundamental safety principle is detailed in ten safety principles (IAEA, 
2006), that represent the basis to develop all the safety requirements and, therefore, 
to implement the safety measures in all nuclear facilities and activities, during the 
entire lifecycle (e.g. planning, siting, design, manufacturing, construction, commis-
sioning, operation, decommissioning, transport and management of radioactive 
waste).  
These safety principles express the basic concepts for the entire structure of the 
IAEA Safety Standards. They are listed below (IAEA, 2006).  
• Responsibility for safety: the first step is to understand who owns the re-
sponsibility to ensure the safety; the owner or the organizations responsible 
for the nuclear system must be clearly identified. All the activities must be 
licensed. 
• Role of government: the nuclear activities must rely on a properly estab-
lished system of regulatory bodies and regulations; 
• Leadership and management for safety: in each activity the safety leader-
ship and management must be clearly expressed, must be efficient and must 
always guarantee the respect and improvement of the safety culture, the con-
tinuous check of safety performance and the implementation of lessons 
learned from experience;  
• Justification of facilities and activities: it must be demonstrated that the ben-
efits of a nuclear installation are higher than the implied costs (in terms of 
radiological risk);  
• Optimization of protection: the safety provisions can be considered opti-
mized only if the facility can be safely operated without disproportionate 
limits;  
• Limitation of risks to individuals: nobody must be exposed to unacceptable 
radiological risk; the dose must continuously be measured, and the protec-
tion systems must be efficiently operated and optimized;  
• Protection of present and future generations: the risks connected to nuclear 
installations are not limited in space and time; in fact, the possible conse-
quences of an accident are not limited by the national borders and can bother 
the future generations; therefore, these aspects must be appropriately con-
sidered;    
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• Prevention of accidents: all practical safety measures must be implemented 
for accident prevention and mitigation. The defence in depth concept is the 
first protection against the accident escalation;  
• Emergency and preparedness and response: a response plan must always 
be ready in case of accident in order to mitigate any consequences for human 
life and health and the environment and avoid consequences escalation;  
• Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks: the risk 
of an excessive exposure to radiations is always possible; in these situations, 
protection actions must be foreseen to reduce immediately the dose and mit-
igate the consequences.  
These general principles give guidelines to be oriented among all the other 
IAEA documents.   
They are deeply analyzed and explained in a set of seven “General Safety Re-
quirements” reports, where different aspects and key points are examined; in par-
ticular, it is specified the “What” and “Who” for each requirement and “Why” each 
requirement exists.  
Each “General Safety Requirements” report is supported by a “General safety 
Guide” that aids in accomplishing its objectives, explaining the “How”.  
The general safety principles, general safety requirements and general safety 
guides are valid for all nuclear facilities: nuclear power plant, fuel cycle facilities, 
research reactors, radioactive waste disposal facilities, milling and mining, applica-
tion of radiation source, transport of radioactive materials.  
The “General Safety Requirements” and the “General Safety Guide” are de-
clined for each technical area into a certain number of “Specific Safety Require-
ments” and of “Specific Safety Guides” that provide all the guidance necessary for 
implementing the general principles.  
For example, in the specific case of a nuclear power plant, there is a whole set 
of specific safety requirements divided into different categories corresponding to 
different phases of the life cycle of the system (e.g. the site evaluation, the design, 
the commissioning and operation …). For each of these specific safety require-
ments, there are several specific safety guides. For example, about the requirements 
for the design of nuclear power plant, there are specific directives about the design 
of the core, the design of the containment system, the safety classification of struc-
tures, systems and components in nuclear power plants and so on.  
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While the ten safety principles are general enough to be applicable also to 
non-LWRs, all the other documents and standards are referred specifically to 
LWRs (Carpignano et al., 2018).  
An equivalent well-articulated system of standards for new generation nuclear 
systems does not exist yet. Nevertheless, some methodologies suitable for innova-
tive facilities and inspired by the general principles are available, such as the 
INPRO methodology (paragraph 3.5) and the ISAM methodology (paragraph 3.6). 
Moreover, for advanced reactors, IAEA provides ARIS (Advanced Reactors In-
formation System), a web-accessible database that collects balanced, comprehen-
sive and up-to-date information about advanced nuclear plant designs and con-
cepts. It constitutes a platform for the Member Stater to have access to information 
and development trends. (ARIS website) 
 NRC: US licensing 
Similarly, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations, and in par-
ticular the Part 50 and Part 52 of the Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 52) (USA NRC, 2017), establish Principal Design Criteria 
(PDC) derived from the General Design Criteria (GDC) that are specifically re-
ferred to LWRs (Appendix A of 10 CFR 50). In US, the licensing process can be 
performed into two ways:  
• A staged process: each phase of the system design, construction and oper-
ation must obtain a formal approval; this process is described in 10 CFR 50. 
The applicants can submit a preliminary safety report to obtain the construc-
tion permit; then, they can start building the plant without the guarantee that 
the reactor will be actually licensed to operate. The final documents will be 
submitted when the reactor is almost ready. This method has been used to 
license all the commercial reactors in the US prior to 2012 (MIT, 2018). 
• A one-step process: all the life phases of the systems obtain a single ap-
proval; this process is described in 10 CFR 52. The entire documentation 
must be furnished to the regulatory body before beginning of the construc-
tion. This method has been used to license 11 reactors in US, two of these 
(AP1000) are under construction (MIT, 2018). 
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The one-step approach is particularly suitable for systems with high design and 
operational maturity. In fact, it requires furnishing all the information years before 
the start of the construction; even if it is highly probable that modifications will be 
made during the entire process that will claim for updated of the licensing proce-
dure, for very standardized systems, it is extremely probable that at the end the 
reactor will be actually operated. Nevertheless, a final verification will be neces-
sary, with the possibility of unexpected criticalities. Moreover, a staged approach 
is currently used in many engineering fields (non-nuclear), e.g. the Seveso III, the 
EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment), the European offshore directive, etc.  
The interest in advanced reactors poses the problem of their licensing. Since the 
last US commercial non-LWR was shut down in 1989 (Fort St. Vrain, a HTGR), 
the update of these processes is challenging (Carpignano et al., 2018). This is due 
to lack of specificity in the technology, lack of maturity of design and the unavoid-
able technical skills gap (Lee, 2016).  
Different approaches have been proposed and they demonstrate that the licens-
ing process can be defined using the existing tools and strategies and can be adapted 
to different and innovative technologies. Up to now, a staged process with smaller 
and frequent approvals seems to guarantee flexibility, transparency and continuous 
feedbacks between the applicants and the regulatory body, even on smaller portions 
of the design. Nonetheless, the formal approval cannot be given until all the 
“pieces” are evaluated together (even if each part has already been approved singu-
larly, the entire project has to be approved too). As a drawback, the process can 
slow down, because the different phases of the process have to proceed in series. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that, up to now, the formal approval of each piece 
requires the fulfilment of prescriptive requirements, while the risk-informed and 
performance-based approach, which seems the most adequate to treat the innova-
tive system, does not appear in the 10 CFR 52. The key point is the efficient com-
munication between the applicants and the regulatory body (MIT, 2018). 
For innovative systems, a staged licensing approach seems to be more conven-
ient; nonetheless, an update is needed: a set of non-LWRs design criteria must be 
defined. In particular, to ensure flexibility to the design process, they should be 
technological-neutral, risk-informed and performance-based (see paragraph 2.2.2). 
The definition of technology-specific design criteria could be a part of the pre-li-
censing process.   
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Several studies about possible licensing pathways are on-going, such as the 
DOE Advanced Reactor Option Study (Petti et al., 2017) about commercial reac-
tors, commercial prototypes reactors, test reactors and research reactor. Nonethe-
less, a new regulatory framework for advanced systems (a formal “Part 53” of Title 
10) is foreseen and will need several years to be available. 
 IEC EN 61508 
Nowadays a widely accepted approach in the process industry is the one de-
scribed in the standard IEC EN 61508 (IEC 61508, 2015) and in the principles of 
functional safety there defined. Its major idea is that the safety of systems must be 
studied and pursued from the early design by risk analysis tools and must be ad-
dressed considering the entire system life cycle (design, integration, operation, 
maintenance, modification and decommissioning), guaranteeing a mix of prescrip-
tive and performance-based requirements. It is worth highlighting the tight link 
between the design evolution and the safety demonstration, which proceed to-
gether. Even if it is not mandatory, its application is highly recommended in several 
local, national and international regulations.  
The 61508 is a generic standard common to several industries: other specific 
standards have been developed for other industrial fields and for specific applica-
tions, e.g. 61511 refers to process industry, while 61513 (described in the next par-
agraph 3.4) applies to nuclear industry. The specific standards (e.g. 61511 and 
61513) complete the general standard 61508; this means that each specific applica-
tion of the functional safety approach foresees the implementation of the 61508 and 
the correspondent specific standard at the same time.  
The first step of the procedure is to list all the Equipment Under Control (EUC), 
successively a preliminary risk assessment is performed in order to identify all their 
potential hazards. Then, the IEC 61508 is centred on the definition of the Safety 
Instrumented Functions (SIFs) and Safety Integrity Levels (SILs).  
The Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) must be fulfilled in order to obtain 
acceptable risk. The risk reduction can be obtained through additional safety-related 
systems (SISs, Safety Instrumented Systems, both hardware and software), addi-
tional risk reduction facilities (e.g. redundancy and separation) and additional safety 
requirements, technical and operational. 
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The Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) are parameters indicating the class of prob-
ability that must characterise a system so it can properly perform a specific SIF 
within a predefined period of time and respecting defined technical, functional, ar-
chitectural and design parameters (IEC 61508, 2015). 
The standard suggests several possible techniques to support the SIL allocation, 
mainly: 
• Quantitative approach by detailed QRA; 
• Semi-quantitative approach by Safety Layer Matrix Method; 
• Qualitative approach by Calibrated Risk Graphs; 
• Qualitative approach by Risk Graph; 
• Semi-quantitative approach by Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA). 
Following the previous steps, a set of Safety Requirement Specifications (SRSs) 
must be established for each identified SIF and for the related SISs that will imple-
ment it. The SRSs shall provide a basis for design, and the document shall be further 
developed and maintained through all lifecycle phases of the SIS. The SRSs may 
be quantitative requirements (SILs), functional (e.g. response time, draining tank 
capacity, etc.), architectural (e.g. redundancy, separation, etc.), operational, proce-
dural, etc. For example, if for a specific SIF a certain SIL has been allocated and 
must be guaranteed, it is necessary a low failure probability of the implemented 
SISs. This implies to operatively define specific procedures or components charac-
teristics, such as a low test interval for components characterized by undetectable 
failures and adequate maintenance procedures (sufficient resources, immediately 
available spare parts, etc.) for components characterized by detectable failures, in 
order to ensure a Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) as low as reasonably possible.   
To summarize, the IEC 61508 is based on the definition of risk acceptability 
criteria, which can regard population health, environment, asset and production, 
reputations, etc. To fulfil the requirements, it is foreseen to identify a set of SIFs 
and the corresponding SISs satisfying them. Finally, the SILs are allocated to make 
the risk tolerable. This approach integrates the risk analysis since the early phases 
of the design, and the safety demonstration accompanies the entire project evolu-
tion, conditioning also its operational life and the maintenance procedures. This 
standard enhances a good distribution of the safety investments, endorsing actions 
on the major risk contributors and both hardware and software SISs are evaluated 
and implemented.  
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A schematic representation of the risk reduction activities is shown in fig. 3-2.  
 
 
Figure 3-2 Framework for risk reduction (IEC 61508, 2005) 
 
Functional safety assessment in the context of IEC EN 61508 constitutes a 
milestone for safety to drive the design (IEC EN 61508, 2005). Moreover, the stand-
ard introduces the concept of management of Functional Safety, i.e. all activities 
needed to guarantee that the functional safety requirements are met and that safety 
integrity requirements are identified, designed and maintained during the entire 
lifecycle of the system: recalling the previous example about the SIL to be properly 
guaranteed, during the design phase the level is established to fulfil the identified 
tolerability requirements, then adequate components and procedures must be prac-
tically defined and applied to ensure the SIL, finally during the entire operational 
life of the plant the SIL must be kept at least the same as it was at the beginning 
(e.g. monitoring the components aging, respecting the maintenance procedures, 
etc.).  
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The objective of this approach is to coherently link project, operation and 
maintenance choices, strategies and procedure to keep the risk level acceptable; in 
this sense, the final control of the satisfaction of the tolerability criteria will not 
highlight major criticalities in the detailed design that will not be modified substan-
tially: all the major issues should have been solved already in the previous phases, 
with saving of time and money. 
The following fig. 3-3 shows a schematic application of this standard.  
 
Figure 3-3 Schematic application of the IEC 61508  
 
 IEC EN 61513  
The IEC EN 61513 (IEC EN 61513, 2013) standard aims at transposing the 
general requirements of 61508-1, 61508-2 and 61508-4 to nuclear application sec-
tor.  
It focuses on Instrumentation and Control (I&C) important to safety in Nuclear 
Power Plants (NPP). It provides requirements and recommendations for the overall 
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I&C architecture (hard-wired equipment, computer-based equipment or a combina-
tion of the two) (IEC EN 61513, 2013). As the IEC EN 61508, it refers to the con-
cept of a safety lifecycle for both the whole architecture and the individual systems, 
highlighting the relations between the safety objectives of the NPP and the require-
ments for I&C architecture (Carpignano et al., 2018).  
This standard does not specifically discuss the plant safety assessment nor iden-
tify the means of guaranteeing the adequacy of the performance and reliability re-
quirements arising from the analysis (e.g. SILs allocation). In fact, according to the 
nuclear sector practice, the plant safety assessment has to be performed according 
to specific stiff and prescriptive regulations (e.g. IAEA standards and their opera-
tive translation in national regulations or NRC regulations) that are outside the 
scope of this standard. The safety assessment process defines the initiator events, 
their sequences, the DiD concept of the plant and the categorisation of functions 
required to provide the defence. On the other hand, this standard identifies the input 
information necessary so that I&C designer may guide the subsequent design of 
I&C systems and its safety assessment. 
The application of this standard is an iterative process (see fig. 3-4) constituted 
by major steps (inspired by the 61508 philosophy):  
• Definition of the NPP safety goals, coming from IAEA standards; 
• Definition of comprehensive requirements for the overall I&C architecture; 
• Definition of comprehensive requirements for the individual I&C systems; 
• Definition of requirements for integration, commissioning, operation and 
maintenance. 
 
Figure 3-4 Schematic application of the IEC EN 61513 
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Even if the 61513 standard starts from the previous IEC EN 61508, the former 
substantially differs from the latter because it follows international standards (IAEA 
standard in Europe) and refers to systems important to safety as they are defined for 
nuclear power plants. The need to maintain the stiff traditional safety approach for 
nuclear applications makes the 61513 misrepresenting the nature of the 61508; in-
stead, it represents an intermediate step included into a rigid process that was de-
veloped for and it is still suitable to LWRs, but difficult to apply to concepts of the 
next generation.   
Figure 3-5 shows where the 61513 is located along the safety demonstration of 
traditional reactors in a simplified representation of this stiff process.  
 
 
Figure 3-5 Schematic representation of the risk assessment process of a traditional NPP 
(Carpignano et al., 2018) 
 
It is worth noting that the 61513 itself is not valid only for traditional reactors 
and there are not specific elements preventing its application to innovative systems. 
Nevertheless, the standard here described is a small part built a posteriori to adapt 
to a long, complex and rigid process, optimized for traditional reactors.  
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In conclusion, the philosophy of the 61508 (described in the previous paragraph 
3.3) and its practical application described in 61513 can inspire the safety assess-
ment of advanced nuclear plants, but outside the strict framework defined for 
LWRs.  
 INPRO methodology  
The following review of the INPRO (International Project on Innovative Nu-
clear Reactors and Fuel Cycles) method is largely inspired by deliverable 3.5 of the 
SARGEN_IV project (SARGEN-IV, 2012). The INPRO was born in 2000 in IAEA 
context with the aim of promoting communications between international experts 
and regulators to build new sustainable energy capacity in a long-term horizon.  
Among the other applications, INPRO developed a “Guidance for the Applica-
tion of an Assessment Methodology for Innovative Nuclear Energy Systems”, al-
ways inspired by the IAEA general principles but at the same time aiming at imple-
menting the concept of a safety driven design.  
This approach aims at providing a tool to analyze an innovative system in order 
to: 
• Assess if the new nuclear installation is compatible with the sustainable de-
velopment of energy production;  
• Compare different systems to tailor the solution to the needs of a specific 
region or a State;  
• Identify potential improvements. 
 
During the comparison phase, it is essential to consider the uncertainties, con-
sidering the design detail.  
The INPRO assessment (IAEA, 2008) is a stepwise approach with a hierarchic 
structure (see fig. 3-6):  
• Basic Principles (BP); 
• User Requirements (UR); 
• Criteria (CR).  
The criteria must be fulfilled by an Innovative Nuclear System (INS) to prove 
its sustainability. 
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Figure 3-6 INPRO methodology hierarchical structure (IAEA, 2008)  
The highest level in the INPRO structure is constituted by the Basic Principles 
(BPs); it is a statement of a general goal for the INS, hence it is a strong guidance 
for its design evolution. The INPRO BPs apply to 8 competence areas: economics, 
infrastructure, waste management, proliferation resistance, physical protection, en-
vironment, and safety. For the safety, they are directly derived from the IAEA 
Safety Standards. To demonstrate the sustainability of an innovative systems, all 
the BPs must be completely satisfied in all the areas considered by INPRO.  
The second level in the INPRO hierarchy is constituted by the User Require-
ments (URs). They must be satisfied to achieve users’ acceptance of a given INS. 
The users are all the stakeholders (i.e. the designers, the investors, the public, inter-
national organizations). URs represent the instrument to realize the BPs.  
Finally, the Criteria (CR) are indicators to understand if and how well an UR is 
fulfilled by an INS. They can be single parameters, aggregate variables or a status 
statements. Each criterion consists of an indicator and an acceptance limit (IN and 
AL).  
In fig. 3-6, the pathways of derivation and fulfilment of the hierarchy are shown. 
On one hand, the hierarchy derivation is a top-down process, starting from the gen-
eral statements (Basic Principles) to arrive to the operational and technology-spe-
cific criteria. On the other, the hierarchy fulfilment is bottom up process: to fulfill 
a criterion the IN must compliant with the correspondent AL; to fulfill an UR all 
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the derived CRs must be satisfied; to fulfill a BP all the corresponding URs must 
be fulfilled. The satisfaction of all the BPs proves the sustainability of an INS.  
Since this methodology has been developed for new generation nuclear systems 
and some of them are at a very preliminary design stage, during the application 
some data are missing or are very general. For ALs definition, the ALARP concept 
is accepted to correctly manage these uncertainties. As shown in fig. 3-7, for each 
Criterion two ALs must be defined: the Basic Limit and the Basic Objective; then, 
the IN and its uncertainty must be compared with these two limits. The Basic Limit 
is the minimum value that the IN must assume to abandon the unacceptable risk 
zone; the Basic Objective is the minimum value the IN must assume to enter in the 
acceptable risk zone. Between the Basic Limit and the Basic Objective there is the 
ALARP zone. If the IN is in the ALARP zone, the risk should be reduced through 
appropriate measures (e.g. protection systems, preventive measures, further anal-
yses to reduce the uncertainty, etc.) until the cost will become strongly dispropor-
tional with respect to the gained advantage.  
 
Figure 3-7 Three zones of risk: acceptable risk, ALARP zone, unacceptable risk (IAEA, 
2008) 
The described process is iterative, with alternative top-down (derivation of hi-
erarchy) and bottom-up approaches (Fulfilment of hierarchy). In fact, if after the 
application of the methodology the analyzed INS results unsustainable or as non-
compatible with the set standards, it can be archived, or the design will be improved 
through new R&D activities. In the last case, when the new design will be available, 
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the INPRO methodology will be applied again, after checking that the technology-
specific criteria are compatible with the design modifications.  
As said before, during the implementation of the methodology and in particular 
during the comparative phase, the uncertainties must be evaluated, especially the 
design state (if it is pre-conceptual or fully developed). In fact, in the case that an 
INS does not satisfy an IN, but it abundantly satisfies the others, it can be preferred 
to other INSs anyway, for several reasons, for example some indicators may be 
judged more important than others, the design may be at a previous phase, etc.    
One of the major outputs from an INS assessment is the major risk contributors, 
i.e. the areas where a given INS needs to be improved. 
 
 ISAM methodology  
The ISAM developed in the 2011 GIF report (RSWG of GIF, 2011) is meant to 
provide “valuable insights into the nature of safety and risk of Gen IV systems” 
contributing to the realisation of Gen IV safety objectives (see chapter 1). 
The word “Integrated”, present in the ISAM acronym, can be explained through 
two complementary meanings (RSWG of GIF, 2014):  
1) The safety demonstration of an INS is supposed to support and evolve with 
the design during its entire lifecycle; the objective is that safety should rep-
resent an “integrated part” of the project since its earliest stages, rather than 
be added only after the definition of the detailed design. This methodology 
will try to give a safety-related perspective, shaping the design development 
and reducing costs and time.  
2) The ISAM is composed by five tools that complement and support one an-
other with mutual interactions in order to achieve a more comprehensive 
understanding of the safety issues and a safety assessment of the INS as 
robust and complete as possible.  
The five complementary analytical tools are listed below: 
• Qualitative Safety features Review (QSR); 
• Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT);                  
• Objective Provision Tree (OPT); 
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• Deterministic and Phenomenological Analyses (DPA); 
• Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA). 
According to the GIF, these tools guarantee enough flexibility “to allow a 
graded approach to the analysis of technical issues of varying complexity and im-
portance” (RSWG of GIF, 2011). In addition, the methodology can be applied at 
any stage of design. 
Figure 3-8 presents how these tools are interconnected among them and with 
respect to the relevant stages of design evolution. 
 
Figure 3-8 Proposed ISAM task flow (RSWG of GIF, 2011) 
3.6.1 The QSR (Qualitative Safety features Review) 
The main objective of QSR is to furnish to the designer a checklist of “good 
practices and recommendations” in order to help identifying the assets and vulner-
abilities of a design, as early as possible (RSWG of GIF, 2011). 
The checklist should be as complete as possible and based on the existing stand-
ards and practices. The GIF report gives the examples of recommendations formu-
lated by the Risk and Safety Working Group (RSWG) as well as other reference 
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documents (e.g., the IAEA standards, the INSAG, INPRO guidelines) (RSWG of 
GIF, 2011). The elements of the checklist are collected and organised in 4 classes: 
generic and technology neutral (class 1), detailed and technology neutral (class 2), 
detailed and technology neutral for a specific safety function (class 3); detailed and 
technology specific (class 4). In each class all the levels of defence in depth are 
explored. The ISAM provides tables for the first 3 classes, and for all 5 levels of 
defence in depth.  
A designer willing to use the QSR tool as presented in the ISAM should browse 
all these tables and check whether the characteristics of his design have a favoura-
ble, neutral or unfavourable influence on each element of the list. 
For example, the methodology has been partially applied to a pool-type SFR 
(Stratified REDAN). For the prevention level of the DiD, class 3, with respect to 
the Decay Heat Removal (DHR) safety functions, the first level of the table is “Pre-
vention of abnormal operations and failure”. This first level requirement is specified 
more and more up to arrive to the specific criteria to be checked. Among many 
others, a specific element is to “Minimize the number of components per system”: 
the stratified REDAN results “Unfavourable” with respect to this element, since it 
foresees a significant number of electromagnetic pumps (Typical element for the 
primary circuit of liquid metals cooled reactor). On the other hand, with respect to 
the element “Simplify the thermo-hydraulic for the safety of DHR” the analysed 
system is judged “favourable”, since the geometry and the disposition of the ele-
ments of the hydraulic loop help establishing and maintaining the natural convec-
tion and are significantly simplified (RSWG of GIF, 2014).   
Through this qualitative approach the designer should be helped in identifying 
the characteristics to be implemented, and in prioritizing the ones requesting more 
R&D efforts to reduce their drawbacks (RSWG of GIF, 2011).  
3.6.2 The PIRT (Phenomena Identification Ranking Table) 
The main objective of PIRT is the identification of all plausible phenomena 
affecting the outcome of an accident and the consequent generation of ranking ta-
bles identifying correspondent contributions to risk and gaps in the knowledge to 
be fulfilled by R&D work (RSWG of GIF, 2011). 
It is largely based on expert and engineering judgement. Once the phenomena 
are identified, they are ranked basing on their relative importance with respect to 
Errore. Per applicare Heading 1 al testo da visualizzare in questo 
punto, utilizzare la scheda Home. Errore. Per applicare Heading 1 al 
testo da visualizzare in questo punto, utilizzare la scheda Home. 
45 
 
the accidental scenarios and the associated state of knowledge. This step is the most 
delicate.   
In order to determine the importance of each phenomenon, a Figure-of-Merit 
(FOM) is established. It represents the evaluation criterion to judge the relative im-
portance of each phenomenon. Thus, phenomena are ranked according to their ef-
fect on the FOM (usual scale: high, medium, low or insignificant). The second part 
of the ranking process concerns the level of knowledge available for the phenom-
ena. The adequacy of the available knowledge and the correspondent uncertainties 
have to be assessed and documented. Then, an expert judgment is made to rank the 
phenomena (fully known/small uncertainty, known/moderate uncertainty, partially 
known/large uncertainty, very limited knowledge/uncertainty cannot be character-
ized) (RSWG of GIF, 2011). For example, for the stratified REDAN, with respect 
to the scenarios of the primary pumps run down, one of the chosen FOM is the 
“Transient thermal loadings on the core structure”. In this scenario, one of the ana-
lyzed phenomenon is the transient thermo-hydraulic response of the core region, 
referring to the natural convection; the importance of this phenomenon is ranked 
“High” because the establishment of the natural convection helps the minimization 
of the thermal loadings on the core structure (FOM). The status of knowledge is 
ranked “Known”, according to the relative state of the art (RSWG of GIF, 2014). 
The PIRT exercise generates ranking tables (see fig. 3-9). 
 
 
Figure 3-9 PIRT, gaps identification (RSWG of GIF, 2011) 
The PIRT is useful during the pre-conceptual design phase as an early “screen” 
to identify, categorize, and characterize phenomena that are potentially safety-rele-
vant. Successively, it is applied iteratively throughout the development process.   
The list of design open points identified for the MSFR and reported in “Appen-
dix A” constitutes a good input for the implementation of this tool.  
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3.6.3 The OPT (Objective Provisions Tree) 
The objective of the OPT is to help sketching the design safety architecture 
identifying all provisions necessary to guarantee the safety functions, after the iden-
tification of all the potential hazards posed by the plant (RSWG of GIF, 2011).  
It is constituted by two consequent phases. The aim of the first phase is the 
identification of all the potential hazards of the plant as exhaustively as possible 
(for this purpose they are called “challenges/mechanisms”). The aim of the second 
phase is the identification of all the safety provisions (both preventive and mitiga-
tive) useful to preliminary design safety architecture based on the identified haz-
ards. Hence, this step allows the definition of essential measures to ensure success-
ful prevention, control or mitigation of phenomena that could potentially harm the 
nuclear system (RSWG of GIF, 2011). 
According to the ISAM methodology, the OPT exercise should be done for each 
safety function at each level of defence in depth (DiD). This represents one of the 
key characteristics of the OPT. A graphical presentation of the OPT results is pro-
posed and consists in a tree-shaped hierarchical structure where events are con-
nected through the Boolean logic operators (as shown in fig. 3-10). From the top to 
the bottom, it includes:  
• The considered level of DiD (generally from 1 to 5); 
• The objectives to be achieved and the barriers to be protected for this level; 
• The safety functions to maintain or to perform successfully (usually control 
of reactivity, heat removal and fuel confinement); 
• The possible challenges (i.e. hazards) to the safety functions; 
• The plausible mechanisms that can cause these challenges;  
• The provision/provisions to implement in order to prevent, control or miti-
gate the consequences of the challenges/mechanisms (RSWG of GIF, 2011).  
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Figure 3-10 – Hierarchy Structure of OPT (RSWG of GIF, 2011) 
As the PIRT, the OPT should be applied early in the pre-conceptual design 
phase, and iteratively through conceptual design. 
 
3.6.4 The DPA (Deterministic and Phenomenological Analyses) 
They help analyzing and quantifying the aspects/phenomena/transients im-
portant for the design development; hence, they are essential for the system safety 
demonstration. Through DPA, physical transients of accident scenarios are mod-
eled and calculated; the appropriateness of selected provisions is assessed; the re-
quirements and criteria for SSCs are defined (also necessary for PSA); sensitivity 
analyses are performed with the aim of establishing safety margins and reducing 
imprecision and uncertainties in current parameters at the design stage (RSWG of 
GIF, 2011).  
The deterministic and phenomenological analyses include neutronic analyses, 
thermal-hydraulic analyses, thermo-mechanical calculations, reactor physics anal-
48 Errore. Per applicare Heading 1 al testo da visualizzare in questo punto, 
utilizzare la scheda Home. 
 
yses, materials behavior models, structural analysis models and accident simula-
tions. The DPA simulation codes and analytical models must be verified and vali-
dated (RSWG of GIF, 2011).  
3.6.5 The PSA  
The PSA is the final objective of the ISAM and the entire methodology is struc-
tured to facilitate its implementation; it shares interfaces with each of the other tools 
that are developed in the view of its final achievement.  Consequently, PSA is not 
integrated in the ISAM as an alternative to DPA, but rather as a containment where 
deterministic analyses are one kind information, together with all other outputs 
coming from the other tools. The major objective is to check the achievement of 
safety objectives, as required by ISAM (RSWG of GIF, 2011). It is worth noting 
that the ISAM general framework is not deterministic, neither risk-based (see par-
agraph 2.2.2), but it uses elements from both the approaches in a more comprehen-
sive risk-informed point of view.  
PSA is a rigorous, systematic and comprehensive tool with the aim of identify-
ing the events (or sequences of events) that can cause the loss or the damage of 
complex engineered systems and to estimate their frequencies. Furthermore, it stud-
ies the potential interactions between identified hazards (in terms of technological 
failures) and the reliability/availability of safety provisions.  
It provides a structured means of answering three basic risk analysis questions:  
• What can go wrong? 
• How likely can it go wrong?  
• What are the consequences if it does go wrong?  
PSA is historically considered meaningful if applied to a design that has reached 
a sufficient level of maturity and detail, often after the plant is actually licensed and 
operating (see paragraph 2.2.2). Nowadays the concept of a “living PSA” is becom-
ing more and more accepted: since the earliest stages of the design process, the PSA 
is considered a decision tool, whose outputs can drive the design by taking into 
account the highlighted safety vulnerabilities and their potential for risk reduction. 
Regulators widely recognize the value of this technique (also along the licensing 
process); therefore, it is a powerful tool for communication and information sharing 
among different national nuclear regulators. Finally, during the plant operation, 
PSA is used in many ways to improve plant safety, manage plant operations and 
facilitate interactions with regulation bodies.      
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As seen in paragraph 2.2.5, the traditional role and structure of the PSA must 
be reviewed and updated to suit specifically to Gen IV systems.  
3.6.6 Additional remarks on ISAM 
In conclusion, the ISAM (RSWG of GIF, 2011) is meant to combine both prob-
abilistic and deterministic tools, both quantitative and qualitative methods and eval-
uations, some focusing on high-level issues, others on more detailed issues. It aims 
at providing a robust guidance, based on a good understanding of risk and safety 
issues, contributing to the achievement of Generation IV safety objectives. 
A big advantage of this methodology is the constant reference to the defence in 
depth. Unfortunately, the direct implementation of some of the tools of the ISAM 
results difficult to be applied to some innovate concepts, given the preliminary stage 
of their safety demonstration and design. The DiD levels, as well as the entire meth-
odology, depend on the definition of the severe accident (see paragraph 2.2.3), risk 
metrics (see paragraph 2.2.2) and physical barriers (see Appendix B) that represent 
still an argument of discussion for many concepts (e.g. MSFR). To overcome these 
difficulties, it has been chosen to rather use the ISAM as a guideline to formalize 
the objectives to be achieved, with a critical analysis for each of its tools in the view 
of its utilisation for the conceptual systems (see Chapter 4).  
 
 Considerations  
In this chapter, a panoramic view over some standards and methodologies of 
interest for the following analyses is presented.  
At the beginning of the chapter, a brief summary of the fundamental safety prin-
ciples and the structure of the IAEA standards and NRC licensing pathways is il-
lustrated, highlighting what is applicable to all kinds of reactors and what is specif-
ically derived for LWRs. It is worth highlighting that the major part of the practices 
has been defined for LWRs, as it is properly explained in paragraph 2.2.6. The 
safety demonstration of traditional NPPs is performed according to specific stiff 
and prescriptive regulations, which means IAEA standards and their operative 
translation in national regulations or NRC regulations. The regulation is generally 
prescriptive/proscriptive, in order to be efficiently applied to already well-known 
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technologies. On the contrary, their direct application to innovative systems results 
complex and needs a modernization process. This process has already started but it 
is still long, since it regards some of the most sensible concepts of nuclear safety 
(the risk metrics, the severe accident definition, the role of the probabilistic assess-
ment, etc.): several studies all around the world critically analyze the possibility of 
an adaptation of the current regulatory framework for new generation reactors, or 
delineate the necessity of new standards and methodologies specifically developed 
for the innovative technologies, such as the Part 53 for NRC regulations. Some help 
can arrive from non-nuclear sectors, in particular from the standard IEC 61508, 
which systematically introduces the concept of functional safety and its manage-
ment. The standard contains a mix of prescriptive and performance-based require-
ments that aim at helping the design evolution, implementing the safety assessment 
from the beginning of the life of the project. Since the standard has been widely 
accepted in the non-nuclear engineering applications for years, an important expe-
rience is already available. A preliminary declination of the 61508 for nuclear ap-
plications is constituted by the standard IEC 61513. It applies to the I&C architec-
ture of traditional NPPs. The standard does not contain explicit reference to LWRs, 
but it represents a small performance–based contribution in a well-developed, rigid 
and prescriptive process, tailored for traditional plants, misrepresenting the 61508 
philosophy.  
For advanced concepts, in the IAEA framework, two methodologies have been 
developed: the ISAM and the INPRO. They are performance-based, technology 
neutrals and risk informed; nevertheless, their application, especially for the ISAM, 
is not always trivial and the interpretation is not unique. They represent guidelines 
that must be reviewed, completed and adapted, if necessary, also using traditional 
risk analysis tools. They define an inspiring philosophy but do not constitute an 
operational framework; in fact, tailored criteria, requirements and consolidated op-
erational safety assessment procedures have to be defined for new generation in-
stallations in order to guarantee a more efficient implementation of the methodol-
ogy and a unique interpretation of its requirements (Carpignano et al., 2018). For 
example, the ISAM conserves some LWR-specific concept, as Level 1-2- 3 PSA, 
that are difficult to apply to some of the innovative nuclear installations, as already 
explained in paragraph 2.2.5. Moreover, the role of a high-level simplified PSA in 
driving the conceptual design development is not explicitly identified and ex-
plained. Regarding the risk metrics, even if in the ISAM technology-inclusive risk 
metrics are considered necessary, the ISAM tries to adapt the core damage fre-
quency (CDF) to make it applicable to all kinds of nuclear installations, which is 
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tricky for some INS, especially MSFR and fusion devices (see paragraph 2.2.2). 
The CDF acceptance criterion has been established particularly for large LWRs and 
it cannot be transposed to different nuclear installations, even if a core damage sta-
tus can be “easily” defined. A more practical example is given by the implementa-
tion of the OPT tool: in the methodology it is said that the mechanisms challenging 
the safety functions have to be identified, but it is not explicit how to achieve this 
objective, the level of detail, how to define the safety provisions (objective of the 
second phase of the OPT) starting from the result of the first phase of the OPT.  
Both the ISAM and the INPRO are high-level methodology, with all the ad-
vantages and all the disadvantages of their performance-based nature. Notwith-
standing these issues, the ISAM is the chosen methodology for this work because 
it represents a robust guidance for the identification of risks and safety relevant 
aspects, considering the Generation-IV safety requirements, the international safety 
standards, the available return of experience and the peculiarities of INSs. In order 
to cope with the ISAM lack of operability, the methodology has been completely 
reviewed and integrated, as described in Chapter 4. 
 

 
 
  
4 The methodology  
This chapter describes the methodology, which supports risk assessment of new 
generation nuclear systems and takes into account the Generation-IV safety require-
ments, the international safety standards, the available return of experience and the 
peculiarities of the analyzed reactor with the help of available risk analysis tools.  
The objective is to guarantee that the design evolution is guided by safety anal-
yses, in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of safety related design 
vulnerabilities and the resulting contribution to risk. This may lead to new safety 
provisions or design improvements as well as R&D needs. 
The methodology here proposed is based on the Integrated Safety Assessment 
Methodology, ISAM (see paragraph 3.6). As already explained, ISAM constitutes 
a kit of different analysis tools for Gen IV systems, which turn out to be useful at 
any stage of the design maturity. This diversity and complementarity help to pro-
vide a robust guidance based on a good understanding of risk and safety issues.  
In this work, the ISAM tools are reviewed, completed and adapted, when 
needed, to better reflect the European standards/rules and the available return of 
experience. Useful inputs come from other global safety assessment methodologies 
(e.g. INPRO, see paragraph 3.5) developed for Gen-IV reactors, as well as standards 
commonly used in the process industry (e.g. IEC 61508, see paragraph 3.3).  
Moreover, a wide survey on risk analysis operational methods (HAZOP, 
FMEA, etc.) is performed in order to study how they can be integrated within the 
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ISAM framework and to define a complete and operational methodology that well 
suits to advanced reactors analysis. Finally, the methodology is adapted to the spe-
cific analyzed system (Flauw et al., 2018).  
 ISAM review  
Each ISAM tool is reviewed in order to identify the elements that should be 
added, adapted or modified to best fit the purpose of the work. Table 4-1 collects 
the main outcomes of the review process (Flauw et al., 2018).  
Table 4-1 Review of ISAM tools 
ISAM tool REVIEW (criticalities/adaptations/..) 
QSR 
• It should be highlighted the compliance of the checklist criteria 
with the international standards. 
• The checklist tables result very complicated: tables should be 
simplified through the selection of subjects specific to different 
levels of DiD.  
PIRT 
• Since the preliminary design stage of some advanced concepts, 
the selection of the phenomena and scenarios to be analyzed 
through this tool results critical (lack of knowledge). 
• The PIRT can be used only after the application of other safety 
analysis tools allowing the definition of a list of relevant acci-
dents.  
OPT 
• The ISAM methodology proposes to apply the OPT at each level 
of the DiD. At a first step of the analysis, the identification of 
hazards could be performed without defining the DiD level con-
cerned; whereas, in a later stage, the completion of the OPT with 
DiD level identification could be of help to ensure the safety 
architecture is well balanced. 
• The OPT consists in a top-down approach. It is useful to com-
plete the hazard identification step through a complementary 
bottom-up approach (see paragraph 4.3.1), to guarantee a list of 
IEs as complete as possible.  
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DPA 
• In the ISAM, the DPA are considered as a support tool for the 
application of the OPT and the PSA. It is proposed to emphasize 
the role of the deterministic analyses, as a conservative and 
pragmatic safety approach for this early design phase. 
PSA 
• The entire ISAM methodology aims at performing the PSA, in 
this conceptual design phase the role and the weight of this tool 
must be redefined and lowered with respect to the DPA: the PSA 
will represent a support for the deterministic analyses.   
 
In general, the explicit relationship of the ISAM with the various DiD levels 
represents one of its major advantages; nonetheless, these levels, therefore the 
whole methodology, depend on the definition of the risk metrics, the severe acci-
dent and physical barriers that are considered still an open topic for many new gen-
eration advanced systems (see paragraphs 2.2.2, 2.2.3 and annex B). Hence with 
very conceptual design and safety analysis some of the tools of the ISAM and in 
particular the direct link with the DiD concept cannot be fully exploited. Nonethe-
less, in the view of an iterative risk assessment, it will become useful in the next 
phases of the project when keeping a common framework should help speeding up 
the process. Therefore, in this preliminary phase of the project (where safety-rele-
vant concepts have still to be defined and safety-relevant issues have to be solved) 
it has been considered preferable to use the ISAM structure as a guideline to for-
mally define the objectives to be reached.  
In particular, it has been chosen to perform the identification of the hazards 
without defining the DiD level concerned; nevertheless, in a later stage, the com-
pletion with the DiD level identification could help to ensure that the safety archi-
tecture is well balanced, consistently with the OPT analytical tool reckoned in the 
ISAM.  
 The safety assessment process  
Figure 4-1 shows the flowchart elaborated in SARGEN IV project (SARGEN 
IV, 2012) and updated through the previous paragraph considerations. It schemati-
cally illustrates the implementation of the global safety assessment process.  
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Figure 4-1 Flowchart of the implementation process of the global safety assessment and 
relevance of the different tools: the flowchart was developed of the framework of 
SARGEN IV project (SARGEN IV, 2012) (black lines) and updated through the previ-
ously explained considerations (coloured parts). 
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4.2.1 The safety principles, requirements and guidelines and the 
safety goals 
For the definition of the safety principles, requirements and guidelines, at a 
very general level, the IAEA standards provide extensive references. Among the 
others, the work performed by the GIF, WENRA and the OECD MDEP can be 
consulted, too. It is worth to remind that, for some new advanced concepts, the 
requirements present in the available standards may be not exhaustive to account 
their technology-oriented aspects. In this situation, a case-by-case analysis is nec-
essary for an adaptation to the reactor technology (see paragraph 2.2). 
The safety goals are defined at the early stages of a new installation with the 
aim of guiding the design process and have to be ambitious and reasonably achiev-
able at the same time. Driving the continuous improvement of safety, the safety 
goals have to be reviewed every time there is a major accident; in particular, big 
improvements were made on the basis of Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fuku-
shima Daiichi accidents feedback. Moreover, the definition of safety requirements, 
and in particular the definition of operative safety margins, such as the frequency 
of Sodium boiling for SFRs, at a conceptual design stage can be a possible source 
of conflict. Since the limited available and reliable information on the design, the 
phenomena influencing the reactor behaviour and major risk contributors, the cri-
teria might misrepresent the objectives whose achievement they should prove. They 
could be partial or even misleading, driving the design evolution in the wrong di-
rection. Moreover, the development of the system might be slowed down, delaying 
the definition of the complete installation, especially in its non-nuclear part. In fact, 
the definition of the criteria itself represents a complex issue, consuming time and 
resources. This could constitute a safety issue since, especially in the nuclear field, 
the design and the safety demonstration are always focused on the nuclear island, 
while less attention is given to the “traditional part of the plant” and to the auxiliary 
and protection systems, which paradoxically result less protected. In the end, if the 
requirements are excessively ambitious or strict, the process of design definition 
might be stiffened, or the complexity of the system could be immoderately in-
creased to fulfil the criteria, or the criteria themselves could represent an obstacle 
for the research of innovative solutions.  
In this framework, the definition of the safety goals for advanced systems can 
start from different documents: for example, the GIF technology roadmap (GIF, 
2014), “Basis for the Safety Approach for Design & Assessment of Generation IV 
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Nuclear Systems” (GIF RSWG, 2008), “WENRA Statement on Safety Objectives for 
new Nuclear Power Plants” (WENRA, 2008).  
In particular, WENRA defines 7 safety goals for new nuclear power plants; 
however, they are not always well adapted to the specificities of the new generation 
reactors (e.g. an accident with core melt has no meaning for MSFR technology) 
(WENRA, 2008). Moreover, these goals are formulated in a qualitative manner to 
drive design enhancements for new plants with the aim of obtaining a higher safety 
level compared to existing plants. For these reasons, WENRA safety goals have to 
be detailed, adapted and completed. 
The following non-exhaustive list represents an example of safety goals, which 
may be applied to new generation systems:  
• Safety in operation (plant complexity, organizational and human factors);  
• Independence of the levels of DiD, in particular levels 3 and 4; 
• Plant autonomy; 
• Consideration of external hazards, combination rules (natural and human 
hazards); 
• Plant robustness with regards to the station blackout or heat sink loss; 
• Accidents affecting the fuel treatment unit; 
• Accidents affecting simultaneously the reactor and the fuel treatment unit; 
• Events impacting multiple units on the same site;  
• Severe accidents management in the long term; 
• Accessibility, functionality, habitability of the control room and of the emer-
gency response center; accessibility of local control points; reliability and 
functionality of the on-site and off-site communication systems, equipment 
measuring releases, radiation levels and meteorological conditions (Flauw 
et al., 2018). 
 
4.2.2 Compliance of the design with safety principles, require-
ments, guidelines and safety goals  
After the definition of the safety principles, requirements and guidelines and the 
safety goals, the compliance of the design with these criteria must be checked. The 
QSR is the ISAM instrument dedicated to realizing this step.  
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The QSR checklist has already been partially developed (RSWG of GIF, 2011), 
at least in its general sections. Nevertheless, it can be simplified, at least for systems 
with a conceptual design. In fact, the exercise can be performed in an early design 
phase with the aim of becoming aware of the safety issues so that they can drive the 
design rather than giving a final and punctual answer for the safety demonstration 
of the reactor. The same exercise (with the same objective) may be carried out for 
the successive updates of the design taking into account the feedback of the previ-
ous applications.  
In particular, the QSR points dealing with safety goals or principles, study rules 
which are not linked to a specific level of DiD (integration of the principle of DiD 
itself, single failure criterion, materials qualification, separation, diversification…) 
may be ignored for the application of the QSR tables in the framework of concep-
tual systems, but they have of course to be considered in the safety assessment pro-
cess. 
4.2.3 Identification of risks, elaboration of a list of initiating events 
and definition of safety provisions  
The successive step of the safety assessment foresees the identification of haz-
ards and the compilation of a list of initiating events. For systems whose design 
is still in the conceptual phase, suitable methods shall be identified. For the purpose 
of this work, it is proposed to use both top-down and bottom-up approaches for 
identification of hazards and elaboration of a list of initiating events, in order to 
guarantee a list of initiators as exhaustive as possible.  
The combined use of Master Logic Diagram (MLD, top-down approach) and 
Functional Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FFMEA, functional bottom-up ap-
proach) will thus be considered. Both methods should be used at reactor level in a 
first time, and more generally in the whole plant in a second time, including the fuel 
treatment unit, with due considerations for the different plant states. 
After completion of MLD and FFMEA, a review by experts will be needed to 
complement the hazards identification with available experience feedbacks gained 
from previous studies. As stated in paragraph 3.6.2, the use of PIRT could further 
be of help to study in more details the phenomenology of some relevant accidental 
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scenarios defined thanks to the previous methods and may complement and consol-
idate the hazards list. The identification of the initiating events will stand for the 
first step of the OPT method as referred to by the ISAM. 
Among all the identified initiating events, an analysis will be performed to se-
lect a unique list of relevant items to be considered as Postulated Initiating Events 
(PIEs). At this stage, some events may be grouped to shorten the list. A preliminary 
classification of initiating events (incidental, accidental…) may be suggested on the 
basis of experts’ judgment and available experience. 
Once a list of initiating events is defined, the next step of the methodology is to 
preliminary sketch the safety architecture. To do so, it is proposed to use the Lines 
of Defence (LoD) methodology. This step can stand for the second part of the OPT 
method (identification of safety provisions). Compared to the OPT, and given the 
very preliminary stage of some designs, these safety provisions will not be arranged 
according to the defence in depth at this stage and the focus will be put on their 
correct identification in terms of number and quality. At a second stage, the associ-
ation of the safety provisions to the different defence in depth levels could be done, 
taking profit of the fact that the LoD method forces to put in place independent 
provisions for a given risk, and complies well with the defence in depth principle. 
The risk to be prevented should at least include: 
• Loss of main safety functions;  
• Severe accident and practically eliminated situations (if any). 
Number and quality of LoD required for each risk should be defined considering 
potential consequences associated to each risk.  
Since this step of the methodology represents the core of the present work, the 
operational path and each risk assessment tool (FFMEA, MLD, LoD) is exhaust-
ively explained in paragraph 4.3.  
4.2.4 Conformity of the safety architecture  
Starting from a preliminary safety architecture, deterministic calculations need 
to be performed to refine the design of safety provisions and check the adequacy of 
the safety systems. The process is again iterative and design enhancement could be 
required to ensure satisfactory behaviour of the reactor.  
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The safety assessment should first concentrate on deterministic studies to 
achieve a sound and robust safety design. In a later stage, probabilistic insights may 
be used to identify potential weak points of the safety architecture and reinforce 
them, to further identify complex accidental sequences to be taken into account, and 
to consolidate the safety demonstration by finally giving insurance that the design 
is well balanced and allow achieving high reliability performances (Flauw et al., 
2018). 
4.2.5 PSA level 1 implementation  
Different levels of PSA (level 1, 2 and 3) are available for different stages of 
the design process. Since the preliminary design stage, a fully quantitative PSA 
cannot be envisaged. A simplified and semi-quantitative/qualitative PSA level 1 
would be feasible, while a PSA level 2 makes sense only after the definition of all 
the barriers and support systems and a PSA level 3 is feasible after the site evalua-
tion.  
For the MSFR, after the identification of the whole set of PIEs (through the 
already described risk analysis methods, FFMEA and MLD) and the identification 
of the necessary safety provisions (through the LoD method) with their plausible 
and postulated unreliability and unavailability (not calculated - that become con-
straints for the successive detailed project steps), the PSA would be performed to 
evaluate the risk from the frequency and the damage estimation. Both of them can 
be classified in macro-categories according to experts’ judgements. 
The risk evaluation can be useful to allow the detailed design to reach an ac-
ceptable level of risk, using a semi-quantitative risk matrix. This analysis should be 
completed by deterministic accident analyses that are crucial to properly character-
ize physical phenomena that can occur, to quantify parameters and technological 
constraints due to the design and/or materials, to quantitatively define all the provi-
sions required to guarantee the safety functions, to ensure the independence of the 
provisions and to take into account eventual common cause failures. PSA is meant 
to check whether these safety provisions are robust enough in terms of effective-
ness, availability and reliability and it will be used mainly as a verification tool at 
the conclusion of the entire safety evaluation (Flauw et al., 2018). 
More advanced evaluations (fully quantitative PSA level 2 and level 3) will be 
performed successively at more mature stages of the design. 
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The inputs for PSA level 1 will come from the other tools of the ISAM meth-
odology (PIRT, OPT), while its expected outputs will drive the deterministic anal-
yses (DPA). 
 The operational path of the work   
The aim of this paragraph is to define the operational methodology that guides 
the performed analyses. It corresponds to the third step of the global safety assess-
ment methodology as described in paragraph 4.2.   
Starting from the ISAM general framework, three risk analysis methods, which 
are appropriate for systems at the early stage of the design, are chosen to be inte-
grated into it in order to define a complete and operational methodology. Moreover, 
since this analysis has been developed in the framework of the European project 
SAMOFAR, WP partners selected tools whose implementation for INS was already 
experienced. In particular, the methods are listed below.    
• The FFMEA (Functional Failure Mode and Effect Analysis): it is a bot-
tom-up methodology suitable to define the possible accident initiators when 
there are not sufficient design details to allow more specific evaluations at 
the component level. The loss of the function is postulated rather than the 
specific failures of systems and components; in this way, it is possible to 
overcome the lack of information in the design (Pinna et al., 2015). The 
outputs of the FFMEA can give suggestions for the elaboration of other 
ISAM tools, i.e. the PIRT and the OPT. The methodology is described in 
detail in paragraph 4.3.1.  
• The MLD (Master Logic Diagram): it is a top-down deductive approach 
for the identification of the possible initiating events. It is particularly ap-
propriate for projects in early design phases as the identification of hazards 
derives from the process main characteristics and phenomena and is not 
linked to detailed design assumption (Papazoglou, 2003). Outputs from the 
MLD will notably contribute to the elaboration of the “Objective Provision 
Tree” through a top-down approach, as requested in the ISAM. The meth-
odology is described in detail in paragraph 4.3.2.  
• The LoD (Lines of Defence): it ensures that every accidental evolution of 
the reactor state is always prevented by a minimum set of homogenous (in 
number and quality) safety features - called Lines of Defence - before a sit-
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uation with potentially unacceptable consequences may arise. It suits pre-
liminarily designed projects as it can be used as a pragmatic guidance for 
sketching the architecture of the safety components and systems and for the 
classification of accidental sequences (Lo Pinto et al., 2017). Outputs from 
the LoD will contribute to the elaboration of the second step of the OPT, the 
sketch of the safety architecture, as requested in the ISAM. The methodol-
ogy is described in detail in paragraph 4.3.4. 
Furthermore, the MLD has a long tradition in the nuclear field; some other tools 
(e.g. LOPA, the calibrated graphs of the IEC 61508) were proposed to fulfill the 
same objective of the LoD, which has been preferred due to the experience of its 
application for the risk assessment of INSs.  
The integration of these tools in the ISAM is shown in fig. 4-2.  
The FFMEA and the MLD represent the operational instruments allowing the 
fulfilment of the first objective of the OPT: the identification of the operational 
hazards posed by the plants and the list of the accident initiators. The two methods 
are selected and employed separately in order to be as exhaustive as possible, being 
the exhaustiveness in the identification of possible hazards a major safety issue.  
On one hand, these outcomes drive the successive deterministic and phenome-
nological analyses, which, on a first approach, will be performed in priority on the 
accidents, which are more likely to arise safety concerns. The deterministic and 
phenomenological analyses represent the quantitative safety assessment with direct 
effect on safety margins definition and design evolution. Therefore, the hazards 
identification through FFMEA and MLD will be the foundations of the safety 
demonstration of the MSFR.  
On the other hand, a list of open points (Appendix A) has emerged from the 
application of the methodologies, regarding systems or procedures to be further de-
fined and phenomena to be further investigated. It points out the potential limita-
tions of the design and makes suggestions to enhance the safety of the concept. The 
implementation of these tools helps focusing on the available information about 
design, phenomena, procedures, etc. and the correspondent weak points. In fact, the 
identification of the hazards and their consequent categorization and ranking aid the 
designer to localize the sensible areas of the installation, to be further studied and 
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protected or drive the experts to research different solutions for increasing the avail-
ability/reliability of the system always fulfilling the safety functions (e.g. need of 
redundancies, empowerment of protection systems, additional safety barriers, etc.). 
Moreover, since the design is preliminary, it continuously evolves and many aspects 
have to be defined, many options are still available. These methods help to system-
atically point out the open issues and give preliminary information about the com-
parison if several solutions are available.    
The LoD method receives the list of initiating events as an input and accom-
plishes the second objective of the OPT: to define a set of provisions to sketch safety 
architecture on the basis of the identified hazards to be prevented or controlled; the 
DPA has to validate these results or highlight plausible deficiencies. The experts’ 
elicitation and the exploitation experience will be taken into account as a comple-
mentary contribution to the events identification. This part of the analysis is the 
clearest example of the expression “the safety driven design”. The outcomes of the 
LoD method will practically influence the number of safety provisions (protection 
systems, procedures, safety criteria) and their characteristics (failure rate, mainte-
nance policies, etc.).  
The analysis here presented focuses on the fuel circuit and the systems in direct 
interaction with it, e.g. the fertile blanket, the intermediate circuit, the wall cooling 
system, the gas bubbling system and the sampling system, in normal operation con-
ditions during power production.  
The risk assessment process for an advanced nuclear plant is proposed to be 
iterative rather than serial: as the design matures and more design details become 
available, the set of accident initiators will be updated and broadened to gradually 
address other plant systems and operational states (Gérardin et al., 2019). At the 
same time, the selected events will be studied through deterministic analyses in or-
der to define more accurate events sequences. When the deterministic inputs are 
modified, the design changes and the intended PSA model evolves as well. 
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Figure 4-2 Schematic representation of the safety assessment methodology 
 
4.3.1 Functional Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FFMEA) 
The Functional Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FFMEA) aims at defining 
possible accident initiators when the design detail is not sufficient to allow more 
specific evaluations at the component level (US NRC, 2009). Therefore, it is par-
ticularly suitable to perform new systems safety assessment, notwithstanding their 
preliminary state of design. The objective is to identify functional deviations able 
to compromise the reactor safety, to list the PIEs and to recognize major risk con-
tributors, lack of information and/or criticalities of the design and need of additional 
safety provisions.  
The methodology is composed by different consequent steps, which are listed 
below: 
• The first step is to list all possible systems and main components of the 
plant, thanks to the available design information and intents. Then, each 
system is decomposed into subsystems that can be considered functionally 
independent. At the end of this step the first version of the plant breakdown 
structure (PBS) is defined.  
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• The second step is to identify the main functions (process functions, safety 
functions, investment protection functions, etc.) of the system and specify 
them in sub-functions through the functional breakdown structure (FBS). 
Then, each function/sub-function is correlated to one (or more than one) 
component performing it, creating a link between the PBS and the FBS.  
• The third step is to compile the FFMEA table, postulating the loss of func-
tions, rather than specific failures of systems and components. In this way, 
through the functional approach, the lack of information in the design is 
managed. However, in order to highlight causes and safety consequences 
the relation between functions and components is always highlighted, as 
much as possible. Furthermore, possible improvements, prevention and mit-
igation actions are recommended. 
The objective of the FFMEA is to provide a list of potential accident initiating 
events (IEs) as exhaustive as possible and give suggestions for improving the over-
all safety of the system/reactor. 
• The last step is to select a set of postulated initiating events (PIEs) from 
the complete list of IEs: for this work, the PIEs are defined as the most se-
vere events challenging the safety of the plant. Each elementary IE is asso-
ciated with the related PIE. In this way, safety analyses focus on the most 
relevant accident sequences. 
These steps are schematically represented in fig.4-2.  
 
Figure 4-3 Steps of the FFMEA methodology 
This methodology should be iteratively applied, as the design evolves; simi-
larly, the list of the PIEs will be updated when new design details are available and 
the physical-chemical phenomena governing the behaviour of the system are inves-
tigated through deterministic analyses. Therefore, the objective of this tool if to 
influence the concept development from its earliest stages. 
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The results of the first three steps of the application of the FFMEA methodology 
are reported in paragraph 5.2.1 for the MSFR.  The results of the identification of 
the PIEs are reported in paragraph 5.2.5 for the MSFR and in paragraph 6.1.3 and 
6.2.3 for DEMO.  
4.3.2 Master Logic Diagram (MLD) 
The Master Logic Diagram (MLD) is a qualitative risk analysis method that 
aims at identifying the hazards and possible initiating events of a system in a de-
ductive and systematic way. This top-down approach is adequate for projects in 
early design phases; in fact, the tool does not analyze the specific components of 
the reactor but focuses on physical phenomena and general considerations. Moreo-
ver, it helps highlighting the correlations between different functions/phenomena, 
proving to be an advantage in the study of complex systems such as NPPs. It has 
been widely used in nuclear industry as well as in other engineering fields such as 
chemical plants and processes (Papazoglou et al., 2003). 
The main steps of the method can be summarized as follow: 
• Identification of the top event, i.e. the situation to be prevented. 
• Decomposition of the top-event into detailed sub-events, which are possible 
causes of the considered top-event. The decomposition continues a suffi-
cient level of detail is achieved (for example statistical data are available for 
the identified causes, e.g. failure rates, MTTR, etc.) and the events directly 
challenging the safety functions are identified. In this step, the completeness 
in the consideration of all physically possible phenomena is crucial for the 
efficacy of the approach, even if the link with the design is not explicitly 
defines in a first time. 
• Identification of the initiating events, i.e. the basic events that cannot be 
further decomposed into sub-events. 
The diagram is usually presented in the form of a qualitative fault tree, begin-
ning from the top event, where the sub-events are linked through the Boolean logic 
and the lowest levels of the tree show the elementary failures. 
These steps are schematically represented in fig. 4-4.  
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Figure 4-4 Steps of the MLD methodology 
4.3.3 Compilation of the list of PIEs   
In order to identify the PIEs (Postulated Initiating Events), all the IEs (the ele-
mentary failures that compromise process functions with safety related conse-
quences obtained from the application of both the FFMEA and the MLD) are col-
lected in a single list. Then, they are grouped into families. In order to group them, 
it can be useful to answer the following questions (Pinna et al., 2015): 
1. What is the plant status after the IE, without considering the further accident 
propagation?  
2. What are the mitigating actions (lines of defence) to be provided to avoid 
the accident propagation to the environment?  
3. What are the mitigating actions (lines of defence) to be provided to limit the 
accident consequences to the environment?  
The IEs can be assigned to a certain family, basing on criteria of similarity of 
their consequences and of the plant response (e.g. the triggering of preventive and 
mitigating actions). Therefore, all the events presenting similar answers to the three 
questions listed above can be grouped into the same family. Hence, based on pre-
liminary engineering judgement, for each family, the event with the most severe 
consequences is selected as a PIE (Pinna et al., 2015). Since the very preliminary 
design stage, it is not simple or evident to identify the most severe events; therefore, 
in a conservative point of view, many events are selected as PIEs. In the future, 
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when new data and design information will be available, the list can be updated and 
optimized.  
As final result of the work, each identified PIE has to be studied to define the 
possible accidental sequences; deterministic analyses shall be performed to verify 
the plant capacity to mitigate the consequences, to check the compliance with safety 
limits and to drive the design choices (Pinna et al., 2017).  
It is also underlined that at this stage some PIEs are selected independently from 
their likelihood, with the purpose to guarantee the analysis of all phenomena of 
potential interest (for example: for the MSFR analysis the fuel salt freezing sce-
nario, the postulated prompt critical power excursion with induced shockwave…). 
Some of them may be later found not to be possible in the future studies and thus 
eliminated from the PIEs list. 
The common practice is to define incident and accident categories with associ-
ated occurrence frequency ranges. Therefore, not only the low probability cases 
with potentially severe consequences (bounding events) should be identified, but 
also the “not so low probability events” (the relevant events) for which criteria will 
be more stringent. Nevertheless, the evaluation of the expected frequency for each 
PIE is not performed in detail at this stage of the analysis given the premature state 
of the current design, and only very preliminary considerations on the probabilities 
have been made (distinguishing frequent events, rare events, and very rare events), 
based on engineering judgement.  
If it is evaluated that some events do not cause safety concerned consequences, 
they can be classified as not relevant from the safety point of view (N/S). Nonethe-
less they can be important in the future when Reliability, Availability, Maintaina-
bility and Inspectability (RAMI) analysis will be performed (Pinna et al., 2015) 
(e.g. they can result critical from the production point of view). 
4.3.4 Lines of Defence (LOD)   
The Lines of Defence (LoD) method aims at ensuring that every undesired evo-
lution of the reactor state is always prevented by a minimum set of homogenous (in 
number and quality) safety provisions - called Lines of Defence – in order to avoid 
situations with potentially unacceptable consequences. Therefore, the tool helps the 
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designer to assess the adequacy of the present safety features to manage the ana-
lysed accidental situation.  
This method is deterministic and compliant with the internationally accepted 
safety principles. It suits well the early design phases, since, it can guide the design 
of the architecture of the safety components and systems. The method helps to iden-
tify and classify accidental sequences (Lo Pinto et al., 2017). 
The LoD method steps 
The safety demonstration of nuclear installations depends on the accomplish-
ment of a set of safety functions, that guarantee the control of the reactor in all the 
operational modes with adequate safety margins, ensure accidents prevention, avoid 
that the small deviations from normal operation degenerate into severe accidents 
(domino effect) and ensure that the residual heat is constantly extracted during the 
reactor shutdown (GIF, 2002). Nuclear installations must realize these safety func-
tions with systems and procedures during all the life phases of the systems.  
The initiators (identified in the previous steps of the analysis) challenge the re-
actor integrity and the safety functions; they are grouped into families depending 
on their possible consequences on the reactor (Gérardin et al., 2019). For each fam-
ily, are selected specific initiating events (IEs) to be further analysed. In this work, 
the LoD tool is applied to some of the identified IEs.  
An initiating event initiates the accidental sequence. The accidental sequence is 
the evolution of the accident from the initiating event until the final consequences 
and damage. The consequence is the effect in physical terms of a particular accident 
and the damage represents the last impact of failures/accidents on the population, 
the environment, structures/assets, and reputation (in this work it is quantified in 
terms of availability of the system, investment loss or radioactive release). The pre-
vention and mitigation of the accidental sequence is given by the implementation 
of LoDs. 
For a given accidental situation to be prevented (typically, the situation of loss 
of the main safety functions or severe accident is generally considered here), the 
main steps of the LoD method are: 
1. Define the number and quality of LoDs to be provided for prevention of 
this accidental situation (if several safety functions are interested, the 
method should be implemented for each of them); 
Errore. Per applicare Heading 1 al testo da visualizzare in questo 
punto, utilizzare la scheda Home. Errore. Per applicare Heading 1 al 
testo da visualizzare in questo punto, utilizzare la scheda Home. 
71 
 
2. For each IE, ensure an adequate set of LoD (in terms of number and qual-
ity).  
It is worth to note that at the early design stages (when the safety provisions are 
not defined yet) the method provides a guidance to sketch the safety architecture; 
when a more detailed safety architecture is defined, the tool checks its adequacy, 
and allows the classification of accidental sequences upstream accident analyses.  
One of the essential points in the application of this method is to ensure the 
independency and the diversification of the LoDs implemented for each IE in 
order to minimize the risks of CCF (Lo Pinto et al., 2017).  
Lines of Defence definition 
There are three types of LoDs: the measures aimed at preventing the occurrence 
of the IE (in fact, the low occurrence frequency of an initiating event may stand by 
itself for a LoD), the measures aimed at limiting the consequences of the IE by 
means of specific equipment, and the intrinsic behaviour and natural resistance to 
the progression of the accident. 
The lines of defence are classified according to their expected reliability and 
availability: 
• Strong LoD, type “a” (failure rate of approximately 10-3 to 10-4/year or so-
licitation); 
• Medium LoD, type “b” (failure rate of approximately 10-1 to 10-2/year or 
solicitation) (Lo Pinto et al., 2017). 
From the experience, it is possible to distinguish strong and medium LoDs as 
described below: 
• Strong LoD (“a”): for example active systems designed respecting the 
standards of the nuclear industry and including internal redundancies; pas-
sive equipment (e.g. confinement barriers) respecting the standards of the 
nuclear industry; intrinsic behaviour ensuring a long grace period to perform 
human corrective actions. 
• Medium LoD (“b”): for example active systems without internal redun-
dancy; actions by the operator. 
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Two medium independent LoDs may be considered equivalent to one strong 
LoD (Lo Pinto et al., 2017). 
Use of the LoD method within the advanced reactors safety architecture def-
inition process 
Once a list of IEs is defined, the hazardous situations to be prevented should at 
least take into consideration: 
• Loss of main safety functions: it usually includes the risk of loss of the 
reactivity control, the risk of loss of the decay heat removal function; the 
risk of relevant releases in the environment; 
• Occurrence of a severe accident situation or a practically eliminated situ-
ations situation (if any). 
The quantity and quality of LoD required for each situation should be defined 
considering its potential consequences. If a risk of important or early radiological 
releases is supposed, three LoDs are generally considered necessary. This means 
that, for each IE potentially leading to a severe accident or a practically eliminated 
situation, two strong LoDs and one medium LoD (“2a + b”), which can operate 
with a different order, shall be available and reliable (it is reminded that the low 
occurrence frequency of an initiating event can stand for one LoD by itself).
 
 
  
5 Results - Case Study: the MSFR 
The aim of this chapter is to summarize the main results obtained from the ap-
plication of the previously defined methodology (see paragraph 4.3) to different 
advanced systems. In particular, in this chapter, the entire methodology is applied 
to the Molten Salt Fast Reactor (MSFR), whose design is described in paragraph 
5.1, as reported in the deliverables of the SAMOFAR project (Allibert et al., 2017).  
 Description of the system  
Along with five other concepts (see Chapter 1), MSFR was selected by the GIF-
IV due to its promising design and safety characteristics (GIF, 2014).  
The MSFR, object of this analysis in the frame of the SAMOFAR project, is a 
3000 MWth reactor based on the thorium fuel cycle. The MSFR can be operated in 
the full range from breeder to burner reactor and is flexible in terms of operation 
(load-following capabilities…) and design choices (core geometry, fuel composi-
tion, specific power level…), but very different from solid-fuel reactors in terms of 
design and safety characteristics (Gérardin et al., 2019).  
Figure 5-1 shows a schematic representation of the MSFR plant. It includes 
three circuits involved in the power generation: the fuel circuit, the intermediate 
circuit and the power conversion circuit. These circuits are associated to other sys-
tems composing the whole power plant: the emergency draining system, the routine 
draining system to the storage areas and the reprocessing units. 
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It is worth to note that the design is still conceptual; design activities are cur-
rently on-going with the aim to establish if MSFR can satisfy the goals of Genera-
tion-IV reactors in terms:  
• Sustainability (U-233 breeding from Th-232):  
• Non-proliferation (integrated fuel cycle, multi-recycling of actinides);  
• Resource saving (closed Th/U fuel cycle, no uranium enrichment); 
• Safety (e.g. as far as regard the following MSFR characteristics: no reactiv-
ity reserve, strongly negative feedback coefficient);  
• Waste management (potential actinide burner). 
 
 
Figure 5-1 Schematic representation of the MSFR plant (GIF, 2014) 
5.1.1 The fuel circuit  
In its preliminary design, the core of the MSFR is a single compact cylinder 
(2.25m high x 2.25m diameter) where the nuclear reactions occur within the liquid 
fluoride salt acting both as fuel and as coolant. The fuel salt flows from the bottom 
to the top of the core cavity (Allibert et al., 2017).  
A schematic representation of the fuel circuit is shown in fig. 5-2.  
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Figure 5-2 Schematic representation of the reference MSFR fuel circuit (Allibert et al., 
2017) 
The major components of the MSFR are listed hereafter.  
• Core: The core or ‘active region’ corresponds to the salt volume where most 
of the nuclear fissions take place. It includes the flowing salt in the central 
cavity, the injection zone (at the bottom of the core) and the extraction zone 
(top of the core). The MSFR core does not include any solid internal support 
structure except for the wall materials. The reference concept is designed 
with a salt temperature rise preliminarily fixed at ∆T = 100 K. The operating 
fuel temperatures are in the interval [650°C-700°C] (inlet salt temperature) 
and [750°C-800°C] (outlet salt temperature). The lower limit is set in order 
to have a safety margin from the salt melting point (585°C) while the upper 
limit is imposed by the resilience of the structural materials (limited to 
800°C with a thermal protection envisaged). The core operating parameters 
were defined after various parametric studies (Mathieu, 2005; Mathieu et 
al., 2009; Merle-Lucotte, 2008; Brovchenko, 2013; Heuer et al., 2014; Lau-
reau, 2015a); their purpose is to minimize neutron losses, reflector irradia-
tion and in-core fissile inventory, while maintaining a fuel salt volume in 
the heat exchangers large enough to ensure a ∆T = 100 K. The resulting core 
shape is roughly a cylinder, with 1/2 of the entire salt volume inside the 
core, the rest being located in the external fuel loops. This torus core geom-
etry has been further improved to guarantee a stable flow in the core 
(Brovchenko et al., 2014; Dulla et al., 2014). 
• Upper and Lower Reflectors: The lower and upper walls of the core are 
neutron reflectors. The upper reflector is submitted to mechanical, thermal 
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(the fuel salt mean temperature in the extraction area is around 750°C with 
possible spatial and time dependent fluctuations) and radiation constraints. 
The combination of high temperature and high radiation levels seems to be 
the biggest challenge for the proposed alloy so that the surface of the upper 
reflector may require a thermal protection. Due to the significantly lower 
inlet temperature with respect to the outlet temperature, the lower reflector 
is under reduced thermal stress. The lower reflector is coupled to the Emer-
gency Draining System. The shape of these reflectors has been determined 
in studies aiming at ensuring a stable thermal flow in the core (Dulla et al., 
2014; Rouch et al., 2014). 
• Recirculation loops (called sectors): Each of these loops or external sectors 
is dedicated to the cooling of the fuel salt, from its extraction at the top of 
the core to its injection at the bottom. A sector consists in a pump, a heat 
exchanger block and the bubbling system (a bubble injection device in the 
cold leg and a salt/bubble separator in the hot leg), a blanket salt tank, and 
cooling equipment (which uses as coolant the intermediate fluid). When the 
sectors are in place, there is some play among them and between the sectors 
and the vessel. The spaces among the different sectors and between the sec-
tors and vessel will be filled with salt which, during normal operation, is 
kept in the solid state (because of the temperature distribution). A pre-filling 
operation with an inactive salt may be necessary before the fuel salt filling 
in order to avoid the presence of fuel salt in dead areas (Allibert et al., 2017). 
Figure 5-3 shows a schematic representation of the sectors inside the reac-
tor.  
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Figure 5-3 Schematic representation of the lower part of a sector showing the blanket salt 
tank (green), the neutron shield (grey), the intermediate exchanger (yellow), the pump 
with its salt collector and its distributor connected to the exchanger (blue) (Allibert et al., 
2017). 
• Heat Exchanger (one per sector): Each heat exchanger (HX) unit has to extract 
about 187 MW during normal operation. The HX design is challenging since a 
very compact design is needed (to reduce the volume of the fuel salt outside the 
core) but on the other hand the maximum compactness achievable is limited by 
considerations on the HX pressure drop, the maximum allowed salt velocity  (to 
limit erosion phenomena) and the thermodynamic properties of the working flu-
ids. A preliminary design has been developed based on a plate HX option, which 
represents a reasonable compromise between compactness (exchange area) and 
pressure drop. This preliminary design is adequate for the purpose of the present 
studies but will require further examination (in particular related to the geome-
try, materials and fabrication) for better optimization. The design of this com-
ponent affects the heating (ΔT) in the core when both reactor power and total 
fuel volume are fixed (Allibert et al., 2017). 
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• Fertile Blanket: This component serves as a radial reflector and as a neutron 
shield to protect the external components of the fuel loops (pipes, heat exchang-
ers). In addition to this protective function, the fertile blanket improves the 
breeding capabilities of the reactor. The walls of the blanket tank are made of a 
Ni-based alloy for corrosion resistance and are layered with B4C on the outer 
wall to reinforce the neutron shielding. The salt in the blanket is of the same 
type as the one in the core but with 22.5 mol% Th and without any initial fissile 
material. Since the thorium in the fertile salt is exposed to the core neutron flux, 
it generates the 233U fissile element by neutron capture. A small fraction of the 
233U produced in the blanket will fission, so that fission products are produced 
in the blanket and will have to be removed. In addition, the power arising from 
the 233U fissions (estimated ~ 7 MW in the whole blanket volume) and from the 
captures on thorium (~24 MW) will heat the fertile salt in the blanket. It has 
been found that this heat cannot be evacuated through the blanket walls by nat-
ural convection so that an external cooling system is also necessary for the fer-
tile blanket. If breeding is not required, the MSFR design could be simplified 
by replacing the fertile blanket with an inert reflector, similar to the axial reflec-
tors. Optimized shapes of the fertile blanket may also be studied to improve the 
thermal flow in the core. 
• Pump (one per sector): The salt is circulated in the reactor by 16 pumps (one 
for each recirculation loop). The fuel salt flow rate is about 0.28 m3/s to ensure 
an adequate temperature rise in the core for the current core power level. The 
pump characteristics (static head) has an impact on the circulation time of the 
salt and thus on the temperature rise in the core since the produced power is 
fixed and proportional to the product of the fuel velocity in the core by this 
temperature rise. 
• Bubbling system: The online bubbling system aims at removing the gaseous 
fission products (FPs), via dilution in a carrying gas, and removing the metallic 
particles dragged by the fuel salt, via capillary sticking to the bubbles.  
If the fission gases, especially Kr and Xe, are not extracted, the fuel reaches 
saturation rapidly. Gas bubbles grow in the fuel and in particular on the walls 
of the exchangers, since the solubility of the noble gases decreases with the 
temperature. In the absence of any special device, these gases escape via the 
fuel free surfaces: the expansion tank, the pumps, and any interstice with a free 
liquid salt surface. A gases extraction device must then be envisioned in order 
to control their behavior. 
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The non-soluble metals naturally deposit on the surfaces encountered in the 
course of their travel within the fuel salt. Therefore, they may cluster preferen-
tially on the exchanger plates and in the bends, with occasional obstructions. A 
non-soluble metals extraction device must be envisioned in order to control their 
behavior.  
There are different options to design the bubbling system, it can be in-core or 
out-core, and each solution presents advantages and drawbacks. The advantage 
of the in-core solution is its high FPs extraction rate, hence a short residence 
time in the fuel. The main drawback is the in-core presence of a complex sepa-
ration device. Conversely, the out-core option is simpler to be realized, but it 
has a poorer extraction efficiency, with a longer FPs residence time in fuel.  
For the in-core option, it is foreseen that the fuel reaches the top of the sectors, 
enters into a pipe that makes it swirl, and then a cyclone maintains the swirling 
motion. The central part of the swirled fuel salt is separated into a separation 
chamber. After the fuel-gas separation, the fuel salt is led back to the cyclone 
beneath the pump inlet. The separated gas is compressed by a liquid ring pump 
into the gas processing tank, where it stays about 1000s before being recycled. 
Another function of the bubbling system is the control of the reactivity, inde-
pendently on the FP extraction. In this case large bubbles are injected into the 
core to reduce the local fuel density. The void ratio could be up to 3% of the 
core volume, instead of 0.1 to 0.5% for FP extraction. Gas extraction has to be 
dimensioned accordingly.  
The bubbling system has only been partially studied up to now. Some sugges-
tions are presented in Appendix A to provide useful information for risk assess-
ment associated to this component.  
Figure 5-4 shows a schematic representation of the components of a sector. 
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Figure 5-4 View of the top of a sector showing the pump (blue) and the two parts of the 
separation device consisting in a cyclone to concentrate the gas phase in the vortex center 
(collector & cyclone) and deriving this central part of the fuel stream to a separation 
chamber (Allibert et al., 2017). 
• Pipes: The piping conveys the salt circulation between the core and the HX and 
pumps. The pipes are sized (diameter and length) according to two main con-
straints: reduction of the fuel salt volume outside the core and limitation of the 
maximum salt speed in the pipes to mitigate erosion. The pipe diameters affect 
the circulation period of the fuel salt in the system, and thus its heating in the 
core, if the power is fixed. Other considerations that will have to be analyzed in 
the future include optimization of the pressure drop, thermal fatigue (in particu-
lar in the upper pipes), pipe vibration, welding, seismic behavior, access for in-
spection, thermal shielding, etc.  
• Reactor Vessel: The core and the reactor systems (components of fuel loops such 
as pipes, pumps, HX, etc.) described above are contained within a reactor vessel 
which is filled with an inert gas (e.g., Argon). The inert gas has a double func-
tion: it is used to cool the reactor components by maintaining the gas temperature 
at about 400°C, and it can be sampled for an early detection of any salt leak. 
Setting the gas temperature at 400°C guarantees that in the event of a small fuel 
salt leak, the leaked salt solidifies since its melting temperature is 565°C. The 
reactor vessel parameters (geometrical and material) do not directly affect the 
core performance (and thus are not needed for the optimization) but are neces-
sary for the safety analysis. 
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The sectors contain all identical components that can be factory-made, in small 
quantities. They must be easily transportable and manageable, implying that they 
should be as small as possible. This requires a larger multiplicity of these compo-
nents. Moreover, a failure in one of the sectors is the less damaging since the num-
ber of sectors is large. In this respect CCFs have to be evaluated. 
The sectors are arranged in one row around the core vessel and they comprise a 
pump that ensures the fuel salt circulation. The bulk of the pump is likely to be the 
limiting quantity for the number of sectors. Furthermore, the intermediate circuit 
will probably comprise fewer circulation loops than sectors so that each intermedi-
ate circuit will feed several sectors. This means that the total number of sectors is a 
multiple of the number of sectors fed by each intermediate circuit circulation loop. 
Each sector is connected to an intermediate fluid circuit (4 circuits, each feeding 4 
sectors, for example, can still cool the core if one of the intermediate circuits fails). 
5.1.2 Intermediate circuit 
The intermediate fluid cools down the core and heats up the Balance of Plant 
(BoP) fluid. Moreover, it cools down the fertile salt and the reactor walls. It is im-
portant to ensure the compatibility between the hot leg temperature and the maxi-
mum temperature manageable by the BoP fluid. The cold leg temperature must be 
high enough to eliminate any chance of solidifying the fuel salt in the intermediate 
exchangers. The intermediate fluid is not defined, yet. It may be a liquid metal (LM) 
or a salt. 
The advantage of LMs (Na or Pb, essentially) is their very good thermal con-
ductivity, which enhances the global thermal transfer coefficient with a smaller ex-
change surface. As a drawback, the cold leg temperature must be close to the fuel 
salt melting temperature (585°C), with corrosion issue for lead. The use of sodium 
involves several hazards, due to its high reactivity with air and water.  
Among the salts, there are several options: FLiBe, FLiNaK, LiFZrF4 or fluorob-
orate (8NaF-92NaBF4). The poor conductivity of the salt can be compensated by 
the fact that there is a temperature gradient at the interface between the salt and the 
wall, permitting a cold leg intermediate temperature significantly lower than the 
fuel salt melting temperature. 
An online gamma spectrometry analysis of the intermediate fluid must be im-
plemented to monitor any fuel salt leaks in the intermediate heat exchangers. 
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5.1.3 Expansion vessel and fuel sampling 
The free levels are fundamental for guaranteeing the fuel expansion in case of 
temperature increases. Among the others, two of them are the most important: the 
gas-salt separation chambers (if the core bubbling option were adopted) and a spe-
cific expansion tank. The expansion tank may be used to remove and add fuel salt 
at a daily rate of 10 to 40 liters, in one or several batches. Remembering that the 
mean fuel volume is 18 m3 and a mean temperature variation of ±10K has to be 
allowed (with a relative volume dilation coefficient around 210-4/K), the total vol-
ume change is around ±36 liters. The current major idea is that the tank volume is 
to be dimensioned as the double of this volume variation (80 liters).  
The expansion tank is placed in the center of the upper reflector with a vertical 
inlet for the insertion of new fuel in the core, for allowing the online refueling. 
Lateral pumping through radial pipes keeps the in-core fuel content constant. The 
tank walls are cooled and protected by a refractory lining because of the high fuel 
temperature and large decay heat. The tank is closed with a removable lid. In order 
to guarantee the nominal composition of the fuel, a pressurized sampling device is 
foreseen. During sampling, the lid is removed and replaced by a sampling vessel 
where the fuel can be transferred both ways by differential pressurization.  
Figure 5-5 shows the upper reflector with the expansion vessel and the sampling 
device.  
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Figure 5-5 Illustration of an expansion vessel on the upper reflector fitted with a sampling 
vessel for fuel transfer (Allibert et al., 2017) 
 
5.1.4 Draining systems 
There are two foreseen draining modes, each operated by a different system: 
• Controlled routine draining: Fuel salt is transferred to the actively cooled 
storage tanks, for routine maintenance procedures (a few days to a few 
weeks). They also ensure the fuel salt heating before the core filling. The 
routine draining is rather slow (e.g., one hour) in order to adequately reduce 
the fuel temperature before the draining. It is foreseen to perform this type 
of draining every 1 to 5 years, during sectors substitution. 
• Emergency draining: in case of anomaly during operation, the fuel salt can 
be drained in the Emergency Draining Tank (EDT), either by active devices, 
or by passive means. This process must be rapid (e.g., less than 10 minutes) 
enough to limit the fuel salt heating in a loss of heat removal event.  
In case of emergency, the EDS triggering must be redundant and reliable: 
three opening systems are foreseen and depend on the reactor status. They 
are based on three different mechanisms and at least one of them will be 
passive (specifically, a fusible plug). The EDS orifices are short pipes (30 
84 Errore. Per applicare Heading 1 al testo da visualizzare in questo punto, 
utilizzare la scheda Home. 
 
to 60 cm) that run through the bottom reflector. Their diameter (~10 cm) 
allows a 15 minutes draining with only one orifice open. The risk of 
spurious activation if the EDS limits the number of orifices. The fuel salt is 
drained to a funnel-shaped collector that ends into a vertical shaft, driving 
the salt into the passive storage reservoir (EDT), which guarantees a deeply 
subcritical core geometry. The collector can communicate with the core, in 
order to allow the gases to return into core. The design of the EDS is still 
on-going. One of the considered design is constituted by a system of cooling 
rods. The gaps between the rods is filled by the drained fuel salt, while the 
inside of each rod is filled with a thick layer of inert salt, leaving space in 
the central part for cooling channels. The cooling fluid has not been selected 
yet (Allibert et al., 2017).  
In fig. 5-6, one of the design options for the EDS is shown. 
 
Figure 5-6 Schematic representation of EDS plausible design (Allibert et al., 2017) 
For the successive analyses (especially during LoD application), it is useful to 
note that the fuel salt system has 3 kinds of free surfaces (see fig. 5-7) that can help 
to manage temperature increases and the consequent liquid fuel volume dilation, 
mainly in case of unavailability of the EDS: 
• The central opening for the fuel periodical transfers, located in the upper 
reflector; 
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• The salt-gas separators with controlled pressurization, supposedly  at 
low pressure for efficient degassing; 
• The siphons, which are attached to the vessel, not to the sectors, and 
have their own pressurization. The inert gas is returned to the vessel 
during draining via the sampling opening in the expansion tank. 
 
 
Figure 5-7 The fuel salt free surfaces are situated in the gas-salt separator (blue) and in 
the expansion vessel (gray). The bottom of the fuel storage tanks is approximately at the 
same level as the bottom of the core vessel (ends of the siphons) so as to allow complete 
draining without large pressure gaps (Allibert et al., 2017). 
In conclusion, the MSFR unique characteristic is the circulating molten salt, 
performing as fuel and coolant contemporarily, and the fast neutron spectrum. Some 
consequences are the possibility of a reconfiguration of the core geometry in case 
of anomalies through passive systems, the regular adjustments of the fuel composi-
tion permitting low reactivity reserves in core, a higher risk of reactivity insertion 
accident during refueling and the fact that a significant part of the fissile matter is 
not in core (Uggenti et al., 2017).  
Figure 5-8 shows the position of the different systems in the reactor building. 
In this figure, the HXs between the intermediate circuit and the energy conversion 
circuit are located within the reactor building. It has to be noted that other design 
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options are currently studied, where these heat exchangers are located outside of 
the reactor building. Their position is still matter of discussion.  
 
 
Figure 5-8 Schematic view of the main systems located in the reactor building; proposals 
for the confinement barriers are highlighted. 
 
At the present stage, the design of the reactor is incomplete and in evolution. As 
it can be deduced from the systems description, there are many open points, on 
systems, components procedure and physical phenomena characterizing the reactor 
behavior. Annex A lists these open points and presents the different available op-
tions with the correspondent advantages and drawbacks.  
 Identification of Initiating Events for MSFR 
The major safety analysis performed for the MSFR in the frame of this PhD 
work has been carried out on the reactor during nominal power production and 
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concerns the different MSFR systems involved. Some design evolutions and opti-
mizations of the MSFR have also been suggested as a result of the safety analysis 
presented here as will be explained in the following. 
The following assumptions and considerations drive the analysis:  
• The design of the system is at a preliminary stage and still in evolution, 
therefore the outcomes of the study are not final, but could/will evolve with 
the design details;  
• Only the core circuit and the immediately adjacent systems, interacting with 
it, are analysed, e.g. the fertile blanket, the intermediate circuit, the wall 
cooling system, the gas bubbling system and the sampling system, in normal 
operation conditions during power production;  
• The analysed operational mode is the normal operation of the reactor during 
power production (P= 3000 MWth);  
• Security issues are not taken into account during the study.  
Moreover, in order to perform the analysis, the physical barriers able to prevent 
a radioactive release should be defined. In annex B, the issue is analysed and some 
proposals are presented. The following analysis is coherent with the third proposal 
(see paragraph 9.3.3), which is summarised in the following bullets:  
• The first containment physical barrier is constituted by the fuel circuit and 
the EDS vessel (in green in fig. 5-8); 
• The second containment physical barrier is constituted by the fuel casing (in 
sky blue in fig. 5-8);  
• The third containment physical barrier is constituted by the reactor building 
(in orange in fig. 5-8).  
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5.2.1 FFMEA application to the MSFR  
The Plant Breakdown Structure (PBS)  
The PBS is the first step of the FFMEA methodology (see paragraph 4.3.1). It 
is a hierarchical structure that is created early in the project life cycle and that high-
lights what has already been designed and what has to be completed. 
The system is subdivided into different subsystems that can be considered func-
tionally independent and the PBS organizes items and materials that are necessary 
for the project. These components will be associated with the performed functions 
and become one of the inputs for the FFMEA table.  
For the specific case of the MSFR, the list is organised into nine main parts, 
one for each main system/unit of the reactor according to the available design in-
formation.  
The more developed sections are: 
• The active fuel zone (section 1 of the PBS), which regards the components 
in direct contact with the fissile and fertile salts, no matter the operational 
phase (the Emergency Draining System is listed in this section);  
• The intermediate salt circuit (section 2 of the PBS);  
• The energy conversion circuit (section 3 of the PBS).  
The other sections could not be completed yet because of the still preliminary 
design stage. This represents a clear example of the iterative nature of the method-
ology: the design data are inputs for the safety analysis whose results drive a more 
detailed design evolution, which allows the improvement of the accuracy and the 
completeness of the safety assessment.  
A part of the PBS compiled for the MSFR is reported below. The different col-
ours indicate the different levels of the list.   
Example:   
1. Active fuel zone  
1.1. Fuel casing system  
1.1.1. Reactor vessel filled by inert gas (e.g. Argon) 
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1.1.2. Fuel casing removable lid (for the change of fuel recirculation sec-
tors)  
1.1.3. Removable lid upon the expansion vessel system 
1.1.4. Openings for the intermediate salt pipes  
1.1.5. Valves to isolate the intermediate circuit  
1.1.6. Support system for the reactor vessel  
1.1.7. Support system for the core vessel 
1.2. Fuel circuit containment structure  
1.2.1. Core vessel  
1.2.2. Upper and lower closure of the core cavity  
1.2.2.1. Upper closure of the core cavity  
1.2.2.1.1. Upper reflector  
1.2.2.1.2. Expansion Vessel system  
1.2.2.1.2.1. Expansion Vessel (fuel salt free surface)  
1.2.2.1.2.2. Vertical inlet pipe for the fuel from the core to 
the expansion tank  
1.2.2.1.2.3. Radial fuel outlet pipes (x4)  
1.2.2.1.2.4. Removable condenser lid  
1.2.2.1.2.5. Valve to isolate expansion vessel for exchang-
ing condenser lid and sampling device 
1.2.2.1.2.6. Pressurised sampling device  
1.2.2.1.2.7. Gas injection for pressurized sampling device 
1.2.2.1.2.8. Opening for fuel transfer through the upper re-
flector (Sampling and injection)  
1.2.2.1.2.9. Connexion from the pressurised sampling de-
vice to the reprocessing unit through the reactor build-
ing (for fuel salt samples transfer-sealed system)   
1.2.2.1.2.9.1. Pipes  
1.2.2.1.2.9.2. Gates 
1.2.2.1.2.10. Connexion between the fission product re-
moval system and the expansion vessel  
1.2.2.1.2.11. Valves  
1.2.2.2. Lower closure of the core cavity  
1.2.2.2.1. Lower reflector  
1.2.2.2.2. Openings for fuel salt draining  
1.2.2.2.3. Openings for the bubble injector for reactivity control 
1.2.3. Cooling system circulating within the external walls (cooled by in-
termediate circuit fluid) 
1.2.3.1. Pipes  
1.2.3.2. Pumps  
1.2.3.3. Heat Exchanger   
1.2.3.4. Valves  
1.2.3.5. Openings in the core vessel  
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… … … … … 
The Functional Breakdown Structure (FBS) 
In the standard IEC 61226 (IEC EN 61226, 2005), the function is defined as 
the specific purpose or objective to be accomplished that can be specified or de-
scribed without reference to the physical means implementing it. There are different 
families of functions for a system, e.g. process, safety and investment protection 
functions.  
The main objective of the process functions is to operate the plant/system and 
to demonstrate the feasibility of the power production from the system.  
Safety functions should be guaranteed by the physical provisions and barriers, 
in order to prevent or mitigate nuclear and non-nuclear damages (radiological, 
chemical, electrical, magnetic, etc.) for workers, public and environment.  
The main objective of the investment protection functions is to ensure that 
operations are performed safeguarding the investments, such as machinery and 
equipment, as well as to minimize operational costs (Pinna et al., 2015). The asset 
integrity, usually taken into account in the process industry analyses, manages the 
capability of a system to perform its function effectively and efficiently, always 
safeguarding population and environment with the aim to optimize the production, 
e.g. by proper maintenance policies. On the other hand, the investment protection 
applies to INS, whose major objective is the demonstration of the feasibility of the 
project rather than the availability/reliability of the plant. Moreover, it is highly 
probable that the first attempt to build an innovative system will be a prototype (one 
of a kind), whose costs are increased by the fact that there is not a scale economy 
for the components that are manufactured ad hoc.   
The FBS is the second step of the FFMEA methodology and it systematically 
lists and organizes the functions, so that the higher-lever functions are more and 
more specified in lower-level functions, whose negations are one of the inputs for 
the FFMEA table. The highest-level process functions are 2: “to produce electric-
ity” and “to produce fissile matter in the blanket sectors”; therefore, the FBS re-
sults to be composed by two complementary sections, each one referred to one of 
the main production objectives of the reactor (to burn and to breed).  
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These functions are specified more and more, taking into account all the com-
plementary aspects necessary to accomplish them (operation, control, measure-
ment, structure integrity, etc.).  
A part of the FBS for the process of the MSFR is shown below. In the FBS, the 
utilization of different colours allows a clearer identification of the different levels.  
Example: 
1. To generate electricity   
1.1. To generate heat by realizing fissions in the core cavity 
1.1.1. To provide fuel salt inventory in the core cavity  
1.1.1.1. To keep and preserve the integrity and leak-tightness of the 
core cavity 
1.1.1.2. To keep and preserve the integrity of the fuel salt recircula-
tion sectors  
1.1.1.3. To add fuel salt to the core cavity  
1.1.1.4. To remove fuel salt from the core cavity 
1.1.1.5. To manage pressure/volume of the fuel salt 
1.1.1.5.1. To preserve free surfaces in the active zone  
1.1.1.5.2. To manage the fission products presence (in terms of 
pressure and volume) in the active zone  
1.1.2. To maintain controlled and self-sustained chain reaction in the core 
cavity   
1.1.2.1. To maintain the core critical geometry and mass  
1.1.2.1.1. To keep and preserve the integrity and leak-tightness 
of the core cavity 
1.1.2.1.2. To keep and preserve the integrity of the fuel salt re-
circulation sectors  
1.1.2.1.3. To maintain the fuel recirculation sectors in the cor-
rect position  
1.1.2.1.4. To maintain the core cavity in the correct position 
1.1.2.1.5. To add fuel salt to the core cavity  
1.1.2.1.6. To remove fuel salt from the core cavity 
1.1.2.1.7. To manage pressure/volume of the fuel salt  
1.1.2.1.7.1. To preserve free surfaces in the active zone  
1.1.2.1.7.2. To manage the fission products presence (in 
terms of pressure and volume) in the active zone  
1.1.2.2. To ensure the fuel salt homogeneity in the core cavity  
1.1.2.2.1. To keep and preserve the integrity and leak-tightness 
of the core cavity 
1.1.2.2.2. To provide the fuel salt circulation in the core cavity  
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1.1.2.2.3. To provide the correct geometry and space for the fuel 
salt circulation  
1.1.2.2.4. To provide fuel salt flow  
1.1.2.2.5. To provide enough turbulence eddies in the core cav-
ity  
1.1.2.2.6. To maintain the fuel salt at a liquid state  
1.1.2.3. To manage the reactivity of the fuel salt by the temperature  
1.1.2.3.1. To maintain the correct temperature range in the core 
cavity (density/Doppler effect) 
1.1.2.3.1.1. To transfer heat from fuel recirculation sectors 
to intermediate circuits (ref.)  
1.1.2.3.1.2. To transfer heat from the structures to inter-
mediate circuits (ref.)  
1.1.2.3.2. To change power in the core cavity by heat exchang-
ers temperature using reactivity feedback reactions (load 
following) 
1.1.2.3.2.1. To provide intermediate salt mass flow varia-
tions  
1.1.2.3.2.2. To transfer heat from fuel recirculation sectors 
to intermediate circuits (ref.)  
1.1.2.3.2.3. To transfer heat from the structures to the in-
termediate circuits (ref.) 
 
… … … … …  
 
The FFMEA table 
The third step of the FFMEA methodology is the compilation of the FFMEA 
table. The FFMEA table is a specific table that is suggested to report the results of 
the analysis.  
The heading of the table refer to the following items (Pinna et al., 2015): 
1. Selection of a function to be analysed (i.e. negated) from the process func-
tions list (see table 5-1, column 1: “Process function”); 
2. Identification of the systems and/or main equipment and/or components de-
voted to performing the function (see table 5-1, column 2: “PBS elements”); 
3. Indication of the analysed operating mode (see table 5-1, column 3: “Op. 
Md.”); 
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4. Identification of the function failure modes (see table 5-1, column 4: “Fail-
ure mode”); 
5. Investigation of the possible causes for the loss of function for each failure 
mode (see table 5-1, column 5: “Causes”); 
6. Analysis of the possible consequences for the plant deriving from the loss 
of these functions, in terms of damage to the machine, of radioactive inven-
tory mobilization through the different containment barriers and to the en-
vironment, and, finally, of possible damage to workers and population (see 
table 5-1, column 6: “Consequences”); 
7. Possible actions/means set to prevent occurrence of the initiator and the pro-
gress of accident chains (e.g., detections and responses of the control sys-
tem) if necessary. This column is not present in the extract of FMEA pre-
sented in table 5-1 due to space limitation. 
8. Possible actions/means set to mitigate the consequences of the failure if nec-
essary. This column is not present in the extract of FMEA presented in table 
5-1 because of space limitation. 
9. Representative PIEs for the elementary failure identified (see table 5-1, col-
umn 7: “PIE”); 
The higher-level functions are automatically analysed through the lower level 
ones, being the relationship such that the failure of a lower-lever function causes 
the failure of the related higher-level function. 
Table 5-1 shows an extract of the FFMEA table compiled for the process func-
tions of the MSFR in normal operation conditions during power production. 
Process function PBS 
elements 
Op. 
Md. 
Failure 
mode 
Causes Consequences PIE 
P1 To generate 
electricity 
      
P1.1 To generate 
heat by realizing 
fissions in core 
cavity 
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Table 5-1 Extract from the FFMEA MSFR table 
 
5.2.2 MLD application to the MSFR  
The MLD method (described in paragraph 4.3.2) is applied to the same condi-
tions for the FFMEA. According to the assumptions listed in paragraph 9.3.3, the 
fuel circuit constitutes the first confinement barrier. Therefore, the fuel circuit deg-
radation or fuel circuit failure is selected as top event in the current study. An extract 
of the compiled tree, produced with the Arbre-Analyste software (Clement, 2013), 
is presented in fig. 5-9, where the top event is decomposed according to the phe-
nomena involved (thermal, chemical, mechanical, etc.); in fig. 5-10 the tree relative 
to the sub-event “Insufficient fuel cooling” is also reported. The second tree is just 
an example of analysis of a specific sub-event; in this case it is simple to highlight 
the initiating events that correspond to the last level of the tree, e.g. “Blockage of 
one or several sectors”, “Spurious stop of one or several fuel circuit pumps”, “Rup-
ture of one or several fuel circuit pumps”.   
P1.1.1 To provide 
fuel salt inventory 
in the core cavity 
      
P1.1.1.1 To keep 
and preserve the 
integrity and 
leak-tightness of 
the core cavity 
Core 
vessel 
NOp
-P 
Loss of 
contain-
ment 
leak-
tightness 
Leak/Ru
pture in 
the core 
vessel 
The fissile fuel 
flows outside 
the core cavity; 
The chain reac-
tion shuts down; 
The fissile fuel 
is collected in 
the collector; 
The fissile fuel 
is drained in the 
EDS and cooled 
down in order to 
remove residual 
heat; 
Etc. 
Loss Of 
Liquid 
Fuel  in 
the bot-
tom part 
of the 
core cav-
ity: 
Breach in 
the lower 
reflector  
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Figure 5-9 Extract of the MSFR MLD 
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Figure 5-10 Part of the MLD related to the "Insufficient fuel cooling event" 
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5.2.3 Comparison of FFMEA and MLD 
The FFMEA and the MLD methods are based on different approaches: with the 
FFMEA the user is led to reason from a functional point of view by searching for 
the possible causes of the loss of the functions of the system and their consequences. 
Instead, the MLD approach is more phenomenological and the user identifies the 
causes of phenomena that can lead to the physical degradation of the system. Both 
methods have proved to be relevant for the purpose, despite some lacks of precise 
data on the MSFR components, systems or procedures. In the FFMEA the 
identification of the postulated initiating events is due to the loss of functions rather 
than the specific failures of systems and components; similarly, in the MLD the 
hazards identifications derives from the process main characteristics and is not 
linked to detailed design assumptions. Indeed, in both methods the link with the 
component is made explicit only in a second time, making them more suitable to an 
application at early design phase. Moreover, the two methods are qualitative, while 
the semi-quantitative estimation of the frequency and consequence in terms of 
macro-categories is performed for the categorization of the initiating events and the 
selection of the postulated initiating events, which are mainly based on engineering 
judgement. More quantitative methods will be implemented when the design details 
will be sufficient for the purpose.  
The two methods (FFMEA and MLD) gave similar results and many events 
were found redundantly. However, few events appeared only in one of the two anal-
yses. For the application of the MLD to the MSFR, risks have been differentiated 
according to the physical phenomena involved and the method also revealed risks 
caused by external hazards or by the action of other systems of the plant (e.g. aux-
iliary systems). In table 5-2, the selected PIEs are listed, specifying if they have 
been identified through the implementation of the FFMEA, of the MLD or both. 
For instance, the event “Loss of Chemical Control: Chemical reaction between dif-
ferent fluids” only appeared through the MLD analysis: this represents a typical 
event identified by the MLD since its phenomenological approach. On the other 
hand, the FFMEA brought more details onto the failure modes thanks to the effort 
to link the loss of each function to one or more than one component or system fail-
ures. For instance, even if the breach in the upper reflector was well identified with 
the MLD, the FFMEA highlighted the fact that the breach could involve the rupture 
of the wall cooling systems and/or the expansion vessel system, according to its 
location and its deepness.  
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The FFMEA has the advantage to sketch a plausible accident evolution and to 
provide additional information on the systems or procedures used for detection, 
prevention and mitigation, while the MLD offers a good graphical tool to present 
the hazards and helps understand the logical connections (AND/OR) between them. 
In conclusion, the combined use of the FFMEA and the MLD methods proved 
to be useful to ensure a more complete identification of the hazards and initiating 
events of the MSFR. This list cannot be considered final, but it will be updated, as 
new deterministic results are available, and the design is detailed. In addition, as a 
complementary result, both the methods helped to highlight the open points of the 
project, which are presented in Annex A and could be taken into account during 
next steps of the design, with their advantages and drawbacks, in the logic of a 
safety-driven design.  
5.2.4 List of postulated initiating events  
The first result obtained from the application of the methodology is a list of 
initiating events. Among the set of elementary events challenging the plant in sim-
ilar way and producing equivalent fault plant conditions, the most severe accident 
initiators in terms of potential radiological consequences (given in particular the 
related solicitations on confinement barriers) are selected as PIEs, according to the 
methodology described in paragraph 4.3.3.  
Table 5-2 lists the PIEs obtained through the implementation of the FFMEA 
and the MLD, accordingly to the design stage. The table contains many events, 
conscious that the list can be refined in a later stage of the design. 
 
Table 5-2 List of Postulated Initiating Events. Selection made on the expected conse-
quences of the events; if the code of the PIE contains an ‘F’, the event has been identified 
through the application of the FFMEA, if the code of the PIE contains an ‘M’, the event 
has been added to the list thanks to the application of the MLD, if the code of the PIE 
contains ‘FM’, the event was a result of both the methods (Gérardin et al., 2019). 
PIE-F-1 
Loss of liquid fuel in the upper part of the core cavity: Breach the 
upper reflector with rupture of the structure cooling system (without 
damages to the expansion vessel system) 
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PIE-F-2 
Loss of liquid fuel in the upper part of the core cavity: Breach in the 
upper reflector with rupture of a radial fuel outlet pipe (without dam-
ages to the structure cooling system) 
PIE-F-3 Loss of liquid fuel in the bottom part of the core cavity: Rupture of a pipe of the reactivity control system 
PIE-F-4 Loss of liquid fuel in the bottom part of the core cavity: Breach in the lower reflector (with rupture of the structure cooling system) 
PIE-F-5 Loss of integrity of the core cavity: Complete (internal + external) rupture of the pressurized sampling device 
PIE-F-6 Loss of integrity of the core cavity: Breach of a heat exchanger plate/channel 
PIE-F-7 
Loss of integrity of the core cavity: Rupture of blanket tank wall be-
tween fuel and fertile salt with rupture of the cooling circuit for inter-
nal structures 
PIE-F-8 Loss of pressure/volume control in the core cavity: Obstruction of the vertical inlet pipe for the fuel from the core to the expansion vessel 
PIE-F-9 
Loss of pressure/volume control in the core cavity: Rupture of the 
connection between the free surface of the fuel storage tank and the 
free surface of the core for the gas in the part between the core cavity 
and the valve 
PIE-FM-
10 Loss of liquid fuel flow: Complete rupture of the pump   
PIE-FM-
11 
Loss of criticality control: Reactivity insertion accident: Accidental 
insertion of fuel 
PIE-FM-
12 
Loss of criticality control: The welded joints taking the recirculation 
sectors in the correct position collapse 
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PIE-F-13 Loss of chemistry control: Rupture/obstruction of reactivity bubble injector 
PIE-FM-
14 
Loss of chemistry control: Rupture of horizontal bubble injector for 
salt cleaning 
PIE-F-15 Loss of chemistry control: External rupture of the gas separation chamber from the liquid part 
PIE-F-16 Loss of chemistry control: External rupture of the gas separation chamber from the gases part  
PIE-FM-
17 Overcooling: overworking of one of the fuel salt pump  
PIE-M-18 Overcooling of the intermediate circuit: conversion circuit pump overworking  
PIE-FM-
19 Overcooling: Over-working of the pump of the intermediate circuit 
PIE-M-20 Loss of heat sink: Leakage of intermediate salt   
PIE-M-21 Loss of heat sink: complete rupture of one or more than one interme-diate pump  
PIE-M-22 Total loss of electric power 
PIE-M-23 Mechanical degradation: external aggression (e.g. earthquake)  
PIE-M-24 Mechanical degradation: Ejection of a conversion system component in direction of the fuel circuit  
PIE-M-25 Chemical degradation: Chemical reaction between different fluids (e.g. hot part of intermediate circuit and water)  
 
If the code of the PIE contains an ‘F’, the event has been identified through the 
application of the FFMEA, if the code of the PIE contains an ‘M’, the event has 
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been added to the list thanks to the application of the MLD, if the code of the PIE 
contains ‘FM’, the event was a result of both the methods (Gérardin et al., 2019).  
5.2.5 Selection according to the frequency and the consequences 
of the initiating events 
An alternative approach has also been applied, where the IEs are categorized 
according to their occurrence frequency (in terms of orders of magnitude) and their 
consequences on the plant and the most representative events of each category are 
then selected as PIEs. This categorization is useful to determine the level of the 
safety studies that should be undertaken in the next steps of the safety approach. 
Indeed, it allows increasing the effort on the events that have a high probability of 
occurrence and high consequences and for which more stringent criteria should be 
used.  
Method 
This second approach used in order to classify the IEs (according to their fre-
quency and consequences) and select a restricted list of PIEs is described below and 
is summarized in fig. 5-11. 
 
Figure 5-11 Method for the selection of the PIEs 
 As for the first approach, all the elementary IEs are listed in a unique document 
and are grouped into families, depending on their potential effects on the reactor. 
The families of events identified for the MSFR are currently: 
• F1: Reactivity insertion 
• F2: Loss of fuel flow 
• F3: Increase of heat extraction/over-cooling 
• F4: Decrease of heat extraction 
• F5: Loss of fuel circuit tightness 
• F6: Loss of fuel composition/chemistry control 
Classification of the 
events by families
Classification of the 
events of each 
family in categories 
Selection of the 
most representative 
events in each 
family and category 
as PIEs
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• F7: Fuel circuit structures over-heating 
• F8: Loss of cooling of other systems containing radioactive materials 
• F9: Loss of containment of radioactive materials in other systems 
• F10: Mechanical degradation of the fuel circuit 
• F11: Loss of pressure control in fuel circuit 
• F12: Conversion circuit leak 
• F13: Loss of electric power supply 
 
This list will be updated with the progress of the MSFR safety analysis if other 
phenomena are identified. Some events can appear in several families at the same 
time. For instance, the event “Detachment of the thermal protection” (to prevent the 
damage to the structures due to the high temperature in the fuel circuit) appears in 
the families “Reactivity Insertion’’, “Loss of Fuel Flow” and “Fuel Circuit Struc-
tures Over-Heating”.  
Subsequently, event categories are defined with frequency ranges. Given the 
premature state of the current design and the large uncertainties on the frequencies 
of most of the events, only three macro-categories have been used for the classifi-
cation: 
• Incidents characterized by a frequency of occurrence higher than 10−2 
event/reactorˑyear; 
• Accidents characterized by a frequency of occurrence between 10−2 and 
10−6-10−7 event/reactorˑyear;  
• Limiting events characterized by an extremely low likelihood; their fre-
quency of occurrence is lower than 10−6 - 10−7 event/reactorˑyear or they 
can be postulated, based on the defence in depth principle. 
 
Some scenarios or phenomena have been classified as “limiting events”, even 
if no specific cause of the scenario/phenomenon have yet been identified, because 
they constitute bounding cases or specific risks for the concept. Thus, they should 
be documented in the next steps of the safety approach. The objective is to drive 
the analysis towards the consideration of all phenomena of potential interest (for 
example fuel salt freezing scenario, postulated prompt critical power excursion with 
induced shockwave, etc.). The classification of the events into categories is also 
linked to the expected consequences of the IEs. Since an event with a high occur-
rence frequency and large consequences is unacceptable, some dispositions should 
be taken in the design to diminish its consequences or to reduce its frequency and 
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bring it down into a category of lower frequency. Using different words, if a sce-
nario has a frequency of occurrence higher than 10−2 event/reactorˑyear, it is classi-
fied as an incident and in order to be considered acceptable its consequences must 
be low enough; according to the INES scale (International Nuclear and Radiologi-
cal Event Scale) introduced by IAEA in 1990, from a safety point of view even a 
serious incident cannot produce lethal health effect, otherwise preventive or miti-
gative measures must be implemented in order to reduce its frequency or its conse-
quences. Similarly, if a scenario has a frequency of occurrence between 10−2 and 
10−6-10−7 event/reactorˑyear, it is classified as an accident; since the low frequency, 
lethal effects are considered tolerable according to the INES scale. If a scenario has 
a frequency of occurrence lower than 10−6 - 10−7 event/reactorˑyear or they can be 
postulated, it is classified as a limiting event, characterized by the worst tolerable 
consequences. At this point of the analysis, the INES scale is not the only possible 
option to distinguish incident, accident and limiting events and it only refers to ef-
fects on population and environment (radioactive release).  
Due to the lack of information in this phase of the design, regarding in particular 
the normal and emergency procedures and the possibility to rapidly recover the fuel 
from the EDS, the consequences related to the operability of the reactor have not 
been considered.  
The simplified Farmer diagram used for the MSFR safety analysis is presented 
in fig. 5-12. The evaluation of the event frequency and their categorization is based 
on expert judgment and available experience feedbacks, especially referring to the 
Oak Ridge reports (Haubenreich, 1968). As the occurrence frequency of a given 
event may be difficult to assess at this stage, considering an event in a given acci-
dent category may also be seen as an objective to be further aimed at design level 
and checked in future analysis (Allibert et al., 2018). 
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Figure 5-12 Simplified Farmer diagram used for the classification of the MSFR initiating 
events 
Finally, PIEs are identified as the most severe events in a given family and a 
given category (i.e. in a given occurrence frequency range). Therefore, not only the 
low probability cases with potentially severe consequences should be identified, but 
also the “not so low probability events” for which criteria will be more stringent.  
The classification of the events and the selection of the PIE is illustrated in table 
5-3, applied to the «F2: Loss of Fuel Flow » family.  Each initiating event/func-
tional failure (in the first column) is classified in a category (in the second column) 
and associated to a PIE (in the third column). Events that are themselves selected 
as PIEs are written in bold. The PIEs selected with this approach are listed in the 
next section.  
Table 5-3 Extract of the list of initiating events for the family “F2: Loss of Fuel Flow” 
Functional failure  Category Associated PIE 
Failure of one or several fuel circuit 
Pump Incident 
Failure of one or several (up to all) 
fuel circuit Pump 
Failure of all fuel circuit pumps Incident Failure of one or several (up to all) fuel circuit Pump 
Spurious speed reduction of the fuel 
circuit pumps Incident 
Failure of one or several (up to all) 
fuel circuit Pump 
Blockage of one or several sectors 
of fuel salt circuit  Accident 
Blockage of one or several sectors 
of fuel salt circuit  
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Rupture of one or several fuel cir-
cuit pumps Accident 
Rupture or blockage of one or 
several fuel circuit pumps  
Blockage of one or several fuel cir-
cuit pumps Accident 
Rupture or blockage of one or sev-
eral fuel circuit pumps 
Distortion of the geometry of the 
pipe that makes the fuel swirl Accident 
Blockage of one or several sectors 
of fuel salt circuit  
Compression of a part of the fuel 
circuit Accident  
Blockage of one or several sectors 
of fuel salt circuit  
Obstruction of HX pipes/plate Accident Blockage of one or several sectors of fuel salt circuit  
Distortion of salt extraction from 
the core to the heat exchanger Accident 
Blockage of one or several sectors 
of fuel salt circuit  
Distortion of salt injection from the 
heat exchanger to the core Accident 
Blockage of one or several sectors 
of fuel salt circuit  
Rupture of the cooling system for 
the pump 
Accident Rupture or blockage of one or sev-
eral fuel circuit pumps 
Blockage of the cooling system for 
the pump 
Accident Rupture or blockage of one or sev-
eral fuel circuit pumps 
Fuel circuit pump speed reduction Accident Failure of one or several (up to all) fuel circuit Pump 
Complete rupture of a fuel circuit 
pump with breach on the pump shaft 
at the level of the sector lid 
Accident Rupture or blockage of one or sev-
eral fuel circuit pumps 
Defect of sealing within the compo-
nents of the sector 
Accident Blockage of one or several sectors 
of fuel salt circuit  
Detachment of the thermal protec-
tion  
Accident Blockage of one or several sectors 
of fuel salt circuit  
Rupture/collapse of the sector frame 
/support 
Accident Blockage of one or several sectors 
of fuel salt circuit  
Rupture of the sector suspension 
system (welded joints taking the 
sector in the correct position) 
Accident Blockage of one or several sectors 
of fuel salt circuit  
Fuel salt freezing scenario Limiting event Fuel salt freezing scenario 
Rupture or blockage of all fuel cir-
cuit pumps 
Limiting 
event 
Rupture or blockage of all fuel 
circuit pumps 
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Blockage of all sectors of fuel salt 
circuit 
Limiting 
event 
Blockage of all sectors of fuel salt 
circuit  
 
The classification of the initiating events (IEs) in terms of incidents, accidents 
or limiting events is performed on the basis of the available data, considering anal-
ogies with respect to operating reactors and the experts’ judgement.  
Among the incidents, the failure of one fuel circuit pump or the spurious reduc-
tion of its speed are considered. The contemporary failure of all the pumps is also 
classified as an incident because the event can be caused by common cause failures 
that still have to be analyzed, e.g. the loss of electric power. It is highly plausible 
that the consequences of the contemporary failure of all the circuit pumps are worse 
than the consequences of a single pump failure (partial or complete). Therefore, the 
former event will be analyzed rather than the latter. The consequences of this event 
must be accurately quantified in order to understand if they are acceptable (hence, 
the classification of the event as an incident can be kept) or if they must be reduced 
through modifications of the design (e.g. eliminating the CCF) or though preventive 
or mitigative actions to be included into the project. It is important to highlight that 
the pumps are equipped by a flywheel that allows a slow reduction of the fuel 
flowrate, rather than an abrupt stop, noting that this applies in case of spurious stop 
or failure of the pump. On the other hand, all the events implying the rupture or the 
blockage of the pump cannot profit of this inertia; therefore, they are considered 
more severe, due to the rapid transient. Different initiators are identified, e.g. broken 
pieces of the fuel circuit carried through the pump, or the distortion of the fuel cir-
cuit geometry.  These events are considered less frequent than the failure of one or 
several pumps; hence, they are classified as accidents. Since at the current stage of 
the design and of the deterministic analyses it is hard to understand the differences 
between the blockage and the rupture of the pumps, the associated PIE is “rupture 
or blockage of one or several fuel circuit pumps”.  As before, a proper analysis for 
the identification of plausible CCF causing the contemporary rupture/blockage of 
all the fuel circuit pumps has not been performed yet. Nevertheless, the partial loss 
of fuel flow, classified as an accident, is distinguished by the total loss of fuel flow, 
classified as a limiting event. This classification is based on engineering judgement.   
Moreover, the event “Blockage of one or several sectors of fuel salt circuit” is 
classified as a PIE. This is an example of possible excess of detail in the definition 
of the PIEs list; in fact, it is possible that in a later stage of the analysis the PIEs 
“Rupture or blockage of one or several fuel circuit pumps” and “Blockage of one 
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or several sectors of fuel salt circuit” will be merged together. Also in this case the 
blockage/rupture of one sector is distinguished from the event “Blockage of all sec-
tors of fuel salt circuit” that in this analysis is classified as a limiting event.  
For all the events previously mentioned, the role of the natural convection must 
be clearly defined relying on detailed deterministic simulations and experimental 
campaigns.  
The event “Detachment of the thermal protection” is not considered a PIE for 
the family “Loss of fuel flow”, but it will be selected inside the families “Reactivity 
insertion” and “Fuel circuit structures over-heating”.  
For the event “Fuel salt freezing scenario”, no explicit causes are identified; 
nevertheless, this event is kept in the list since it can be interesting from a phenom-
enological point of view and it can result fundamental for the reactor dimensioning.  
This analysis allowed identifying a certain number of events to be analyzed 
through DPAs for the safety demonstration. In the next paragraph, the PIEs for each 
family are presented, without the reference to the complete list of initiators.   
 
Results 
The next paragraphs list the selected PIEs, which are considered the most rep-
resentative accident initiators in terms of frequency of occurrence and radiological 
consequences. The PIEs are presented by family of phenomena and then, inside 
each family, by category of frequency. 
F1: Reactivity Insertion 
The events listed in this family challenge one of the safety function “control the 
chain reaction”. The reactivity variations can be caused by modifications of the fuel 
composition/density, of the core geometry and of the temperature of the fuel salt. It 
is important to notice that the events related to the variation of the heat extraction 
are treated in the families “Increase/Decrease of heat extraction” (F3/F4), the for-
mer causing a positive reactivity insertion, the latter causing a reactivity reduction. 
The events are listed in table 5-4.  
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Table 5-4 List of PIEs of the family F1 (Reactivity insertion) 
Category PIE 
Incident • Limited precipitation of fissile matter on cold parts and release 
in core 
• Involuntary/excessive addition of the fuel salt 
• Addition of fuel salt with a too high concentration of fissile 
matter  
• Addition of too cold fuel salt 
• Failure/spurious shut down of the bubbling system 
• Fuel circuit structures over-cooling 
• Fertile salt over-cooling 
• Insufficient addition/ involuntary removal of fuel salt  - nega-
tive reactivity insertion 
• Addition of fuel salt with a too low concentration of fissile 
matter  - negative reactivity insertion 
• Addition of too hot fuel salt  - negative reactivity insertion 
• Too high bubbles injection  - negative reactivity insertion 
Accident • Detachment of the thermal protection 
• Incorrect fuel salt composition (too high amount of fissile ma-
ter) and/or too fast loading  
• Addition of fuel salt in the fertile blanket 
Limiting event • Important deformation of the fuel circuit leading to an in-
creased core volume (e.g. fall of a sector, deformation of fertile 
blanket wall, etc...) (PIE-FM-12) 
• Fertile blanket loading with fuel salt 
• Fuel salt freezing scenario  
• Bulk precipitation of fissile matter (e.g. inlet of water) 
 
F2: Loss of Fuel Flow (LOFF) 
This family has already been discussed in the previous paragraph where the 
method has been described. The events are reported in table 5-5 for the sake of 
completeness.  
Table 5-5 List of PIEs of the family F2 (Loss of Fuel Flow) 
Category PIE 
Incident • Failure of one or several (up to all)  fuel circuit Pumps 
Accident • Blockage of one or several sectors of fuel salt circuit  
• Rupture or blockage of one or several fuel circuit pump 
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Limiting event • Fuel salt freezing scenario 
• Rupture or blockage of all fuel circuit pumps (PIE-FM-10) 
• Blockage all sectors of fuel salt circuit  
 
F3: Increase of Heat Extraction/Over-cooling (OVC) 
The major effect of the increase of heat extraction may be the overcooling of 
the fuel salt. Due to the feedback reaction, it implies a positive insertion of reactiv-
ity, therefore an increase of temperature. The major risks associated to the events 
of this family are:  
• Too high temperature in the hot leg (especially inside the heat exchanger, 
where there is no thermal protection);  
• Too low temperature in the cold leg, with the possibility of localized fuel 
salt freezing.  
The PIEs associated to this family are listed in table 5-6. 
Table 5-6 List of PIEs of the family F3 (Increase of Heat Extraction/Overcooling) 
Category PIE 
Incident • Over-working of one or several (up to all) fuel circuit pumps 
(PIE-FM-17) 
• Overworking of one or several (up to all) intermediate circuit 
pumps (PIE-FM-19) 
• Over-cooling at conversion circuit level (PIE-M-18) 
• Over-cooling of the structures cooling system  
• Over-cooling of the fertile blanket cooling system  
Accident • Over-cooling at loading or at low power 
 
The overcooling of the fuel salt can be caused by the increase of the flowrate 
of the fuel salt or of the intermediate salt, due to an overworking of the fuel circuit 
pumps or of the intermediate circuit pumps. This implies a more efficient heat ex-
change between the fuel circuit and the intermediate circuit. Moreover, a malfunc-
tion of the BoP can cause an overcooling of the intermediate circuit, which influ-
ences the fuel circuit temperatures. The BoP cooling fluid has not been defined yet, 
so it is not possible to better detail this point.  
110 Errore. Per applicare Heading 1 al testo da visualizzare in questo punto, 
utilizzare la scheda Home. 
 
In addition, an overcooling of the structures and fertile blanket cooling circuits 
can affect the fuel circuit temperatures, even if, at this point of the study, the effects 
are considered weak. However, further analyses are necessary to confirm this point, 
therefore the event is kept in the list of table 5-6.  
The case of overcooling at low power is considered more severe, since there is 
more potential for overcooling at this state.  
 
F4: Decrease of Heat Extraction 
The events listed in this family challenge one of the safety function “The con-
trol of heat removal to an ultimate heat sink”. It is important to notice that in this 
section are considered only the events related to the circuits cooling the fuel salt 
(i.e. the intermediate circuit and the BoP). The phenomena linked to the loss of fuel 
salt flow are considered in the family “F2: Loss of Fuel Flow”.  
The PIEs associated to this family are listed in table 5-7. 
Table 5-7 List of PIEs of the family F4 (Decrease of Heat Extraction) 
Category PIE 
Incident • Loss of heat extraction at conversion circuit level 
• Unwanted closure of a valve/gate in the intermediate circuit  
• Failure/shut down of one or several (up to all) intermediate 
pumps  
• Loss of main heat sink (water)  
Accident • Inadvertent opening of a draining valve of the intermediate cir-
cuit  
• Leakage of the intermediate salt outside core vessel, in reactor 
vessel or reactor building (e.g. pipe rupture) (PIE-M-20) 
• Rupture/blockage of one or several (up to all) intermediate cir-
cuit pump (PIE-M-21) 
• Obstruction/Blockage of the intermediate circuit (e.g. freezing 
in conversion HX) 
Limiting 
event 
• Complete loss of the intermediate salt (e.g. complete draining, 
large breach) of all intermediate circuit 
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The loss of heat extraction can be caused by the loss of flow of the intermediate 
circuit. It can be due, for example, to the failure of one (or several) pump of the 
intermediate circuit, the spurious closing of an intermediate circuit valve, the ob-
struction of the intermediate circuit (e.g. because of a freezing in the heat exchanger 
between the intermediate circuit and the BoP or accumulation of corrosion prod-
ucts). Consequently, the heat exchange decreases up to the point where the temper-
atures of the fuel salt and the intermediate salt are equal. Then, both the tempera-
tures increase. As discussed for the family “F2: Loss of Fuel Flow”, the rup-
ture/blockage of the pump is more severe than the failure, due to the loss of inertia 
ensured by the flywheel. In the case of pump failures, the role of the natural con-
vection must be analyzed. As reported in the design description, paragraph 5.1, 
there are four intermediate circuits, therefore all the mentioned events regard only 
one circuit. On the other hand, the heat extraction from the fuel circuit can be zeroed 
in the case of complete loss of the intermediate salt (e.g. because of a spurious 
draining of the intermediate circuit or a catastrophic breach). This event involves 
all the four circuit. Its frequency is preliminary judged low enough to be classified 
as a limiting event.  
Moreover, the loss of heat extraction can be caused by a loss of flow in the BoP 
or a loss of the ultimate heat sink. The components constituting these systems are 
non safety-relevant components, therefore their failure rates imply that the related 
initiating events are classified as incidents. The consequences of these events will 
be evaluated by future studies in order to understand if mitigating measures will be 
necessary (e.g. an emergency cooling system for the intermediate circuit alternative 
to the BoP). 
 
F5: Loss of Fuel Circuit Tightness 
The PIEs associated to this family are listed in table 5-8. 
Table 5-8 List of PIEs of the family F5 (Loss of Fuel circuit tightness) 
Category PIE 
Incident • Spurious opening or failure to close the gate isolating the fuel 
circuit from the fuel salt sampling system 
• Spurious opening or failure to close the gate allowing the rou-
tine fuel salt draining 
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Accident • Fuel salt leak – Spurious draining of the fuel circuit to the 
EDS 
• Fuel salt leak - Unwanted draining to storage tank 
• Rupture of a routine draining pipe  
• Rupture of the lower reflector (with rupture of the structure 
cooling system) (PIE-F-4) 
• Rupture of the upper reflector with possible damage to the 
structure cooling system and/or to the expansion vessel sys-
tem (PIE-F-1/2) 
• Rupture of the fuel circuit in the gas part (e.g. fuel circuit lid) 
(PIE-F-5) 
• Rupture of the connection between the free surface of the 
EDS and the free surface of the core for the gas 
• Rupture of a heat exchanger plate/channel between the fuel 
circuit and the intermediate circuit (PIE-F-6) 
• Rupture of blanket tank wall between fuel and fertile salt with 
or without rupture of the structures cooling system. (PIE-F-7) 
• Rupture of the bubble injector of the bubbling system for fuel 
salt purification (PIE-FM-14) 
• Rupture of the gas processing unit (with possible leak of pro-
cessing fluid)  
• Fuel salt leak - Rupture of the core vessel 
• Abnormal fuel salt inlet in the gas processing unit (through 
gas separation chamber) e.g. rupture of gas separation cham-
ber (PIE-F-16) 
 
The events of this family regard all the components in contact with the fuel salt 
in normal operation during power production:  
• The pressurized sampling device: the “spurious opening of the gate isolating 
the fuel circuit from the fuel salt sampling system” can cause the exit of the 
gaseous FPs from the first barrier to the second barrier. Since this event is 
linked to the failure rate of a valve, it is classified as an incident.  
• The routine fuel draining tanks: the “Spurious opening or failure to close 
the gate allowing the routine fuel salt draining” can cause, as before, the exit 
of the gaseous FP from the first barrier to the second barrier. Since this event 
is linked to the failure rate of a valve, it is classified as an incident. Other 
examples are the “Unwanted draining to storage tank” and the “Rupture of 
a routine draining pipe”. The former event is interesting since the normal 
operation shutdown procedure foresees that the fuel salt remains in-core for 
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a while; in fact, the routine draining tanks are not dimensioned for evacuat-
ing the decay heat during the first phases after the stop of the chain reaction. 
The latter event is interesting since it does not involve a loss of salt until the 
routine draining process is trigger; thus highlighting the importance of the 
failure detection.  
• The emergency draining system: for example, the “Spurious draining of the 
fuel circuit to the EDS” does not imply the exit of the fuel from the first 
barrier. On the other hand, the event “Rupture of the connection between 
the free surface of the EDS and the free surface of the core for the gas” 
involves the exit of the gaseous FPs from the first barrier to the second bar-
rier. Both these events are classified as accidents by experts’ elicitation. 
Several check-valves can be foreseen to mitigate the consequences of this 
IE.  
• The online bubbling system: the events “Rupture of the bubble injector of 
the bubbling system for fuel salt purification” and “Abnormal fuel salt inlet 
in the gas processing unit (through gas separation chamber)” can imply the 
entry of the fuel salt into the bubbling system, and thus its degradation. Con-
versely, the event “Rupture of the gas processing unit (with possible leak of 
processing fluid)” can involve the exit of the processing fluid and its mixing 
with the fuel salt. Therefore, to demonstrate the compatibility of these fluids 
is fundamental. It is worth to note that the consequences of these events 
never cross the first barrier since the bubbling system and the gas process 
unit are entirely located inside it.  
• The heat exchanger: the event “Rupture of a heat exchanger plate/channel 
between the fuel circuit and the intermediate circuit” implies the mixing of 
the fuel salt and the intermediate salt (also in this case the chemical compat-
ibility of these two fluids needs to be ensured). The circulation of the salts 
helps the mixing process and the diffusion of the FPs in the intermediate 
circuit. The higher pressure of the intermediate salt with respect to the fuel 
salt delays the exit of the fissile matter from the first barrier, giving a certain 
grace time for the accident managing. The implementation of check valves 
can help limiting the effects of the failures to the involved sector, mitigating 
the consequences. 
• The fertile blanket: the event “Rupture of blanket tank wall between fuel 
and fertile salt with or without rupture of the structures cooling system” in-
volves the mixing between the fissile and fertile salt. As described in the 
previous paragraph, the fertile blanket pressure can be higher than the fuel 
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circuit, in order to maintain the fissile matter in-core. Nevertheless, fertile 
blanket is still inside the first barrier. Remembering that the fertile blanket 
has to be cooled down, it is relevant to consider the case if the rupture in-
volves also the cooling structures, with a consequent mixing of the fuel salt, 
the fertile salt and the intermediate salt and the escape of the radioactive 
matter from the first to the second barrier.  
• Structures of the fuel circuit: the consequences of the events of failure of the 
fuel circuit structures depend on the dimension of the breach. In case of a 
large breach, the fuel is drained in direction of the EDS, therefore the con-
sequences are the same as the event “Spurious draining of the fuel circuit to 
the EDS”, with a possible escape of the gaseous FPs; conversely, in the case 
of a small breach, the fuel salt can freeze in contact with the air and thus 
cover the failure. Moreover, if the failure happens in the lower reflector, it 
can involve also the structure cooling system, with consequences analogous 
to the one described in the previous paragraph. If the failure happens in the 
upper reflector, it can affect also the expansion vessel and the pressurized 
sampling device.  
It is worth to note that, in all the considered cases, the radioactive products 
never exit from the second barrier. In many cases the fuel is drained in the EDS, 
where it is supposed to be in case of accident. Some IEs involve the mixing of 
fluids: this is a theme of research inside the SAMOFAR project, where the team 
focusing on the chemical risks works on the identification of the proper materials 
and fluids, also according to the reciprocal compatibility in case of accident.  
F6: Loss of Fuel Composition/Chemistry Control 
The events included in this family can affect the critical composition/tempera-
ture, produce unexpected chemical reactions, and worsen the corrosion processes.  
The PIEs associated to this family are listed in table 5-9. 
Table 5-9 List of PIEs of the family F6 (Loss of Fuel Composition/Chemistry Control) 
Category PIE 
Incident • Inability to control and adjust the fuel salt composition (via 
sampling system and reprocessing unit) 
• Failure of the system measuring the redox-potential 
• Failure/shut down of the bubbling system 
• Incorrect management of fuel composition in reprocessing 
unit  
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• Release of particles (HX, filters, etc.) 
• Inlet of impurities in small quantities impacting redox poten-
tial (e.g. Fe3+, tracks of oxygen or humidity)  
Accident • Rupture of the gas processing unit (with possible leak of pro-
cessing fluid) 
• Obstruction/blockage of the bubbling system for fuel salt pu-
rification (PIE-F-13) 
Limiting event • Inlet of water 
• Draining/inlet of the fuel salt in a tank containing water  
 
The event “Inability to control and adjust the fuel salt composition (via the 
sampling system and the reprocessing unit)” makes the total inventory of fissile 
matter decrease and the FPs inventory increase, modifying the  composition of the 
salt and consequently departing from criticality. Nevertheless, this process is slow 
because compensated by the breeding of Th-232. The event “Incorrect management 
of fuel composition in the reprocessing unit” can insert fuel salt with a too high or 
too low fissile concentration. The event “Failure/shut down of the bubbling system” 
makes the FPs inventory increase. The “Release of particles” (e.g. precipitates’ 
clusters or corrosion products) can cause the local variation of the fuel salt compo-
sition.  
The events involving the mix of different fluids impact the reactivity level, be-
cause of the composition modification. Moreover, the chemical compatibility of the 
missing fluids must be evaluated. The fluids that can potentially enter in the fuel 
circuit are:  
• The fertile salt: since it is of the same nature as the fissile salt, the two are 
compatible; hence, no chemical reactions are expected but an effect on the 
system reactivity is anyway expected.  
• The intermediate salt: even if the intermediate salt composition is not defin-
itive, the plausible choices are all compatible with the fuel salt; further stud-
ies may be necessary to study its behavior at higher temperatures (i.e. the 
intermediate salt temperature increases when in touch with the fuel salt, with 
possible dissociation phenomena, to be further analyzed). 
• The purifying fluid: even if this fluid has not been defined yet, a proposition 
is to use lead (as for the MOSEL concept, see (Kasten, 1964)). Lead and the 
fuel salt cannot mix; therefore, two separate phases will be formed. Moreo-
ver, the Pb density is higher than the fuel salt density; hence, it will descend 
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in the bottom part of the fuel circuit. Finally, the corrosive power of the Pb 
increases with temperature. The long-terms effects of this corrosion must be 
evaluated in order to understand if the involved risks are acceptable.  
• Air (in particular the O2): from chemical analysis, it has been demonstrated 
that the fuel salt does not react in contact with air. Therefore, this is not 
considered a PIE.  
• Water: from chemical analysis, it has been shown that the fuel salt reacts 
with water producing HF and oxides of uranium and thorium, with a risk of 
vapor cloud explosion. The events involving a reaction between the fuel salt 
and the water (“Inlet of water” and “Draining/inlet of the fuel salt in a tank 
containing water”) are classified as limiting events, even if their specific 
causes have not been identified, yet. In order to minimize the probability of 
these events, alternative EDS cooling solutions are explored.  
The corrosion phenomenon is mainly driven by the redox potential. The IEs 
impacting it are “Failure of the system measuring the redox-potential”, “Inlet of 
impurities in small quantities impacting redox potential (e.g. Fe3+, tracks of oxygen 
or humidity)”, “Failure/shut down of the bubbling system”, “Obstruction/blockage 
of the bubbling system for fuel salt purification”. Corrosion can challenge the in-
tegrity of the fuel circuit; therefore, corrosion detection methods should be put in 
place in order to optimize maintenance procedures.  
 
F7: Fuel Circuit Structures Over-Heating 
The PIEs associated to this family are listed in table 5-10. 
Table 5-10 List of PIEs of the family F7 (Fuel Circuit Structures Over-Heating) 
Category PIE 
Incident • Failure of the circuit cooling down the structures (Obstruc-
tion, pump failure/rupture, etc.) 
Accident • Detachment of the thermal protection 
 
The IEs considered for this family are only two:  
• The “Failure of the circuit cooling down the structure” can have different 
causes, e.g. pump failure/blockage, pipe obstruction, etc. The structures 
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cooling circuit is not completely described, yet; nevertheless, this transient 
is expected to be slow due to the inertia of the system;  
• The “Detachment of the thermal protection” can challenge the structures, 
especially in the location where the detachment actually occurs. A higher 
coolant flowrate must be foreseen to compensate the loss of this protection. 
 
F8: Loss of Cooling of Other Systems Containing Radioactive Materials 
The elements containing radioactive matter are the fertile blanket, the gas pro-
cessing unit and the fuel salt reprocessing unit. These components must evacuate 
the decay heat (safety function). Among these systems, the decay heat associated 
to the gas processing unit is the highest. Nonetheless, the cooling of all the systems 
must be ensured. For example, the loss of cooling of the fertile blanket can be 
caused by the failure/rupture of a fertile circuit pump, the obstruction of the fertile 
circuit, etc.  
The PIEs associated to this family are listed in table 5-11. 
Table 5-11 List of PIEs of the family F8 (Loss of cooling of other systems containing ra-
dioactive materials) 
Category PIE 
Incident • Loss of Fertile salt cooling – Failure/rupture of the fertile cir-
cuit pump. 
• Loss of Fertile salt cooling – Failure of the circuit cooling 
down the fertile blanket (obstruction, pump failure/rupture) 
• Loss of Gas processing cooling – failure of the cooling circuit 
for the gas processing unit 
 
F9: Loss of Containment of Radioactive Materials in Other Systems 
The events of this family are associated to the same components containing 
radioactive matter and treated in the previous paragraph about “F8: Loss of Cooling 
of Other Systems Containing Radioactive Materials”. These systems must guaran-
tee the integrity of the circuit (second safety function). In addition, all the systems 
dedicated to the handling and re-processing of the fissile salt, the fertile blanket and 
gas have to be considered. It is worth to note that the consequences of these events 
are limited by the small quantities reprocessed daily (e.g., 40 liters of fuel salt). 
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The PIEs associated to this family are listed in table 5-12. 
Table 5-12 List of PIEs of the family F9 (Loss of containment of radioactive materials in 
other systems) 
Category PIE 
Incident • Spurious opening or failure to close the gate isolating the 
fertile circuit from the fertile salt sampling system 
Accident • Rupture of the fertile salt sampling system 
• Rupture of the fuel salt sampling system 
• Rupture of a pipe of the intermediate circuit (outside core). 
• Rupture of the heat exchanger between the fertile circuit 
and its cooling circuit 
• Rupture of a fuel salt storage tank  
• Rupture of a fertile salt storage tank  
• Rupture of the gas sampling system 
 
For the fertile blanket, the considered events are “Spurious opening or failure 
to close the gate isolating the fertile circuit from the fertile salt sampling system” 
and “Rupture of the heat exchanger between the fertile circuit and its cooling cir-
cuit”: analogous events are considered for the fuel salt circuit (see PIEs of family 
“F5: Loss of Fuel Circuit Tightness”). In particular, the second event implies the 
mixing between the fertile salt and the intermediate salt, hence the diffusion of the 
fertile blanket radioactive matter present into the intermediate circuit. Also in this 
case, the fact that the intermediate circuit is at a higher pressure than the fertile salt 
can mitigate the consequences. 
Since the bubbling system is entirely in-core, the events of “Loss of Contain-
ment” of this system are already considered in the family “Loss of Fuel Circuit 
Tightness” and do not involve the failure of the first barrier. The failure modes of 
the gas process unit will be object of analysis of a forthcoming research project 
financed in the frame of the H2020 Programme, called SAMOSAFER.  
The intermediate salt is constantly subject to neutron irradiation; therefore, its 
activation must be evaluated. The event “Rupture of a pipe of the intermediate cir-
cuit (outside core)” considers the loss of activated intermediate salt: this is interest-
ing since it can occur at any point of the intermediate circuit, also in the heat ex-
changer between the intermediate salt and the BoP coolant. In the reference design, 
this component is located inside the reactor building, but other proposals place it 
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outside the reactor building, in order not to have a high-pressure component in the 
same building of the core. In this latter case, the considered event will cause a loss 
of radioactive material outside the reactor building.  
Similar considerations are valuable for the fissile and fertile salt storage tank, 
since their position has not been defined univocally. In the reference design, they 
are located inside the reactor building, but it is possible that they will be placed in 
a dedicated unit. The related IEs “Rupture of a fuel salt storage tank” and “Rupture 
of a fertile salt storage tank” can produce their consequences inside or outside the 
reactor building according to the design evolution.  
 
F10: Mechanical degradation of the fuel circuit 
The mechanical degradation of the fuel circuit can cause the rupture of other 
components or structural elements and challenge the integrity of the fuel circuit 
(first barrier). It is generally due to pressure variations and erosion phenomena. 
The PIEs associated to this family are listed in table 5-13. 
Table 5-13 List of PIEs of the family F10 (Mechanical degradation of the fuel circuit) 
Category PIE 
Incident • Abnormal flowrate/pressure fluctuations 
Accident • Blockage of fuel circuit pump 
• Water hammer (or “salt hammer”) in the fuel circuit 
• Presence of solid elements in the fuel circuit (extraneous 
elements, broken pieces of fuel circuit components, ag-
glomeration of element etc.) 
Limiting event • Shock wave produced by prompt criticality 
 
Among the pressure effects, the considered events are:  
• “Abnormal flowrate/pressure fluctuations”, which impose mechanical con-
straints on structures and components and can be caused by pumps malfunc-
tion or reactivity oscillations;  
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• “Water hammer (or “salt hammer”) in the fuel circuit”, which can be caused, 
for example, by the blockage of fuel circuit pump/sector;  
• “Shock wave produced by prompt criticality”, in fact, the increase of power 
induces the increase of temperature, which cause the dilation of the fuel and 
pressure increase.   
Among the erosion effects, the considered event is “Presence of solid elements 
in the fuel circuit (extraneous elements, broken pieces of fuel circuit components, 
agglomeration of element etc.)”.  
 
F11: Loss of Pressure Control in the Fuel Circuit 
Even if the fuel circuit is at ambient pressure, it is a closed system; therefore, 
in this family, all the events causing loss of pressure control in the fuel circuit are 
listed. In particular, the loss of control of the pressure of the fuel circuit is caused 
by the unavailability of the free levels causing the increase of pressure of the fuel 
salt.  
The PIEs associated to this family are listed in table 5-14. 
Table 5-14 List of PIEs of the family F11 (Loss of Pressure Control in the Fuel Circuit) 
Category PIE 
Incident • Abnormal flowrate/pressure fluctuations 
• Obstruction of the gas outlet pipes from expansion vessel 
Accident • Rupture of the expansion vessel 
• Gas sampling system discharge in fuel circuit 
• Obstruction of the vertical inlet pipe for the fuel from the 
core to the expansion vessel (PIE-F-8) 
Limiting event • Obstruction of all free levels  
• Inlet of water in the fuel circuit  
• Draining/inlet of the fuel salt in a tank containing water 
 
As reported in paragraph 5.1, in the fuel circuit different free levels are fore-
seen, all connected. Therefore, the pressure of the gaseous phase at the free level 
has to be continuously monitored. Different IEs modify the geometry of the free 
level and reduce their availability, e.g. “Obstruction of the gas outlet pipes from 
expansion vessel”, “Rupture of the expansion vessel”, “Obstruction of the vertical 
inlet pipe for the fuel from the core to the expansion vessel”. The prevented fuel 
 121 
 
 
salt dilation will cause an increase of the fuel salt pressure. The “Obstruction of all 
free levels” is classified as a limiting event; in fact, in this case an important increase 
of pressure, due to an important increase of temperature will not have the necessary 
space to evolve. The consequences of this event must be analyzed in detail.  
Some of the identified IEs cause an increase of fuel salt pressure: “Gas sam-
pling system discharge in fuel circuit”, “Inlet of water in the fuel circuit” and 
“Draining/inlet of the fuel salt in a tank containing water”. For the first event, the 
increase of pressure is due to the production of gaseous FPs. For the other two 
events, the increase of pressure is due to the chemical reactions between the fuel 
salt and the water, already explained for “F6: Loss of Fuel Composition/Chemistry 
Control”.  
Some of the listed events challenge the integrity of the fuel circuit; hence, the 
exit of the radioactive matter from the first to the second barrier.  
 
F12: Conversion circuit leak 
The PIEs associated to this family are listed in table 5-15. 
Table 5-15 List of PIEs of the family F12 (Conversion circuit leak) 
Category PIE 
Incident • Small leakage of the HX between the intermediate circuit 
and the energy conversion circuit 
• Leakage of the conversion fluid in/out of the reactor 
building (e.g. pipe rupture) 
Accident • Large leak of the heat exchanger between the intermedi-
ate circuit and the energy conversion circuit 
• Large breach of the conversion fluid in/out of the reactor 
building (e.g. pipe rupture) 
Limiting event • Ejection of a conversion circuit component (PIE-M-24) 
 
IT must be stressed that the BoP design is still conceptual and no details are 
provided about this unit. Therefore, only very qualitative considerations can drive 
the analysis. For example, it is chosen to distinguish the small breach (that are con-
sidered frequent, therefore classified as incidents) from the large breaches (that are 
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considered less frequent, therefore classifies as accidents). Any breach on this cir-
cuit implies the loss of the heat sink, which is a safety function. Moreover, the BoP 
fluid has not been selected, yet: different fluids are proposed: helium, supercritical 
CO2, supercritical water. Since the event “Small leakage of the HX between the 
intermediate circuit and the energy conversion circuit” implies the mixing between 
the BoP fluid and the intermediate salt, analyses of chemical compatibility must be 
performed. In addition, the BoP will be in pressure, while the intermediate salt is 
only weakly pressurized; hence, this kind of failure increases the intermediate cir-
cuit pressure. In case of a breach on the pipes entering the intermediate salt/BoP 
coolant heat exchanger, the component position results fundamental. In the refer-
ence design, it is inside the reactor building, which can be pressurized in case of 
failure.  
Lastly, the high pressure of the BoP can cause the ejection of a component that 
can hit other components. During the safety demonstration of the MSFR, it is fun-
damental to demonstrate that this projectile can never affect the fuel circuit.  
F13: Loss of electric power 
The PIEs associated to this family are listed in table 5-16. 
Table 5-16 List of PIEs of the family F13 (Loss of electric power) 
Category PIE 
Incident • Loss of electric power (grid)  
Accident • Total loss of power supply (PIE-M-22) 
 
The consequences of these IEs are generally summarized as the spurious stop 
of all the pumps (fuel circuit, intermediate circuit, BoP). The event “Total loss of 
power supply” implies the loss of all the electrical systems (normal operation sys-
tems and protection systems). In the safety report, this is usually divided according 
to the duration of the event. In the case of this analysis, it is not possible to perform 
detailed analyses since the electrical systems are not designed yet.  
5.2.6 Considerations  
These methodologies can be iteratively applied, following the design develop-
ment; similarly, the lists of the PIEs evolve with the detail of the design and the 
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investigation of the physical phenomena governing the behavior of the system, 
through deterministic analyses.  
It can be noted that many events identified with the first approach (FFMEA) 
also appear with the second approach (MLD). Most of the time, these events are 
classified in the “limiting event” or “accident” categories. The list of PIEs obtained 
with the second method takes into account these events but also the events with 
high occurrence frequency and low expected consequences. This list has been used 
to perform the next steps of the safety analysis that are presented in the following 
sections.  
In the next steps of the safety analysis, each identified PIE has to be discussed 
outlining the possible accidental sequences and deterministic analyses shall be per-
formed to verify the plant capacity to mitigate the consequences, to check the com-
pliance with safety limits and to drive the choices for the selection of the reference 
design.  
Annex A contains a list of open points (about systems, components, procedures, 
phenomena, etc.) that have been highlighted as a complementary result during the 
implementation of the FFMEA and the MLD for the compilation of the list of PIEs.  
 Identification of Safety provisions: LOD application 
to the MSFR  
5.3.1 LOD application for MSFR in the context where no severe 
accident is clearly defined at this stage 
The LOD method has been applied to some PIEs judged relevant for the MSFR 
analysis.  
Cliff-edge effects studies allowing to precisely define severe accident and situ-
ations to be practically eliminated for a MSFR, are still on-going and to be further 
continued. The following approach is thus employed in the first place: 
• Identification of the most relevant initiating events (i.e., those who have the 
potential for major changes in the fuel circuit in terms of neutronic, chem-
istry, thermal hydraulic, mechanics…) 
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• Preliminary assessment of their consequences in the absence of any safety 
limitation feature, on the basis of previous studies, and considering on-going 
calculations in the SAMOFAR project,  
• Preliminary allocation of the lines of defence in function of the expected 
consequences. The following preliminary allocation is proposed : 
o Sequences or situations which could significantly impair the reactor 
availability (meaning quick restart is not possible following the 
event), or which could lead to limited radiological releases but sig-
nificantly exceeding normal operation releases (and order of magni-
tude could be value up to but below 1 mSv per event), should at least 
be prevented by one medium line of defence (b), 
o Sequences or situations which could significantly impair the reactor 
investment (meaning for example significant and expensive repair 
may be needed, with in some case uncertainty on the ability to restart 
the reactor), or which could lead to significant radiological releases 
but with no need for off-site confinement measures (and order of 
magnitude could be value up to but below 10 mSv per event), should 
at least be prevented by one strong line of defence (a),  
o Sequences or situations which could threaten safety, with potentially 
important radiological releases (which may need limited off-site 
measures such as confinement or even more significant measures) 
should at least be prevented by two strong and one medium lines of 
defence (2a+b). 
In the application of the LoD method, it is pointed out that input data regarding 
natural behaviour following the initiating events, with a preliminary evaluation of 
expected radiological consequences, is key to be able to define the required number 
of safety provisions. For the SAMOFAR project, the process should thus be itera-
tive and the safety architecture refined as the evaluation of the MSFR natural be-
haviour and potential for radiological releases is assessed into more details.  
5.3.2 Guidelines for practical MSFR studies 
The occurrence frequency of an incident may be considered as an initial me-
dium line of defence (if the equipment whose failure initiated the incident has a 
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failure rate in the 10-1-10-2 /reactorˑyear range) or no line of defence at all. If the 
occurrence of an incident corresponds to a “b” (medium line of defence), then the 
following number of lines of defence are required for the limitation of its conse-
quences: 
• No additional line of defence strictly required if there are availability con-
cerns only. Limited radiological releases may occur: the interest of addi-
tional LoD should still be studied here in an ALARP approach, 
• At least one medium line of defence “b” with regard to investment concerns 
and risk of significant radiological releases, 
• At least two strong lines of defence “2a” with regard to potentially important 
radiological releases. 
The occurrence frequency of an accident may be considered as an initial me-
dium line of defence (if the equipment whose failure initiated the accident has a 
failure rate around 10-2 /reactorˑyear) or a strong line of defence (if the equipment 
whose failure initiated the accident has a failure rate around 10-3-10-4/reactorˑyear). 
This second case is typical for active systems designed in accordance with the 
standards of the nuclear industry and comprising internal redundancies; or passive 
equipment, exploited like confinement barriers, designed in accordance with the 
standards of the nuclear industry (e.g., see the strong LoD definition).If the occur-
rence of an incident corresponds to an “a” (strong line of defence), then the follow-
ing number of lines of defence are required for the limitation of its consequences: 
• No additional line of defence is strictly required if there are investment con-
cerns only. Radiological releases below safety targets may occur: the inter-
est of additional LoD should still be studied here in an ALARP approach, 
• At least one strong line and one medium lines of defence “a+b” with regard 
to potentially important radiological releases. 
In addition to accidents, very rare events may be postulated, to ensure the avoid-
ance of cliff-edge effects in terms of radiological releases, should they occur. For 
such “limiting events”, only one medium line of defence “b” may be considered at 
a first stage, while the interest to consider additional LoD may be addressed at a 
second stage in the frame of an ALARP approach. 
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Figure 5-13 sums up the proposed guidelines for the LoD first application to 
MSFR.  
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Figure 5-13 Guidelines for the LoD first application to MSFR 
5.3.3 General considerations 
Given the very preliminary state of MSFR design and studies, a lot of assump-
tions must be made when applying the LoD method, such that the method cannot 
provide a final statement on the acceptability in terms of safety but rather helps to 
identify relevant safety questions that need to be further addressed.  
Therefore, at this stage, the goal is not to perform a full and final safety assess-
ment but rather to apply the LoD method on few cases, to check that the method 
can effectively be used for the MSFR, and put forward some relevant insights for 
the future safety and design studies. 
The few events selected for a first application of the LoD method, are the fol-
lowing:  
• Loss of main heat sink, 
• Overcooling at zero power  
o Note: although the list of PIE identified in SAMOFAR was focused 
on events arising from power operation, an overcooling event start-
ing from a zero power condition is judged more interesting as in-
volving a larger potential for reactivity insertion 
• Addition of fuel salt with too high concentration of fissile matter  
• Fertile blanket loading with fuel salt  
• Leak of fuel circuit (lower and upper parts) 
• Leak on the intermediate heat exchanger 
• Leak of fuel salt storage tank  
Note: although the list of PIE identified in SAMOFAR was focused on events 
arising from power operation, the event of a leak when the fuel salt is in the fuel 
storage tank is already identified as an interesting event to be analyzed. 
As regards the evaluation of consequences of events and sequences identified, 
it is not always possible to provide a clear conclusion concerning the risk of chal-
lenging the reactor availability, the investment protection or even the safety (e.g. 
no evaluation of radiological releases has been performed up to now). Engineer 
judgment is thus provided on some cases. Besides, there can also be an interest in 
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identifying events or sequences that should be given high priority for further eval-
uations.  
To evaluate the consequences of reactor transients, a common practice is also 
to define decoupling criteria (e.g. in terms of temperature and/or pressure values), 
the respect of which should ensure that availability, investment protection or safety 
concerns are appropriately dealt with (e.g. as regard safety, through preservation of 
safety systems such as containment barriers). Such decoupling criteria are still be 
defined for the MSFR. Nevertheless, some orders of magnitude are preliminary 
given here, to be further confirmed: 
During an accident, the objective is to keep the fuel circuit Hastelloy N struc-
tures below 1100°C, for material structural limits, given the risk of leak-tightness 
loss or even loss of integrity. 
 
5.3.4 Loss of main heat sink event (LOHS) 
Characterization of the event 
The loss of heat sink could result from a failure of the BoP circuit or failure to 
remove heat from the tertiary circuit, so that the heat removal from the intermediate 
salt circuit is no longer ensured. Conservatively, it can be assumed that the heat 
transfer from the intermediate salt circuits to the BoP circuits immediately stops at 
the beginning of the event. 
Prevention of the event 
The loss of main heat sink event is assumed to be frequent, as it may be caused 
by non-safety classified equipment from the tertiary circuit or in connection with 
this circuit. The occurrence of this event is therefore not counted as the crossing of 
a line of defence. 
Natural behaviour of the plant 
As the loss of main heat sink occurs, heat from the intermediate salt circuit, and 
consequently from the fuel salt circuit is no longer removed.  
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The temperatures in the fuel circuit tend to homogenize, and also to rise, due to 
the residual heat. The intermediate loops, unless drained, act as a thermal buffer, 
helping to attenuate the temperature rise. The fuel circuit mean temperature in-
creases by 150°C in about 1000 s starting from a mean fuel circuit temperature of 
725°C, while it would increase by 450°C without the buffering effect of the inter-
mediate loops. The structures may thus undergo high temperatures so that their 
leak-tightness can be challenged, with a loss of investment and potential safety con-
sequences in terms of releases (Gérardin et al., 2018). The 1100°C would not be 
reached on the Hastelloy N surface before one hour and a half. Indeed, leak in the 
bottom part of the fuel circuit may occur but also in other parts of the fuel circuits, 
such as the interface with the fertile blanket, the upper level in interface with the 
upper structure cooling circuit and the intermediate heat exchanger level.  
At the intermediate circuit level, salt decomposition should occur at approxi-
mately 800-850°C with the formation of gaseous BF3 –in case fluoroborate is re-
tained- thus leading to the pressurization of the circuit. The material retained for the 
intermediate circuit is not decided yet, but may not be Hastelloy N. It is thus ex-
pected that the intermediate circuit fails before the fuel circuit. 
There is a special concern if there is a leak at the intermediate heat exchanger 
also, given the risk of siphoning of the fuel salt and of confinement by-pass. Then, 
the relocation of the fuel salt must be studied. Concerns associated to fuel salt heat-
ing are also related to the release of fission products, and to their confinement.  
A scenario with complete and long term loss of the fuel salt heat removal func-
tion has not been studied in detail up to now. It is assumed at this stage that such 
scenario is likely to be unacceptable, as it would lead to an increasing fission prod-
ucts releases from the salt by vaporization with pressure build up, and therefore a 
potential for further releases into the environment. 
Possible lines of defence to cope with the event 
A cooling system on the intermediate loops can be actuated to cool down the 
fuel salt when the tertiary circuit is lost, through exchange with air by natural con-
vection. This system may be counted as a strong line of defence (“a”), considering 
several independent trains are provided on the different loops. 
In the case of failure to limit the temperature rise in the fuel salt circuit, an 
automatic draining through redundant valves opening in the lower region of the 
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circuit is foreseen, accounted for as a strong line of defence (“a”). It has to be 
checked that the draining is fast enough so that the fuel salt temperature increase 
before draining completion is acceptable. Draining devices should also be designed 
to avoid any criticality risks during the overall transient. 
Additionally, fusible valves (redundant and diversified compared to the auto-
matic valves) can besides provide passive draining, accounted for as a strong line 
of defence (“a”) as regard the draining. Should all valves fail, a leak in the lower 
part of the fuel salt circuit could also provoke the fuel sat draining. 
Once the fuel salt is drained, it would still be necessary to collect it and to en-
sure its subcriticality as well as its cooling. To do so, an emergency draining storage 
is provided, with redundant cooling circuits (able to operate in natural convection, 
with air as heat sink: to be confirmed), accounted for as a strong line of defence 
(“a”). 
Lastly, in the case of fuel salt relocation in the EDS and subsequent failure of 
the EDS, further relocation of the fuel salt in the bottom part of the building may 
be considered. A system equivalent to a core catcher, along with a cooling system, 
is under investigation, which may stand for a medium or strong line of defence, to 
be further studied.  
It is assumed that the fuel salt recovery from the EDS can be performed to start-
up the reactor again in a second time, while the fuel salt at the core catcher level is 
considered to be lost, due to mixing with the sacrificial salt. 
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Event tree using the LoD method 
 
Figure 5-14 Schematic event tree of the loss of main heat sink event 
 
 133 
 
 
Preliminary outcomes of the LoD method application 
The situation where the fuel salt is drained in the EDS, with subsequent EDS 
failure, would need further evaluation, to check the avoidance of a cliff-edge effect. 
This situation may require the addition of a “core catcher” or equivalent, with a 
cooling circuit. 
In case of failure of the tertiary circuit, only one system is considered for the 
fuel salt cooling in the fuel salt circuit. Should another system be considered, this 
could alleviate the need for both an EDS and a core catcher. More generally, the 
allocation of lines of defence may be different (3a at this stage could be lowered to 
2a+b). 
The LoD analysis performed here is very preliminary. To confirm the whole 
reliability of the different cooling systems, a more detailed analysis of their respec-
tive independency is needed, in order to check there is no credible common cause 
failure.  
In the course of the accidental sequences, the risk of an IHX leak should also 
be further studied as it could influence the scenario, as it could be considered as a 
sensitivity case to check the avoidance of cliff-edge effect. 
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5.3.5 Overcooling event 
Characterization of the event 
During reactor start-up, it is assumed that both the fuel circuit and intermediate 
salt circuits are circulating at the mean fuel temperature of 725°C, while the heat 
extraction at the tertiary level suddenly increases from few kW up to nominal 
power. This event is preferred for the analysis as compared to the overcooling from 
nominal power, as it is judged more relevant as there is more potential for overcool-
ing from a low power state.  
Prevention of the event 
The start-up procedure is not defined yet, for example progressive increase of 
the mass flow rate at the fuel salt and intermediate salt circuits’ level, as reactor 
power is increased, may be privileged. In any case, the procedure will be such that 
the reactor power increase is progressive. It is assumed at this stage that the occur-
rence of the event is equivalent to one medium line of defence (i.e., the compliance 
with the start-up procedure). 
Natural behaviour of the plant 
Conservatively, it has been assumed in the evaluations that the cold leg of the 
intermediate salt is immediately cooled down at the beginning of the transient in 
proportion to the heat evacuated at the tertiary level. This leads to a cooling down 
of the fuel salt, with a positive reactivity insertion and therefore an increased reactor 
power. If the cold leg of the intermediate salt is lowered too rapidly, such that nom-
inal power is evacuated after less than 30 seconds, prompt criticality can be reached. 
Considering instantaneous reactivity feedbacks, a prompt critical jump would be 
very short, such that the fuel salt temperature in the hot leg remains limited below 
800°C (Laureau et al., 2017). This also implies that the fuel salt expansion, thanks 
to free levels in the upper part of the fuel circuit, is possible. The fuel salt tempera-
ture in the cold leg might also be lowered above the solidification point, an aspect 
which needs to be assessed. A prompt critical jump may also result in a pressure 
wave, to be verified by deterministic calculations. Should fuel salt expansion not 
be possible, this could result in a sustained prompt critical jump with sudden and 
significant energy release and pressure increase.  
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Possible lines of defence to cope with the event 
Before reaching large reactivity insertions, detection measures can be put in 
place, based for example on the temperature decrease in cold leg of the fuel or in-
termediate circuits. The corrective measure could consist in valve closure on the 
intermediate circuit, to stop the heat transfer with steam generators and thus stop-
ping the overcooling. Other measures such as an increased bubbling to lower the 
reactivity may also be considered. The efficiency of such measures will have to be 
checked, considering in particular the time constants (checking notably the possi-
bility to detect sufficiently rapidly the event). At this stage, such measures are ac-
counted only for a medium line of defence ‘b’, but this evaluation may be modified 
on the basis of further analyses. 
The presence of free levels in the upper part of the fuel circuit allows to benefit 
from a largely negative reactivity feedback as fuel expands. It is assumed that the 
design, foreseeing one free level above each pump and a free level above the active 
core region, all communicating together, will be such that the availability of these 
free levels will be ensured with a high reliability, accounting for at least one strong 
line of defence ‘a’, or even more depending on the design evolution. 
Event tree using the LoD method 
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Figure 5-15 Schematic event tree of the overcooling event 
Preliminary outcomes of the LoD method application 
First, it should be required that the design of the reactor, and the energy con-
version system in particular, and start-up procedure are such that even the worst 
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overcooling scenario possible evolves sufficiently slow (time constant for temper-
ature decrease of the intermediate salt cold leg above 30 seconds). 
With regard to rapid overcooling scenarios, there is an interest to look for de-
tection and corrective measures allowing to limit the reactivity insertion, for exam-
ple though valves closure on the intermediate circuit on a salt temperature decrease 
signal. 
The availability of free levels to allow the fuel salt expansion is absolutely nec-
essary. It may be accounted for as a strong line of defence, or even more. This point 
deserves to be studied more in detail: a detailed analysis of all scenarios that might 
lead to free level unavailability (e.g. too much initial fuel salt pouring, blockages, 
salt pouring from the intermediate circuit through an IHX leak…) would be worth-
while, in order to ensure appropriate design measures are taken to ensure a very 
high reliability when it comes to free levels availability for fuel expansion. The 
interest of having pressure relief devices, should fuel expansion be limited, could 
also be studied. 
5.3.6 Heat exchanger leak 
Characterization of the event 
Leak may occur at several locations depending on the intermediate heat ex-
changer design, typically at plate level or collectors, if foreseen. Leaks sizes are to 
be defined. The event studied hereafter is assumed to concern only one IHX, and 
therefore only one intermediate circuit out of four. 
Prevention of the event 
Prevention of leak basically relies on the design quality. Conservatively, a leak 
occurrence is assumed to be a frequent event here, with no line of defence credited. 
A design goal may be to sufficiently prevent the leak to make it an accidental case, 
then crediting the prevention of such a leak as a medium line of defence.  
Natural behaviour of the plant 
Should a leak on the IHX occur, the intermediate salt –which is at higher pres-
sure- would enter into the fuel circuit. Consequently, the fuel circuit level will go 
up. The equilibrium level will depend on the respective pressure in both the fuel 
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circuit upper gas volume and the intermediate circuit gas volume. Conservative as-
sumptions should be made regarding gas pressure regulations in both circuits. At 
the intermediate circuit level, two cases are possible: unavailability of the pressure 
gas regulation system or, on the contrary, sustained gas input in the intermediate 
circuit to maintain its pressure. 
At some points, fuel salt may enter the gas circuits located in the very upper 
part of the fuel circuit, with a potential investment concern, noting however that 
confinement should still be ensured up to this level. 
If the fuel circuit was to be completely filled with salt, with no more spaces for 
fuel salt expansion, it can be noted that the reactivity feedback due to fuel salt ther-
mal expansion would no longer be available in case of reactivity transient. 
In the fuel circuit, fuel salt should mix with the intermediate salt in turbulent 
flow areas. In case fluoroborate is retained, salt decomposition with the formation 
of gaseous BF3 should still be avoided if the temperatures are below approximately 
800-850°C, considering a normal core outlet temperature of 775°C. 
Regarding reactivity, the lower intermediate salt temperature results in a posi-
tive reactivity insertion while the global dilution effect of the fuel salt is linked to a 
supposedly stronger negative reactivity effect. The power level should go down as 
only three loops out of four are still cooling the reactor down. 
After pressure equilibrium, fuel salt diffusion toward intermediate salt may oc-
cur, thus leading to contamination of the intermediate circuit. It should be remem-
bered that the heat exchangers with the energy conversion system may be located 
outside of the reactor building.  
At the intermediate circuit level, a low salt level may also impact the interme-
diate pump, with cavitation risks. 
Should a leak be induced in the fuel circuit or a draining toward the EDS be 
launched, then the salt mixture (with both the fuel salt and part of the intermediate 
salt) would enter the EDS. The EDS is currently sized to recover twice the volume 
of all the fuel salt, thus accounting for a capability to cope with 1/5th on the total 
intermediate salt inventory (all loops). Anyway, at a certain time, the fuel salt circuit 
will have to be drained, a priori toward the fuel salt tanks, to allow the IHX repair 
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or replacement. After fuel salt draining, the IHX leak should be under gas atmos-
phere, with a priori low contamination potential transfer toward the intermediate 
loop, assuming a rather clean gas content during reactor operation (to be checked). 
The above scenario would be quite different if the leaking intermediate loop 
was to be drained in the same time. In such case, the intermediate salt would mainly 
go in its dedicated tanks, together with a portion of fuel salt, with a possible siphon-
ing effect) with a potentially much higher contamination of the intermediate circuits 
and decay heat to be managed at this level. There may be a concern with a potential 
for further radiological releases. 
 
Possible lines of defence to cope with the event 
Sector valves closure on the intermediate circuit (limitation of intermediate salt 
leakage, and confinement barrier recovery) upon detection could act as the first line 
of defence. Currently, one set of valves at each intermediate sector inlet and outlet 
is planned. Detection is needed upstream valves closure actuation, allowing to iden-
tify which intermediate loop is leaking. Besides measures at the fuel circuit level 
(e.g. salt level), it is likely that measures at the intermediate circuit level, such as 
pressure and/or gas inventory, will be needed. At some point, reactivity variation 
should be detected, but the link with the leakage and its location should a priori not 
be deduced from such variation. There may be an opportunity to detect a change in 
the salt composition, for example through on line monitoring of a small salt by-pass 
flow, through absorption spectroscopy, but this would not allow leaking loop iden-
tification if only made at a general fuel circuit level. Therefore, a medium line of 
defence is accounted for here, since more arguments are needed to take credit of a 
strong line of defence, considering the detection would rely on detection at the in-
termediate loop level (mainly gas pressure and/or inventory). Moreover, note that 
it may be needed to stop the intermediate pumps prior to valves closure to avoid 
hammer effects. 
As regard the fuel salt level increase: 
• Fuel salt draining should also be possible, e.g. upon detection of gas pres-
sure elevation or free level increase in the fuel circuit. Such device might 
be credited as a strong line of defence. 
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• An overflow system may be implemented in the fuel circuit design, redi-
recting salt above a certain level toward the EDS. The design of such de-
vices is still to be made, and could include a melting membrane. Such de-
vice might be credited as a strong line of defence (hypothesis made in the 
following). 
As regard the risk of contamination in the leaking intermediate loop: 
• Radioactivity detection would allow reactor vessel/building valves closure 
(if not made yet), possibly accounting for a strong line of defence (two sets 
of valves are currently planned: one set on the intermediate circuit at the 
reactor vessel crossing and the other one at the reactor building crossings).  
• Fuel salt draining may besides further prevent the risk of fuel transfer to-
ward the intermediate loop (only gas transfer could occur after draining). 
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Event tree using the LoD method 
 
Figure 5-16 Schematic event tree of Heat Exchanger Leak event (fuel salt level increase) 
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Figure 5-17 Schematic event tree of Heat Exchanger Leak event (Contamination risk) 
Preliminary outcomes of the LoD method application 
From a confinement point of view, the benefit of having several sectors is not 
strongly put forward here. In case of sectors valves closure, this would of course 
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allow to limit the amount of intermediate leaking salt. Nevertheless, unless the de-
tection allows to identify which sector is leaking, the four sectors of a given loop 
would have to be closed. 
Possibility to arrange efficient detection of free level variation in the fuel circuit 
should be further studied, as well as an overflow passive system. 
Sufficiency of DHR systems for long term accident management should be 
checked, as regard fuel salt relocation in the EDS (at least a strong line of defence 
aimed at in the loss of heat sink event, before relocation of fuel salt in the EDS). A 
deeper focus could thus be made on the occurrence frequency of an IHX leak com-
bined with a failure of the leak detection upon gas/inventory monitoring on the in-
termediate loop, this sequence being likely to lead in a second time to fuel salt 
draining in the EDS.  
Regarding confinement issues, the need to have redundant isolation valves is 
confirmed. An optimisation between reactor vessel and reactor building valves may 
be studied, considering also that, in the end, it may be difficult to allocate more than 
a strong line of defence for all the valves together (sectors valves and reactor ves-
sel/reactor building valves). The case of an IHX leak with failure to isolate the 
valves must be studied to confirm proper confinement management, due to the po-
tential risk of contamination of the intermediate circuits by fuel salt or fission gas 
transfer.  
In the isolation valves procedure, the case where the intermediate pumps would 
still be operating has to be checked, with the goal to avoid an induced failure / leak 
of the intermediate circuit, considering the risk of hammer effect. 
As regard fuel salt relocation, typically in the EDS, proper volumes should be 
considered to allow also recovery of the additional salt volumes coming from the 
intermediate loop. 
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 Considerations  
5.4.1 Current safety and licensing context and changes required 
The majority of current nuclear safety regulatory requirements is based on 
LWRs technology and necessitates changes to suit to a new spectrum of novel, ad-
vanced, next generation plants (Southern Company, 2017). In Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment (PSA), the risks associated with the reactor accidents are highly design, 
plant and site specific; this is demonstrated for any kind of reactor. In particular, 
dealing with next generation nuclear plants implies a much larger range of risks 
variability with respect to an LWR: fundamental differences in the physical pro-
cesses are present, as well as in the plant responses associated with the reactor tran-
sients and accidents. This is due both to the use of different materials for the reactor 
fuel, moderator and coolant and to different safety design approaches for the imple-
mentation of radionuclides barriers (Southern Company, 2017). Because of these 
differences, the LWR risk metrics, for instance the Core Damage Frequency (CDF) 
and the Large Early Release Frequency (LERF), are neither relevant nor useful for 
many advanced nuclear reactors; some plants, in fact, may not involve the core 
damage state that was defined for LWR and, even in the case, its meaning and risk 
framework can be fundamentally different from LWR (INL, 2011). Consequently, 
PSA for advanced reactors may be structured differently than the traditional Level 
1, 2 and 3 model for LWR PSA: it is expected to include out of core sources of 
radioactive material (especially in the case of online refuel, as for the MSFR) and 
to adopt adequate and more general risk metrics (INL, 2011); the latter may lead to 
an appropriate definition of severe accident, detached for the core melting concept. 
Additionally, while the traditional LWR risk assessment was developed following 
the “one-reactor-at-a-time” approach, in next generation nuclear plants the risk as-
sociated to multi-unit sites becomes certainly relevant in the safety assessment, no-
tably after the Fukushima Daiichi accident (Fleming, 2017). Advanced non-LWRs 
may be constituted by several modules, located in the same site: this would imply 
proper evaluation of possible common cause failures/domino effects, due to the po-
tential for sharing of systems and structures or hazards involving more than one 
reactor (e.g. external hazards). This could influence the traditional frequency-con-
sequence tolerability criteria (Southern Company, 2017).  
Finally, it should be bear in mind that there is no recent licensing experience of 
an MSR and the suitability of the existent regulations which were principally de-
veloped for light water reactors must be assessed. Safety regulations adapted to such 
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a concept will have to be developed and validated by the Safety authority of the 
country hosting the plant. However, the fundamental safety principles such as the 
defence in depth remain applicable but their application must be adapted. 
5.4.2 Safety advantages identified for the MSFR concept 
• With the liquid fuel and a fast neutron spectrum, a negative temperature feed-
back coefficient is obtained, whose action is immediate in the event of a salt 
temperature variation. This ensures an intrinsic safety with respect to reactivity 
accidents. 
• The fuel unloading from the core zone is easier and faster as compared to the 
unloading of a solid fuel; this allows to maintain the salt subcritical and to cool 
the fuel. 
• The fuel circuit is not pressurized and the fluoride salt is not likely to cause 
violent exothermic chemical reactions when in contact with the materials of 
the plant. Lithium fluoride does not react violently with air; it does not repre-
sent a fire hazard, and it should not react chemically with water either. 
• Fission gases (and possibly some non-volatile and non-soluble fission prod-
ucts) are released from the fuel during operation, reducing the radiological salt 
inventory, in particular that of the gaseous fission products which are the most 
likely to be released in case of accident with a solid fuel. The fission products 
that remain within the salt, in particular cesium, are not significantly released 
in the event of an accident. 
• The absence of fuel structures in the core such as cladding and subassemblies 
removes any risk of fuel compaction, a major risk of reactivity insertion in a 
fast neutron reactor with solid fuel. 
• The intrinsic temperature feedback effect could eliminate the need of a control 
rod system for adjusting the operating conditions. Moreover, the amount of 
fissile matters dissolved in the critical zone of the fuel circuit is just necessary 
to maintain a critical state. Fertile matters are periodically injected in the core 
without needing to shut down the reactor. This allows to intrinsically reduce 
the risk of accidental reactivity insertion. 
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5.4.3 Safety related Challenges / R&D studies needed for the 
MSFR concept 
• The safety analyses led until now must proceed more in depth to make sure the 
identification of risks is exhaustive. The current report presents some major 
achievements in that respect when it comes to identification of initiating events 
on the reactor during power operation. This risk identification exercise should 
be further continued, trying notably to encompass all initial states / operation 
modes (startup, shutdown phases etc.) and all the facilities, including the fuel 
treatment unit. 
• Note that, as the fuel is in the liquid state, there is no accident similar to the 
severe accident of core meltdown as on solid fuel reactors, where the impact 
of such an accident on the safety functions is an important aspect for the reactor 
design and R&D. The definition and the studies of the severe accidents to be 
considered are in progress and must be continued, including a focus on the 
reactor behavior in case of a postulated prompt-critical jump. 
• The prevention of corrosion of the structures in contact with the salt, especially 
the reactor vessel, must be shown to be sufficient. Suitable measures of sur-
veillance are to be developed. 
• The absence of risk of severe chemical reactions between the salt and the other 
materials employed is to be confirmed, especially the absence of risk of pro-
ducing some hydrogen by the dissociation of water. Also, the consequences of 
a contact between salt and water need to be assessed, in particular the risk of 
steam explosion. 
• The risk of precipitation and concentration of fissile matters in the salt, as well 
as generally speaking the criticality risk of the salt which is not in the reactor 
zone is to be further examined. 
• Fission products extracted from the fuel circuit during operation are stored, in 
particular in the salt treatment unit. Associated risks (i.e., presence of a radio-
logical source term, production of residual power, criticality risk) must be an-
alyzed in detail. 
• The monitoring of the reactor and the salt treatment unit, the features for in-
service inspection and repair or replacement of equipment in contact with the 
salt, must be defined. It should be possible to monitor the envelopes containing 
the salt from the outside. 
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The work presents significant progresses as regard the definition of confine-
ment barriers for fuel salts and fission products. Next steps could include the defi-
nition of their performances required as regards normal and accident conditions to 
consider. 
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6 Results - Case Study: EU DEMO 
The aim of this chapter is to summarize the main results obtained from the ap-
plication of the previously defined methodology (see paragraph 4.3) to different 
advanced systems. In particular, in this chapter, it is described the application of 
part of the methodology (PIEs identification) to specific systems of the EU DEMO, 
as reported in EUROfusion project.  
In PPCS (Power Plant Conceptual Study), four reactor concepts have been de-
veloped (Dongiovanni et al., 2014):  
• Model A, Water-Cooled Lithium Lead blanket (WCLL); 
• Model B, Helium-Cooled Pebble-Bed blanket (HCPB); 
• Model C, Dual Coolant Lithium-Lead Concept (DCLL); 
• Model D, Helium-Cooled Lithium Led concept (HCLL). 
In particular, two blanket concepts have been taken into account: the WCLL 
(Water Cooled Lithium Lead), with and without an Intermediate Heat Storage (IHS) 
and the DCLL (Dual Coolant Lithium Lead), briefly described respectively in par-
agraph 6.1.1 and in paragraph 6.2.1.   
 The methodology implementation: WCLL blanket 
concept 
6.1.1 WCLL description  
The blanket  
This WCLL blanket design refers to the information contained in the report 
(Aubert et al., 2013).  
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The blanket has three main functions: the cooling of primary heat source with a 
cooling circuit insuring power conversion efficiency; the tritium production system 
insuring tritium self-sufficiency; the shielding of the coils (realizing the plasma 
confinement). 
The WCLL blanket is designed with modules of different sizes, attached to-
gether along the poloidal direction with a back supporting structure and fed with 
pipes at the rear of the modules (see fig. 6-1). 
 
Figure 6-1 Several modules assembled in segments (Dongiovanni et al., 2014) 
Each module is built with reduced activation ferritic-martensitic steel Eurofer 
as structural material, filled with liquid lithium-lead (LiPb) as breeder, neutron mul-
tiplier and tritium carrier and water at typical PWR conditions as coolant, i.e. nom-
inal cooling water temperatures are 285°C at the inlet and 325°C at the outlet and 
nominal pressure of the cooling water is 155 bar. The lithium-lead inlet and outlet 
temperatures are above the (eutectic) lithium-lead melting point (235°C), and nom-
inally 285°C (assumed), while the nominal pressure is 5 bar (Pinna et al., 2015). 
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The front part of the blanket module facing to the plasma is the First Wall (FW). 
Two independent cooling loops are envisaged: one for the FW and one for the 
breeder zone (BZ). This concept ensures the blanket cooling even in accidental sit-
uations, allows a separate regulation for the FW and the BZ and minimizes the 
pressure drops. 
The Heat Transfer System without Intermediate Heat Storage  
The PHTS (Primary Heat Transfer System) is outlined in six cooling loops con-
nected in parallel to the reactor blanket BZ and FW, and two additional loops for 
cooling the divertor (DV) (see fig. 6.2). The conceptual design of the heat transfer 
systems of the DEMO WCLL blanket is on-going. 
 
Figure 6-2 Schematic of PHTS for FW and BZ (left) and DV (right) (Pinna et al., 2015) 
 
In the case without an Intermediate Heat Storage (IHS), each of the six BZ/FW 
cooling loops contains two parallel coolant pumps (LP), a pressurizer (PZ) and a 
steam generator (SG). Each loop serves 3 of the 18 tokamak sectors. During oper-
ation, the reactor coolant pumps circulate primary water through the coolant loops. 
The fluid is heated as it passes through the FW/BZ. Then, it flows to the steam 
generators, where the heat is transferred to the water/steam circuit and returns to 
the reactor coolant pumps to repeat the cycle (Pinna et al., 2015).  
Other designs with a different number of cooling loops for the FW and for the 
BZ are investigated, but for PIEs identification this information is not relevant. 
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Table 1 shows the main parameters of the PHTS in the case without IHS (Del 
Nevo et al., 2014; Natalizio et al., 2014).  
 
Table 6-1 Main parameters of the PHTS in the case without HIS (Pinna et al., 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The divertor cooling system comprises two cooling loops, containing each of 
them two liquid pumps (LP), a heat exchanger (preheater) (HX) and a pressurizer 
(PZ). During operations, pressurized coolant is heated at the reactor and preheats 
water entering in the SG. After transferring the absorbed heat to the water/steam 
circuit, the primary water is pumped back to the reactor.  
The pressurizer regulates the water pressure in the primary circuit, with heaters 
and water sprays, which maintain water and steam in equilibrium. A set of valves 
guarantees the meeting of safety requirements in abnormal reactor operations (Del 
Nevo et al., 2014).   
The PHTS is also serviced by the Chemical and Volume Control System 
(CVCS) and the Coolant Detritiation System (CDS). These auxiliary systems are 
interconnected with the reactor coolant piping (Pinna et al., 2015).  
Parameter  Value  
Thermal power from the blanket BZ [MW] 3892 
Thermal power from the blanket FW [MW] 1438  
Primary water pressure [bar] 155 
Primary water inlet T in SG [°C] 325 
Primary water outlet T in SG [°C] 285  
Primary water flowrate [kg/s] 9295 
Primary water T from the divertor [°C] 167 
Primary water T to the divertor [°C] 140 
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It has been found that it could be possible that in case of failure of one of the 
cooling circuits, permanent damage of the in-vessel components could be avoided 
or reduced if independent circuits were used for BZ and FW. In fact, in case of 
failure of the FW circuit and consequent plasma shutdown, the BZ circuit would be 
able to remove the decay heat by conduction through the FW (or vice versa in case 
of fault in the BZ circuit) (Dongiovanni et al., 2014). 
From now, for the purposes of the FFMEA application, the proposal of two 
independent PHT loops for the BZ and for the FW and a separate PHT loop for the 
divertor is considered as reference design.  
It is assumed (Bubelis and Hering, 2014) that the operation of the EU DEMO 
will be pulsed (pulse duration ~ 2 h), with a dwell period of ~ 30 minutes needed to 
re-charge the central solenoid pulse. In consequence of that, the power transferred 
by the PHTS is characterized by a periodic evolution, ranging between almost zero 
and 100%. This could be a problem, both because of fatigue stresses of all compo-
nents and because of the related difficulties of electric power injection into the grid. 
A solution can be the introduction of an IHS using molten salts. In particular the 
solar salt (60% NaNO3 and 40% KNO3) is the option considered in this work (Del 
Nevo et al., 2014; Natalizio et al., 2014).  
As for the PHTS without IHS, in the PHTS with IHS there are two separate 
cooling systems for the FW and BZ and 2 cooling loops for the DV. Each primary 
circuit contains the same above-mentioned elements, but the SG is substituted by a 
heat exchanger (HX) between primary water and molten salt (Bubelis and Hering, 
2014).   
The Balance of Plant in the case without IHS   
In the power plant conceptual study for WCLL concept, in the case without IHS, 
the primary water exchanges heat with the secondary water in the steam generators, 
producing steam. The steam is supplied to a turbine through a manifold collecting 
the steam produced in three or six SGs. The steam flow rate is about 3024 Kg/s.  
The power generator unit transforms steam’s thermal energy into kinetic energy 
firstly and electric energy secondly. It is composed by the high-pressure turbine, 
the low-pressure turbine, the moisture separator re-heater and the generator. The 
high-pressure turbine operates at an inlet temperature and pressure of about 285 °C 
and 7.0 MPa respectively. The exhausted steam is cooled down by the condenser 
system and then pumped through the pre-heating system. In particular, the heat 
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coming from the divertor is used to pre-heat again the low-pressure water coming 
from the condenser. The temperature of the secondary water leaving the divertor 
cooling system is 247 °C, while the primary water inlet in the divertor preheater is 
about 267°C. As a result of a temperature difference of about 20 °C, the divertor 
pre-heater needs to be very large. The condensed water returns to the SGs by a 
distributor. The feed-water temperature is about 230°C (Pinna et al., 2015).  
A set of valves (e.g. Relief and Safety valves, Steam Generator Safety valves, 
Main Steam Isolation valves) and by-pass lines are present in order to insure the 
safety of the plant.  
The condenser is cooled by a third cooling circuit through a cooling tower. 
The Secondary Water Cooling System is shared between the primary building 
and the turbine building: the Steam Generator, as well as the divertor pre-heaters, 
is contained into the primary building, while the collecting manifold, the power 
generator unit and the condenser system are contained in the turbine building (Pinna 
et al., 2015).  
Design activities on the definition of the Balance of Plant (BoP) are in progress 
to define optimum solutions.  
Figure 6-3 shows a schematic representation of the power conversion system, 
as it has been analyzed for the FFMEA purposes.  
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Figure 6-3 Secondary circuit for the WCLL cooling system (Pinna et al., 2015) 
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Figure 6.4 shows a schematic representation of primary circuit and secondary 
circuit in the case without IHS, including only one of the (6 FW + 6 BZ) cooling 
loops of the PHTS.  
 
Figure 6-4 Sketch of the cooling loop in the case without IHS, including only one of the 
(6 FW + 6 BZ) cooling loops of the PHTS (Carpignano et al., 2016). 
Table 6-2 shows the main parameters of the secondary circuit in the case with-
out IHS. 
 
Table 6-2 Main parameters of the secondary circuit in the case without HIS (Pinna et al., 
2015). 
 
 
 
 
Parameter  Value  
Steam pressure in SG [bar] 70 
Steam T at the outlet of SG [°C] 285 
Secondary water flowrate [kg/s] 3024 
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Molten salt circuit and WCLL secondary water circuit in the case with IHS 
The molten salt intermediate circuit is characterized by one loop that contains 
two tanks, which are used to store energy to be used during the dwell period, when 
DEMO is not producing power. The hot tank is at an average temperature of about 
320.7 °C, while the cold tank is at an average temperature of about 284.8 °C. Be-
tween the hot and the cold tank, there is the SG, where thermal energy is transferred 
to steam circuit and the economizer, which pre-heats the secondary water until sat-
uration conditions before entering in the SG. A pump extracts molten salts from the 
cold tank to the HX with the primary water.  The molten salt is at ambient pressure 
(1 bar).          
The required storage capacity needs about 50800 t of molten salt: this means 
significant additional costs for both the molten salts and the additional circuit.  
It is interesting to notice that the molten salt flowrate from the hot tank to the 
cold tank is 28000 kg/s, that is the 80% of the total flowrate (35000 kg/s), while the 
molten salt flowrate from the cold tank to the hot tank is equal to 35000 kg/s, that 
is the 100% of the total flowrate, during 100% power conditions, and it is equal to 
0 during the dwell period (Carpignano et al., 2016). 
Table 6-3 and 6-4 summarize the main parameters IHS and BoP circuit, respec-
tively (Bubelis and Hering, 2014).   
 
Table 6-3 Main parameters of molten salt circuit in the case with HIS (Carpignano et al., 
2016) 
Parameter  Value  
Molten salt melting T [°C] 220 
Molten salt pressure [bar] 1 
Hot tank T [°C] 320.7 
Cold tank T [°C] 284.8 
Total molten salt quantity [t] 50800 
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Table 6-4 Main parameters of the secondary circuit in the case with HIS (Carpignano et 
al., 2016). 
 
 
Figure 6-5 shows a schematic representation of the primary water circuit, the 
molten salt circuit and the BoP in the case with IHS, including only one of the (6 
FW + 6 BZ) cooling loops of the PHTS.  
 
Molten salt flowrate (hot to cold) [kg/s] 28000 
Molten salt flowrate (cold to hot in 100% conditions) [kg/s] 35000  
Molten salt flowrate (cold to hot in 0% conditions) [kg/s] 0 
Parameter  Value  
Steam pressure in SG [bar] 64 
Steam T at the outlet of SG [°C] 279.8 
Secondary water flowrate [kg/s] 985.77 
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Figure 6-5 Sketch of the cooling loop in the case with IHS, including only one of the (6 
FW + 6 BZ) cooling loops of the PHTS (Carpignano et al., 2016). 
 
6.1.2 The molten salt characteristics  
One of the most peculiar aspects of the introduction of the intermediate circuit 
is the presence of the molten salt, which represents the possible cause of new PIEs 
and of the different evolutions of PIEs already identified in the study of the system 
without IHS (Pinna et al., 2015).  Therefore, it is interesting to analyze some spe-
cific features.   
Thermo-chemical characteristic  
The storage material for thermal energy can be solid or fluid. It can utilize sen-
sible or latent heat. The most important characteristics for a storing material are: a 
good capacity for storing, an efficient transfer of heat between the cooling fluid and 
storage material, mechanical and chemical stability because of the number of up-
loading/downloading cycles that it must guarantee, chemical stability at high tem-
peratures, low vapour pressure, high density for compactness, chemical compati-
bility with other fluids and metallic components, low oxidation rate, low thermal 
losses, control and competitive costs (Gil et al., 2010a; Gil et al., 2010b). 
?
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In the EU DEMO (Herrmann et al., 2004), the selected storage material is at the 
liquid state, containing molten salts, because of the wide experience of molten salt 
utilization in solar applications (e.g. concentrated solar power plants), in chemical 
and metal industries and in agriculture. In particular, the solar salt is the first choice 
In fact, it is characterised by a good combination of properties: density (about 1900 
kg/m3), specific heat (about 1500 J/kg K), vapour pressure (< 0.01 Pa) and cost 
(about 0.49 $/kg). Moreover, it is liquid at atmospheric pressure if the temperature 
is above the freezing point; the proposed operating temperature allows the use of 
commercial high temperature and high-pressure steam turbines, with a good effi-
ciency for the Rankine cycle. The solar salt is non-flammable and non-toxic (Gil et 
al., 2010a).  
Since molten salts solidify at relatively high temperature, it is necessary to guar-
antee that the solar salt does not freeze during operation; consequently, routine 
freeze protection systems and operations increase the O&M (operation and mainte-
nance) costs. For example, the installation of an electrical heater could be foreseen 
to avoid the solidification in emergency situations (Gil et al., 2010a). Additionally, 
thermal losses augment because of high temperature of the storage, implying the 
need of more expensive piping and materials (Carpignano et al., 2016).  
Even if the solar salt is composed by two oxidizing agents (sodium nitrate and 
potassium nitrate) and the thermal fatigue increases the corrosion rate, the studies 
concluded that oxidation rate is sufficiently low and impurities have a small effect 
(Gil et al., 2010a). On the other hand, if nitrates are in contact with organic or com-
bustible materials above the ignition temperature, reactions can proceed quickly 
enough to cause ignition, combustion or explosions; if water is inadvertently intro-
duced into the molten salt bath, and a steam explosion can occur (Herrmann et al., 
2004; Kitchen et al., 2004). Finally, the nitrates decomposition can catalyse precip-
itation phenomena and the consequent metallic parts scaling and possible pump and 
pipe plugging (Donatini et al., 2005).  
Notwithstanding these criticalities, it has been concluded that there are not ma-
jor technical issues preventing the realization of this concept.  
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Safety and operational issues or EU DEMO IHS 
In this paragraph, some safety relevant issues from the FFMEA are summarized. 
A superficial oxide layer, which is caused by corrosion, modifies physical, 
chemical and technological steel properties. In fact, the oxide is more brittle than 
the metal, increasing the occurrence probability of a brittle fracture (instantaneous 
and sudden). Additionally, the oxide layer transfers heat worse than the metal, de-
creasing the efficiency of the heat transfer between the primary water and the mol-
ten salt, and between the molten salt and the BoP fluid. It could be the cause of a 
slight overpressure and overheating in the primary circuit; as well, the efficiency of 
the Rankine cycle of the BoP is decreased, because of the increase of the thermal 
losses. Moreover, some oxide fragments, dispersed in the circulating salt can 
change also the thermal resistance between the molten salts and water circuits. 
These fragments enhance the corrosive-erosive nature of molten salt, scrubbing and 
further wearing down the steel surfaces. From these considerations, it is deduced 
the necessity of a molten salt purification system, especially for key and expansive 
components like the pumps. The last ones result the most sensitive components to 
the corrosion problem. Furthermore, preventive maintenance actions are fundamen-
tal, e.g. regular X-rays and ultra-sound inspections, implementing a risk-based in-
spection (RBI) approach, in order to keep constant the material properties (mainly 
ductility and maximal tensile stress).           
The diffusion of molten salt particles in the metallic matrix is not negligible. In 
fact, it causes the embrittlement of the steel, which at the beginning is ductile. The 
molten salt particles represent the heterogeneities, acting as obstacles for disloca-
tions movement. As a consequence, the steel is hardened and the occurrence prob-
ability of a brittle fracture is increased. On the other hand, since the molten salt is 
at high temperature (about 300°C), we can have a kind of compensating effect on 
material properties evolution. In fact, high temperature reduces hardness and Young 
modulus, and augments the maximal elongation. The sum of all these contributions 
(corrosion, diffusion and high temperature flow) result in lower fracture resistance. 
A critical aspect of the solar salt is its oxidizing power. In particular, in case of 
an accidental contact with hydrogen produced in the primary circuit by hydrolysis 
mechanism, the reaction between NaNO3/KNO3 and hydrogen can be primed and 
it is always exothermic.    
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Finally, the probability of molten salt freezing must be evaluated. The liquid 
state of the salt must be guaranteed in all the points of the circuit, especially in 
critical components, i.e. pumps and HX (Carpignano et al., 2016).   
6.1.3 PIEs identification 
Table 6-5 summarizes briefly the results of the implementation of the FFMEA 
for the system without HIS, which led to a list of 27 PIEs (Pinna et al., 2015).  
Table 6-5 List of PIEs identified by the FFMEA on HTSs of the DEMO WCLL reactor 
(Pinna et al., 2015). 
PIE Description 
AOP Loss of Off Site Power 
FB1 Loss of flow in the primary cooling loop of the breeder material 
because pump trip 
FB2 Loss of flow in cooling channels of breeding material in one blan-
ket module because internal clogging 
FD1 Loss of flow in the primary cooling loop of the divertor because 
pump trip 
FD2 Reduction of flow in cooling channels of one divertor cassette be-
cause internal clogging 
FF1 Loss of flow in the primary cooling loop of the FW and blanket 
structures because pump trip 
FF2 Reduction of flow in cooling channels of FW and blanket structure 
of one module because internal clogging 
FM1 Loss of LiPb flow in the liquid metal circuit because electromag-
netic pump trip: the LiPb flow is lost in all blanket modules supplied 
by the LiPb circuit 
FM2 Loss of LiPb flow in one blanket module because clogging of the 
outlet pipe 
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HB99 Loss of heat sink in all FW, BZ and divertor primary cooling cir-
cuits because trip of both HP and LP turbines due to loss of condenser 
vacuum 
HB1 Loss of heat sink in one cooling train of the blanket module (either 
BZ or FW) 
LBB1 Large loss of water from the FW cooling circuit inside breeder 
blanket box: Rupture of a sealing weld 
LBB2 Leak of water from the FW cooling circuit inside breeder blanket 
box: Leak of a sealing weld 
LBO1 LOCA (Loss of Cooling Accident) Out-VV (Vacuum Vessel) be-
cause large rupture of the BZ primary cooling loop in the water mani-
fold feeder inside PHTS Vault 
LBO2 Leak Out-VV because small rupture of the BZ primary cooling 
loop in the water manifold feeder inside PHTS Vault 
LBO3 LOCA Out-VV from the breeder primary cooling loop because 
rupture of tubes in a Steam Generator 
LDO1 LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of the divertor primary cool-
ing loop in the water manifold feeder inside PHTS Vault  
LDO2 Leak Out-VV because small rupture of the divertor primary cool-
ing loop in the water manifold feeder inside PHTS Vault 
LDO3 LOCA Out-VV from the divertor primary cooling loop (DV-
PHTS) because rupture of tubes in the Heat Exchanger with the sec-
ondary loop 
LDV1 LOCA in-vessel because large rupture of the divertor cassette 
LDV2 Leak in-vessel because small rupture of the divertor cassette 
LFO1 LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of the FW primary cooling 
loop in the water manifold feeder inside PHTS Vault  
LFO2 Leak Out-VV because small rupture of the FW primary cooling 
loop in the water manifold feeder inside PHTS Vault 
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In the FFMEA analysis for the system with IHS, some of these PIEs result the 
most influenced by the presence of the intermediate circuit:  
• The loss of heat sink (HB1, HB99); 
• LOCA in tubes of HX between PHTS and HIS, which in the case without 
IHS corresponds to the steam generator (LFO3).  
In the subsequent paragraphs, the PIEs obtained in the analysis (Pinna et al., 
2015) for the concept without IHS are described, in order to facilitate the compari-
son with the PIEs obtained for the concept with IHS, which are reported in para-
graph 6.1.4.   
 
HB99: Loss of heat sink in all FW, BZ and divertor primary cooling circuits  
This PIE can be related to the loss of secondary flow or the loss of secondary 
confinement due to the blockage of a valve or piping leak/rupture or the loss of 
component cooling or turbine protection intervention, e.g. in case of over-speed, 
high vibrations or imbalance. Moreover it is assumed that DEMO reactor will be 
an inductive pulsed tokamak: consequently the turbine works in pulsed regime that 
can lower its reliability, leading to a higher frequency of trips than in stationary 
regime of conventional turbines (Pinna et al., 2015).  
LFO3 LOCA Out-VV from the first wall primary cooling loop because 
rupture of tubes in a Steam Generator 
LFV1 LOCA in-vessel because large rupture of the FW structure: Com-
plete rupture of the FW 
LFV2 Leak of FW cooling circuit inside VV 
TWO1 Tritium and H2 release in the room hosting the water detritiation 
system 
  
N/S Not Safety Relevant 
164 Errore. Per applicare Heading 1 al testo da visualizzare in questo punto, 
utilizzare la scheda Home. 
 
The reference event for the PIE is the loss of condenser vacuum for rupture of 
the condenser or of the interfacing lines. The PIE induces the unavailability of the 
heat sink to all the FW, BZ and divertor primary cooling systems of the reactor. The 
loss of condenser leak-tightness implies: 
• Ingress of air into steam loop towards low pressure turbine; 
• Loss of condenser vacuum; 
• Turbines trip for protection intervention (high pressure control); 
• Loss of saturated steam into turbine building once equalization of pres-
sures; 
• Building pressurization; 
• Release into building of tritium permeated through steam generator; 
• Direct release of tritium contained in secondary fluid towards the envi-
ronment if HVAC (Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning) is not 
promptly isolated; 
• Fast over-pressurization of primary and secondary loops if plasma is not 
promptly shutdown; 
• Pressure relief in primary loops: it will assure heat removal from plasma 
facing components (PFCs) for a while, giving, even if very short, a pe-
riod of time in order to operate the plasma shutdown; 
• Leaks/ruptures in ex-vessel and in-vessel sections of primary loops can 
occur (other leaks/ruptures in secondary circuit can occur too); 
• Plasma disruption and possible in-vessel break of FW of blanket mod-
ules; 
• Vacuum vessel pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to vacuum vessel pressure suppression system (VVPSS); 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into VVPSS room and 
vacuum vessel surrounding area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of vacuum vessel penetration leak-tightness because the 
high overpressure inside the vessel (Pinna et al., 2015).  
The following preventing and mitigating features/actions have been identified: 
• Redundant control of operating parameters in secondary circuit 
o Condenser and vacuum line parameters, 
o Parameters of vacuum equipment dedicated to remove incondensa-
ble gases from the condenser, 
o Hot well and degasser parameters, 
o Pressure relief devices, 
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o Turbine control against over-speed, over-load, vibrations, etc., 
o Interlock plasma operation with turbine parameters , 
o Closure of the high pressure stop valve and opening of the turbine 
by-pass valve. 
• Pressure relief devices in primary circuits. 
• Soft/Fast Plasma shutdown. 
• Vacuum vessel rupture disk opening 
o Release of pressure to the VVPSS. 
• Switch-on atmosphere DS into building. 
• Start of the emergency cooling (e.g. vacuum vessel cooling circuit) 
• Vent of cryostat to reduce the temperature in the vacuum vessel and its sur-
rounding structures (Pinna et al., 2015).  
 
HB1: Loss of heat sink in one cooling train of the blanket module (either BZ 
or FW)  
This PIE can be related to the loss of secondary flow or the loss of secondary 
confinement due to piping leak/rupture or valve leak/rupture in the section of the 
circuit interesting only one SG (e.g. high pressure steam lines from steam generator 
to steam collection header or, main steam safety valves) (Pinna et al., 2015). 
The reference event for the PIE is the unavailability of the heat sink to the FW 
primary loop cooling the FW of all blanket modules of the reactor. This could im-
ply: 
• Damages of the steam circuit; 
• Loss of steam into the building and building pressurization; 
• Release into the building of tritium permeated through the steam generator 
and following environmental releases due to building leaks; 
• Direct release of tritium contained in secondary fluid towards the environ-
ment if HVAC is not promptly isolated; 
• Reduction of the capability to remove plasma heat from FW segments; 
• Fast over-pressurization of FW primary loop if plasma is not promptly shut-
down;  
• Pressure relief in primary loop (it will assure heat removal from FW for a 
while, giving, even if very short, a period of time in order to operate the 
plasma shutdown); 
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• Plasma disruption and possible in-vessel break of FW modules because of 
thermal and mechanical stresses; 
• Vacuum vessel pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to VVPSS; 
• Vacuum vessel radioactive products and tritium released into VVPSS room 
and vacuum vessel surrounding area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of vacuum vessel penetration leak-tightness because the high 
overpressure inside the vessel (Pinna et al., 2015). 
The following preventing and mitigating features/actions have been identified: 
• Redundant control of operating parameters in secondary circuit 
o steam generator parameters, 
o Pressure relief devices. 
• Isolation of steam generator failed loop in secondary and primary side thank 
to a high efficiency isolation valves system; 
• Pressure relief devices in primary circuits. 
• Soft/Fast Plasma shutdown. 
• Vacuum vessel rupture disk opening 
o Release of pressure to the VVPSS. 
• Switch-on atmosphere DS into building. 
• Start of the emergency cooling (e.g. vacuum vessel cooling circuit) 
• Vent of cryostat to reduce the temperature in the vacuum vessel and its sur-
rounding structures (Pinna et al., 2015). 
  
LFO3:LOCA Out-VV from the SG of the first wall primary cooling loop  
The reference event for this PIE is the large loss of water from the FW primary 
cooling circuit inside the secondary loop because rupture of tubes in the steam gen-
erator (Pinna et al., 2015). 
As consequences of the initiator the following chain of accidents can occur: 
• Release of primary water into secondary loop; 
• Tritium and radioactive products contained in primary loop released into 
secondary loop (contamination of secondary loop); 
• Release of radioactive products through secondary loop leaks; 
• Equalization of pressure between the two loops; 
• Decrease of water pressure and inventory inside the primary loop; 
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• Loss/Reduction of capability to remove plasma heat and heat produced by 
the neutron reaction from the FW; 
• FW rupture because thermal and/or mechanical stress (plasma disruption 
can aggravate the thermo-mechanic load on the structures); 
• In-vessel LOCA from FW of blanket modules; 
• Vacuum vessel pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to VVPSS 
• Vacuum vessel radioactive products and tritium released into VVPSS room 
and vacuum vessel surrounding area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of vacuum vessel penetration leak-tightness because the high 
overpressure inside the vessel (Pinna et al., 2015).  
Redundant detection of primary loop parameters could be able to actuate auto-
matic actions to get safe conditions in case of anomalies. The first action is the soft 
or fast plasma shutdown (Pinna et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, as the BZ is cooled by an independent primary loop the damage 
and collapse of the FW could be prevented if safe mitigations are promptly activated 
(Pinna et al., 2015).  
 
6.1.4 Differences found out for the system with IHS  
All the PIEs identified for the case without IHS are valid also for the case that 
includes the intermediate molten salt circuit. The aim of the present paragraph is to 
highlight the differences between the design with and without IHS.  
No major differences have been found concerning events occurring in the breed-
ing blanket, first wall, divertor cooling loop, LiPb circuit and detritiation system, 
because the introduction of the IHS and its possible failure do not affect the func-
tionalities of these components. Table 6-6 summarizes the systems affected by the 
presence of the IHS.   
Table 6-6 Systems affected by the presence of the HIS (Carpignano et al., 2016). 
System Affected Not Affected 
Breeding Blanket  X 
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The PIEs, whose evolution is modified by the presence of the IHS circuit, are 
the loss of heat sink for the primary water circuit and LOCA in the tubes of the HX 
between primary and intermediate circuit. For each PIE, the major differences 
linked to the different nature of the two systems are summarized in table 6-7. 
Table 6-7 Main differences in the PIEs due to the presence of the IHS (Carpignano et al., 
2016). 
 
PIE: Loss of heat sink  
The loss of the heat sink for the FW/BZ can be due to different causes. Figure 
6-6 shows a sketch of an example of rupture location in the system. It causes the 
leakage of molten salt in the containment building. The worst scenario corresponds 
to a leakage in the part of the storage circuit located inside the primary building, 
First Wall  X 
Divertor   X 
LiPb circuit  X 
Detritiation system  X 
PHTS X  
BoP  X  
PIE   Differences 
Loss of heat sink (or of 
off-site power) 
 
- Leakage of molten salt; 
- Need of collecting tanks;  
- Possible solidification of molten salts where 
heaters are not present. 
LOCA in HX tubes 
 - Pressure difference between PHTS and inter-
mediate circuit of about 155 bar; 
- Vapour formation; 
- Water-molten salt chemical reaction;  
- Contamination of molten salts;  
- Possible H2 reaction. 
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even if the fluid is not in pressure, hence there is no building pressurization. Nev-
ertheless, the molten salt must be recollected; therefore, containment tanks must be 
foreseen in order to mitigate this event.  Moreover, even if the salt is non-toxic and 
non-flammable, it must be handled carefully, mainly because of its oxidizing nature 
in presence of hydrogen or other organic compounds (Carpignano et al., 2016).  
 
 
Figure 6-6 Sketch of the accidental rupture location, causing a loss of heat sink 
 
Another potential cause of this PIE could be the partial/total failure of the mol-
ten salt pump. Since the molten salt flow is fundamental to prevent freezing, suffi-
cient redundancies must be foreseen.  
With respect to FW/BZ and VV (Vacuum Vessel), the consequences are similar 
to the case without IHS. They are mainly linked to over-pressure and over-temper-
ature in the primary water, the necessity of a prompt shutdown of the plasma, even-
tual pressure relief in the primary loop and tritium release, possible leak/rupture in 
ex-vessel and in-vessel sections of the primary circuit because of thermo-mechani-
cal stresses and possible radioactive release in VVPSS and VV surrounding areas 
through containment leaks.  
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The event of loss of off-site power should be considered. This can be caused by 
an external event (e.g. earthquake) or to a failure of the on-site electrical network. 
It can initiate a pumps trip, with the consequences already presented in the loss of 
heat sink PIE. Moreover, the loss of off-site power can make the molten salt solidify 
in pipes and components, complicating the post-accident procedures.  
 
PIE: LOCA in tubes of HX between PHTS and HIS 
In the study of a LOCA in the tubes of the HX between primary and intermedi-
ate circuit, it is important to remember that the primary water is in overpressure 
with respect to the intermediate circuit. In fact, while the primary water is at 155 
bar, the molten salt circuit operates at atmospheric pressure. In case of rupture in 
the HX tubes, the primary water goes in the intermediate circuit at the sound speed 
and the primary water contaminates the molten salt. The water pressure decreases 
until the saturation pressure corresponding to the primary water temperature, then 
it evaporates instantaneously. An exothermic water-molten salt chemical reaction 
could be primed, involving fire or even explosion; the hydrogen, present in the pri-
mary water, can react with the salt that is an oxidizing agent, worsening the conse-
quences.  
Figure 6-7 shows schematically a representation of the accident position. 
 
 
Figure 6-7 Sketch of the accident LOCA in the tubes of HX between PHTS and IHS 
Heat Ex-
changer 
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Some consequences of this PIE are similar to the case without HIS, especially 
the ones related to radioactive releases from the primary loop to the secondary loop 
and from the secondary loop leaks to the secondary building (supposing that the 
HX is not contained in the primary building). Furthermore, this PIE causes the 
loss/reduction of heat removal function (plasma heat and heat produced by neutron 
reactions in the BZ). Over-pressure and overheating are expected in the primary 
circuit with thermal-mechanical stresses and risk of explosion because of H2 pro-
duced by radiolysis. Finally the opening of the pressure relief valve to VVPSS 
causes the VV pressurization. The soft or fast plasma shutdown can mitigate this 
accident. 
As for the case of a LOCA in tubes of HX between PHTS and IHS, in the case 
of a rupture of a tube in the SG between IHS and BoP same problems are possible 
to occur. 
 
6.1.5 Considerations  
The thermal storage helps realizing a steady feeding of the SG and continuous 
regime of the turbine (reduced mechanical fatigue) and introduction of the steady 
state electrical power into the grid.  
The FFMEA investigate systematically the concept and guarantees that only 
few systems are affected by the presence of the IHS: the ones heat with the storage, 
the PHTS and the BoP.  
The PIEs interesting the PHTS and the resulting consequences for the case with-
out IHS are still valid in the case with IHS, but the presence of the IHS introduces 
new criticalities connected to the physical-chemical characteristics of the molten 
salt. The presence of molten salt storage requires proper maintenance preventing 
actions by a RBI approach, to control the corrosive-erosive molten salt power, with 
respect to the steel structures (especially the pumps). In particular, the safety func-
tion of heat removal (ultimate sink) is influenced by this event. When the interme-
diate circuit is compromised, overpressure and overheating are likely to occur in 
primary circuit.  
172 Errore. Per applicare Heading 1 al testo da visualizzare in questo punto, 
utilizzare la scheda Home. 
 
However no major safety/operational obstacles are found for IHS concept.  
In future, a quantitative risk analyses will be performed after the definition of a 
more detailed design of IHS. 
 
 The methodology implementation: DCLL blanket 
concept 
6.2.1 DCLL description  
In the DCLL blanket, eutectic alloy LiPb acts as a breeders and coolant for the 
BZ and circulates slowly for limiting corrosion issues, while helium is used for 
cooling the FW and the reduced activation ferritic steel structure. The conceptual 
structure of the DCLL module for EU DEMO is shown in fig. 6-8. The LiPb 
flowrate inside each channel has been selected to maximize the heat extraction from 
the reactor and to avoid LiPb backflow in the poloidal ducts.  
As shown in fig. 6-8, the LiPb enters the module through the annulus (external 
duct) of the concentric pipes located at the top of the module. It goes downwards 
through two rows of parallel poloidal channels located at the rear part. It turns 180º 
at the bottom through radial channels and then circulates upwards in parallel front 
poloidal channels. Finally, the LiPb goes outside through the internal duct of the 
concentric pipes. 
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Figure 6-8 Section of cooling structure of the EU DCLL Breading Blanket module 
(Rapisarda et al., 2015) 
A Back Supporting Structure (BSS) integrates all service connections for every 
module and also acts as shielding. It is composed by two long poloidal ducts cov-
ering the segment whole length where LiPb flows downwards and upwards, respec-
tively. The concentric pipes feed the four independent LiPb circuits in each module 
and are connected to the general manifolds ducts. Two poloidal ducts with smaller 
dimensions are located close to the sidewalls, where helium flows downwards and 
upwards to feed the different modules. They are connected to the internal manifolds 
for helium distribution. 
The DCLL system is constituted by the following subsystems:  
• The breeder blanket segment: it includes the DCLL modules, the feeding 
pipes and the Back Supporting Structure (BSS)  
• The LiPb loop: it provides circulation of LiPb inside the modules and out-
side the VV.  
• The helium loop: it provides the circulation of the coolant from the modules 
to outside of the VV.  
• The Tritium Extraction system (TES). 
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The following fig. 6-9 shows a schematic representations of the circuit.  
 
Figure 6-9 Schematic representation of the primary cooling circuits (Rapisarda et al., 
2015). 
 
He loop  
Due to the lack of information, for these studies, the helium circuit designed for 
ITER DCLL test blanket module (TBM) is used as reference (see fig. 6-10). 
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Figure 6-10 Simplified helium loop design for ITER DCLL TBM (Wong, 2010) 
 
The Helium circulates at ~8.0 MPa and reaches the temperature of 395°C in the 
blanket module. It exchanges heat with the BoP coolant in the HX and it returns in 
the blanket module (no intermediate circuit is considered for this concept). A com-
pressor helps the helium circulation. In case of need, an electric heater switches on 
in case to manage helium temperature and pressure.  
For these preliminary studies, it has been considered that U-tubes constitute the 
helium circuit inside the blanket box. The cooling channels are disposed inside the 
Breading Blanket as shown in fig. 6-11 and fig. 6-12, where operational conditions 
are also indicated. 
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Figure 6-11 U-tube geometry used for He circuit analyses (Rapisarda et al., 2015) 
 
Figure 6-12: FW segment geometry (Rapisarda et al., 2015)  
 
The helium loop is designed in order to maintain the EUROFER temperature 
below 550 °C, maximizing the helium outlet temperature (~395 °C) and minimizing 
the pressure loss. The limiting temperature of 550 °C is given by EUROFER/LiPb 
corrosion (Rapisarda et al., 2016).  
LiPb loop  
A preliminary proposal for the LiPb loop for the DCLL BB concept has been 
performed based on the input data and parameters available in 2014 (Reungoat & 
Vala, 2014). Main operational parameters are listed in the table 6-8 below; they 
have been considered to perform the preliminary safety assessment of the LiPb 
loop.  
 
104
3220
12,7
2,5
q = 0,5 MW/m2
Velocity inlet 
80 m/s, 250ºC
Isothermal wall (400ºC)
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Table 6-8 Operating parameters for the 2014 DCLL BB concept 2014 (Reungoat & Vala, 
2014) 
Parameter Value 
Composition of LiPb coolant Pb-15.7Li 
Maximal temperature of LiPb [°C] 550 
Minimal temperature of LiPb [°C] 300 
Total LiPb mass flow rate for DEMO [kg/s] 46000  
Max LiPb velocity in BB [m/s] 1  
Helium pressure in BB [MPa] 8  
BB material EUROFER + alumina-sandwich for FCI 
LiPb loop material EUROFER 
Corrosion rate of EUROFER [µm/year] 300–900 (TBC) 
BB lifetime [years] 5–6  
Magnetic field [T] Maximum field on Nb3Sn-conductor: ≈ 12 
Pressure drop due to MHD effect [MPa] 1.29 (TBC) 
LiPb inlet/outlet position On the top of the BB segment 
Number of LiPb loops for DEMO 16 (one for each of the 16 sectors) 
LiPb volume in one outboard BB segment [m3] 11.8  
LiPb volume in one inboard BB segment [m3] 8.52 
 
The LiPb loop includes the following components:  
• Expansion tank (ET); 
• Tritium Extraction System (TES); 
• Pump (Permanent Magnet Pump or mechanical pump); 
• Purification system (PS); 
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• Storage tank.  
The BB and the HX are considered as interfaces for LiPb loop. 
In a DCLL DEMO each sector is connected to one LiPb loop, in order to split 
the extremely high LiPb mass flow rate. This improves also the safety aspects; in 
fact, cooling the PFCs through independent primary circuits minimizes the impact 
of the failure of one of them, since the other cooling circuits will remain available, 
giving more time to get safe status of the reactor. The diameter of the LiPb loop 
pipes has been chosen in order to keep the LiPb velocity low and therefore to reduce 
the corrosion rate.  It has been estimated to be 0.44 m/s.  
Finally two different pumping systems have been proposed for the LiPb loop of 
the DCLL BB concept:  
1. A permanent magnet pump (PMP); in this case it is located at the hot leg of 
the loop in order to prevent precipitation of corrosion products (favored by 
a combination of magnetic field and low temperature of LiPb);  
2. A mechanical centrifugal pump; in this case the pump is located at the cold 
leg of the loop in order to limit the operating temperature of the component 
(Rapisarda et al., 2016). 
A schematic representation of the LiPb loop is proposed in fig. 6-13 (Rapisarda 
et al., 2016).  
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Figure 6-13 Proposed DCLL LiPb loop (Tincani et al., 2015). 
 
6.2.2 Safety issues for the DCLL BB in EU DEMO 
Chemical and physical properties of LiPb 
The phase diagram of LiPb alloy is showed in fig. 6-14, where the variation of 
phases is described in terms of system temperature and alloy composition. The LiPb 
eutectic alloy, which is used in DCLL and many other different applications is char-
acterized by a percentage of Pb equal to 83% (99.3 wt%) and melting point of 235 
°C.  
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Figure 6-14 Phase diagram of LiPb alloy (Jauch et al., 1986) 
 
The interaction between LiPb eutectic alloy and water are already studied in the 
frame of WCLL DEMO and ITER blanket.   
With respect to the corrosion process of LiPb in touch with the EUROFER 
structure, the corrosion rate is evaluated equal to 300-900 µm/year, with a maxi-
mum LiPb velocity of 1 m/s in the BB. The lifetime of the BB is evaluated equal to 
5-6 years (Rapisarda et al., 2015). 
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Main issues associated to the LiPb loop 
A number of safety related issues have been identified during preliminary safety 
assessment of the DCLL BB. They are listed below:  
• Tritium will be mostly present in the LiPb and a non-negligible amount may 
permeate into the helium circuit (Carloni, 2014);  
• Erosion/corrosion phenomena are due to high metal velocity within the 
modules and manifolds, in particular fouling and high contamination (Car-
loni, 2014);  
• Activation products, as Po-210 and Hg-203 (relatively volatile and highly 
radiotoxic) and Fe-55 or Mn-54 may be transported in the coolant (Carloni, 
2014);  
• Draining of the BB in accidental scenario is not possible (Carloni, 2014);  
• Extremely high LiPb mass flow rate is present in DCLL (Rapisarda et al., 
2016);  
• MHD (Magnetic Hydro-Dynamic) effects have to be evaluated and limited 
(Rapisarda et al., 2016); 
• LiPb pressure is of vital importance since a sudden overpressure can cause 
the total damage and the PAV (Permeation Against Vacuum) with conse-
quences for safety (Carloni, 2014);  
• Exothermic reactions of LiPb with air and water may take place in acci-
dental conditions (Carloni, 2014);  
• If high LM (liquid metal) oxidation takes place, a high hydrogen production 
could occur (Carloni, 2014);  
• Hydrogen explosion can occur (Carloni, 2014);  
• The LiPb can freeze, if the minimum temperature is lower than the melting 
point, e.g. for an overcooling of the breeding material; 
• CCFs of all circuits have to be evaluated, when the design will be mature 
enough (Carloni, 2014); 
• Eventual reactions between activated helium and LiPb have to be investi-
gated (if any (Rapisarda et al., 2016). 
In addition, a number of technical issues have been identified during this pre-
liminary assessment: 
• Recovery of the LiPb cooling system; 
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• Draining pipe on the bottom of the inboard and outboard BB segments; 
• Measure and control of the Li content in LiPb; 
• Measure and control of the oxygen content; 
• Adapt the LiPb loop according to the technical solutions chosen for the TES 
and the purification system. 
Study will verify whether it is relevant or not to use the expansion tank to re-
move helium bubbles from the LiPb alloy (Rapisarda et al., 2016).  
  
6.2.3 Postulated initiating events (PIE) 
Relevant events have been recognized by the FFMEA on HTSs (Heat Transfer 
Systems) of the DEMO DCLL and they are listed in table 6-9. 
Table 6-9 : Relevant event from FFMEA (Bertinetti et al., 2016) 
PIE Description 
AOP Loss of Off Site Power 
FD1 Loss of flow in the water primary cooling loop of the divertor 
because pump trip 
FD2 Reduction of flow in the water cooling channels of one divertor 
cassette because internal clogging 
FF1 Loss of flow in one primary cooling loop of the FW and blanket 
structures because compressor trip 
FF2 Reduction of flow in cooling channels of FW and blanket struc-
ture of one module because internal clogging 
FM1 Loss of LiPb flow in the liquid metal circuit because electro-
magnetic/mechanical pump trip: the LiPb flow is lost in all blanket 
modules supplied by the LiPb circuit 
FM2 Loss of LiPb flow in one blanket module because clogging of 
the outlet pipe 
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HB99 Loss of heat sink in all FW, BZ and divertor primary cooling 
circuits because trip of both HP and LP turbines due to loss of con-
denser vacuum 
HF1 Loss of heat sink in one cooling train of the blanket module 
(either BZ structure or FW) 
LFB1 Large loss of helium from the FW cooling circuit inside breeder 
blanket box: Rupture of a sealing weld 
LFB2 Leak of helium from the FW cooling circuit inside breeder blan-
ket box: Leak of a sealing weld 
LMO1 LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of the liquid metal loop  
(performing breeding and cooling functions) 
LMO2 Leak Out-VV because small rupture of the liquid metal loop  
LMO3 Rupture of the SG tubes of the liquid metal loop 
LDO1 LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of the divertor primary 
cooling loop in the water manifold feeder inside PHTS Vault  
LDO2 Leak Out-VV because small rupture of the divertor primary 
cooling loop in the water manifold feeder inside PHTS Vault 
LDO3 LOCA Out-VV from the divertor primary cooling loop (DV-
PHTS) because rupture of tubes in the Heat Exchanger with the sec-
ondary loop 
LDV1 LOCA in-vessel because large rupture of the divertor cassette 
LDV2 Leak in-vessel because small rupture of the divertor cassette 
LFO1 LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of the FW primary cool-
ing loop in the helium manifold feeder inside PHTS Vault  
LFO2 Leak Out-VV because small rupture of the FW primary cooling 
loop in the helium manifold feeder inside PHTS Vault 
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LFO3 LOCA Out-VV from the first wall primary cooling loop be-
cause rupture of tubes in a Steam Generator 
LFV1 LOCA in-vessel because large rupture of the FW structure: 
Complete rupture of the FW 
LFV2 Leak of FW cooling circuit inside VV 
N/S Not Safety Relevant 
 
All the PIEs reported are leading to safety relevant disturbance resulting in per-
sonnel exposure and environmental releases. Each event is briefly described in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
AOP: Loss of off-site power 
The loss of the power supply (Bertinetti et al., 2016) to the electrical equipment 
of DEMO can be determined by an external event (e.g. earthquake) or by a failure 
on the on-site electrical network. The reference event for the PIE is the unavailabil-
ity of the electrical supply to all the system of the reactor; this could induce different 
accident scenarios: 
1. Plasma disruption and possible in-vessel break either of FW, BZ and/or di-
vertor modules because of thermal and mechanical stresses (events as dis-
cussed below for the in-vessel LOCA PIEs); 
o VV pressurization;  
o Pressure relief to Expansion Volume (EV) / Vacuum Vessel Pres-
sure Suppression System (VVPSS), with eventual reactions between 
water from the divertor and LiPb from the BZ; 
o VV radioactive products and tritium released into EV/VVPSS and 
VV surrounding area through containment leaks; 
o Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high 
overpressure inside the vessel. 
 
2. Trip of pumps and consequential events as it will be discussed for loss of 
flow PIEs (see next paragraphs). 
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3. Trip of pumps, isolation of valves due to failed closed valves and conse-
quential events as discussed for the loss of heat sink PIEs. 
The following mitigating measures have been identified 
• VV rupture disk opening; 
• Release of pressure to EV/VVPSS; 
• Start of Emergency Diesel generator; 
• Start of the Emergency Cooling; 
• Vent of Cryostat to reduce the temperature in the VV and its surrounding 
structures; 
• Pressure relief from primary loops towards expansion volumes; 
• Pressure relief from secondary loop towards expansion volumes. 
 
 
FD1: Loss of flow in the primary cooling loop of the divertor because pump 
trip  
Several causes can determine the loss of flow in the primary cooling loop of the 
divertor (Bertinetti et al., 2016). The selected representative event is the pump trip. 
As consequences of the initiator the following chain of accidents can occur: 
• Loss of flow in the divertor cooling channels; 
• Over-heating and over-pressurization of divertor primary loop; 
• Loss of capability to remove plasma heat from divertor; 
• Divertor rupture because thermal and/or mechanical (disruption) stress; 
• In-vessel LOCA; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to VVPSS/EV; 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into VVPSS/EV room sur-
rounding area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high overpres-
sure inside the vessel; 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into the VV surrounding area 
through penetration leaks. 
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Redundant detection and measures of primary loop parameters could be able to 
actuate automatic actions to get safe conditions in case of anomalies. The first ac-
tion is the soft or fast plasma shutdown. 
 
FD2: Loss of flow in cooling channels of one divertor cassette 
Several initiators have been grouped under this PIE because similarity of the 
effects (Bertinetti et al., 2016). The selected representative event is the clogging of 
several cooling channels inside one divertor cassette. As consequences of the initi-
ator, the following chain of accidents can occur: 
• Loss/Reduction of capability to remove plasma heat and heat produced by 
the neutron reaction from the divertor cassette; 
• Divertor rupture because local thermal and/or mechanical (disruption) 
stress; 
• In-vessel LOCA from divertor; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to VVPSS/EV; 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into VVPSS/EV room sur-
rounding area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high overpres-
sure inside the vessel. 
Redundant detection and measures of primary loop parameters could be able to 
actuate automatic actions to get safe conditions in case of anomalies. The first ac-
tion is the soft or fast plasma shutdown. 
 
FF1: Loss of flow in one primary cooling loop of the FW and blanket struc-
tures 
Several causes can determine the loss of helium flow in one primary cooling 
loop of the FW and blanket structures (Bertinetti et al., 2016). The selected repre-
sentative event is the compressor trip. As consequences of the initiator the following 
chain of accidents can occur: 
• Loss of flow in all the FW and BZ structure cooling channels; 
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• Loss of capability to remove plasma heat from FW segments and BZ struc-
ture; 
• Over-heating and over-pressurization of primary loop; 
• FW rupture because thermal and/or mechanical stress (plasma disruption 
can aggravate the thermo-mechanic load on the structures); 
• In-vessel LOCA from FW and BZ structure of blanket modules; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to EV/VVPSS;  
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into EV/VVPSS room sur-
rounding area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high overpres-
sure inside the vessel 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into the VV surrounding area 
through penetration leaks. 
Redundant detection of primary loop parameters could be able to actuate auto-
matic actions to get safe conditions in case of anomalies. The first action is the soft 
or fast plasma shutdown. 
As the breeding material is by independent primary loops, the damage and col-
lapse of the FW could be prevented if safe mitigations are promptly activated. 
If the LiPb is cooled even when the plasma is shutdown for a period long 
enough, it can solidify, especially in not well-isolated components. Special atten-
tion must be deserved for the LiPb storage tank design, in order to foresee safety 
component to prevent the LiPb solidification.   
 
FF2: Loss of flow in cooling channels of FW and blanket structure of one 
blanket module 
Several initiators have been grouped under this PIE because similarity of the 
effects (Bertinetti et al., 2016). The selected representative event is the clogging of 
several cooling channels inside the FW and BZ structures of one blanket module. 
As consequences of the initiator the following chain of accidents can occur: 
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• Loss/Reduction of capability to remove plasma heat and heat produced by 
the neutron reaction from the FW and/or BZ structures; 
• FW rupture because thermal and/or mechanical stress (plasma disruption 
can aggravate the thermo-mechanic load on the structures); 
• In-vessel LOCA from FW of blanket module; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to EV/VVPSS; 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into EV/VVPSS room sur-
rounding area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high overpres-
sure inside the vessel. 
Redundant detection of primary loop parameters could be able to actuate auto-
matic actions to get safe conditions in case of anomalies. The first action is the soft 
or fast plasma shutdown. 
As the breeding material is by independent primary loops, the damage and col-
lapse of the FW could be prevented if safe mitigations are promptly activated. 
If the LiPb is cooled even when the plasma is shutdown for a period long 
enough, it can solidify, especially in not well-isolated components. Special atten-
tion must be deserved for the LiPb storage tank design, in order to foresee safety 
component to prevent the LiPb solidification.   
 
FM1: Loss of LiPb flow in the liquid metal circuit 
Several causes can determine the loss of flow in LiPb loop (Bertinetti et al., 
2016). The selected representative event is the trip of the electromagnetic/mechan-
ical pump. As consequences of the initiator the following chain of accidents can 
occur: 
• Overheating of the breeder material in all blanket modules; 
• Expansion of the LiPb volume contained inside the blanket boxes; 
• Increase of the level of LiPb inside the expansion tank;  
• Possible stop of natural circulation flow of the LiPb in case of solidification 
of the liquid metal in the external part of the loop, in particular if pipes heat-
ers are out of operation due to a common cause failure with the pump; 
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• Increase of the thermo-mechanical stress on the blanket box structures; 
• Collapse of one of the blanket box structure; 
• Release of LiPb coolant and He from FW channels inside the VV. The suc-
tion effect of the vacuum conditions inside the plasma chamber could facil-
itate the emptying of the LiPb loop; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to EV/VVPSS of the overpressure induced by the ingress of 
He (liquid metal alone does not generate overpressure); 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into the EV/VVPSS and 
through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high overpres-
sure inside the vessel. 
Redundant detection of LiPb loop parameters could be able to actuate automatic 
actions to get safe conditions in case of anomalies. The first action is the soft or fast 
plasma shutdown. 
As the cooling of the BZ material and FW continues to operate even if the LiPb 
loses its flow, the damage and collapse of the blanket box could be prevented if safe 
mitigations are promptly activated. 
 
FM2: Loss of LiPb flow inside one blanket module 
The clogging of the outlet LiPb pipe from the blanket module is the initiating 
event (Bertinetti et al., 2016). As consequences of the initiator the same chain of 
accidents described for the FM1 PIE can occur, but in this case the anomaly is chal-
lenging only one blanket module: 
• Overheating of the breeder material inside the blanket module; 
• Expansion of the LiPb volume contained inside the blanket box; 
• LiPb Increase of the thermo-mechanical stress on the blanket box structure 
and FW; 
• Collapse of the blanket box structure and/or FW; 
• Release of LiPb coolant and He from FW/BZ structure channels inside the 
VV. The suction effect of the vacuum conditions inside the plasma chamber 
could facilitate the emptying of the LiPb from the box; 
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• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to EV/VVPSS of the overpressure induced by the ingress of 
He (liquid metal alone does not generate overpressure); 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into the EV/VVPSS surround-
ing area through containment leaks. 
Redundant detection of LiPb parameters inside the blanket could be able to 
actuate automatic actions to get safe conditions in case of anomalies. The first ac-
tion is the soft or fast plasma shutdown. 
As the cooling of the BZ material and FW continues to operate even if the LiPb 
loses its flow, the damage and collapse of the blanket box could be prevented if safe 
mitigations are promptly activated. 
 
HB99: Loss of heat sink in all FW, BZ and divertor primary cooling circuits 
This PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) can be related to the loss of secondary flow or 
the loss of secondary confinement due to the blockage of a valve or piping leak/rup-
ture or the loss of component cooling or turbine protection intervention, e.g. in case 
of over-speed, high vibrations or imbalance. The reference event for the PIE is the 
loss of condenser vacuum for rupture of the condenser or of the interfacing lines. 
The PIE induces the unavailability of the heat sink to all the FW, BZ and divertor 
primary cooling systems of the reactor. The loss of condenser leak-tightness im-
plies: 
• Ingress of air into steam loop towards low pressure turbine; 
• Loss of condenser vacuum; 
• Turbines trip for protection intervention (high pressure control); 
• Loss of saturated steam into turbine building once equalization of pres-
sures; 
• Building pressurization; 
• Release into building of tritium permeated through SG; 
• Direct release of tritium contained in secondary fluid towards the envi-
ronment if HVAC is not promptly isolated; 
• Fast over-pressurization of primary and secondary loops if plasma is not 
promptly shutdown; 
• Pressure relief in primary; 
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• Leaks/ruptures in ex-vessel and in-vessel sections of primary loops can 
occur (other leaks/ruptures in secondary circuit can occur too). Both He, 
LiPb and divertor loops can be involved; 
• Plasma disruption and possible in-vessel break of FW of blanket mod-
ules and or divertor cassettes; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to EV/VVPSS; 
• Possible LiPb-water reaction in case of double rupture from blanket and 
divertor, with H2 production; 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into EV surrounding area 
through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high over-
pressure inside the vessel. 
The following preventing and mitigating features/actions have been identified: 
• Redundant control of operating parameters in secondary circuit 
o Condenser and vacuum line parameters, 
o Parameters of vacuum equipment dedicated to remove incondensa-
ble gases from the condenser, 
o Hot well and degasser parameters, 
o Pressure relief devices, 
o Turbine control against over-speed, over-load, vibrations, etc., 
o Interlock plasma operation with turbine and condenser parameters, 
o Closure of the HP stop valve and opening of the turbine by-pass 
valve; 
• Pressure relief devices in primary circuits; 
• Soft/Fast Plasma shutdown; 
• VV rupture disk opening 
o Release of pressure to the EV/VVPSS; 
• Switch-on atmosphere DS into building; 
• Start of the Emergency Cooling (e.g. VV cooling circuit); 
• Vent of Cryostat to reduce the temperature in the VV and its surrounding 
structures. 
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HF1: Loss of heat sink in one cooling train of the blanket module (either BZ 
structure or FW) 
This PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) can be related to the loss of secondary flow or 
the loss of secondary confinement due to piping leak/rupture or valve leak/rupture 
in the section of the circuit interesting only one SG (e.g. high pressure steam lines 
from SG to steam collection header or, main steam safety valves). The reference 
event for the PIE is the unavailability of the heat sink to the FW primary loop cool-
ing the FW and the BZ structures of all blanket modules in one sector of the reactor. 
This could imply: 
• Damages of the steam circuit; 
• Loss of steam into the building and building pressurization; 
• Release into the building of tritium permeated through the steam generator 
and following environmental releases due to building leaks; 
• Direct release of tritium contained in secondary fluid towards the environ-
ment if HVAC is not promptly isolated; 
• Reduction of the capability to remove plasma heat from FW segments; 
• Fast over-pressurization of FW primary loop if plasma is not promptly shut-
down;  
• Pressure relief in primary loop; 
• Plasma disruption and possible in-vessel break of FW modules because of 
thermal and mechanical stresses; 
• He ingress into the VV; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to the EV/VVPSS; 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into the EV/VVPSS surround-
ing area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high overpres-
sure inside the vessel. 
The following preventing and mitigating features/actions have been identified: 
• Redundant control of operating parameters in secondary circuit 
o SG parameters, 
o Pressure relief devices. 
• Isolation of SG failed loop in secondary and primary side thank to a high 
efficiency isolation valves system. 
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• Pressure relief devices in primary circuits. 
• Soft/Fast Plasma shutdown. 
• VV rupture disk opening 
o Release of pressure to the EV/VVPSS. 
• Switch-on atmosphere DS into building. 
• Start of the Emergency Cooling (e.g. VV cooling circuit). 
• Vent of Cryostat to reduce the temperature in the VV and its surrounding 
structures. 
 
LFB1: Large loss of helium from the FW cooling circuit inside blanket box 
The reference event for this PIE is the large loss of helium from the FW cooling 
circuit inside BB box because of a rupture of a sealing weld (Bertinetti et al., 2016). 
As consequences of the initiator the following chain of accidents can occur: 
• Ingress of helium coolant into breeder box; 
• LiPb-activated helium interaction (if any);  
• Over-pressurization of breeder box and LiPb loop; 
• Collapse of the blanket structure and/or rupture of the LiPb external loop, 
because both of them are not designed to withstand the He pressure of 8 
MPa; 
• Loss of LiPb and helium coolant into VV and/or loss of LiPb out-vessel 
because rupture in the external circuit; 
• Possible failure of the LiPb external loop could also occur as consequences 
of the in-VV failure because the suction forces produced by the vacuum in 
plasma chamber (it has to be checked if the external LiPb circuit is able to 
keep leak-tightness also in high vacuum conditions): 
• Ingress of air inside the VV through the by-pass opened through the internal 
and external breaks in the LiPb circuit; 
• Reaction between LiPb and air; 
• Risk of H2 explosion, due to the H2 production for the oxidation of the liquid 
metal; 
• Possible air-dust reaction too with risk of explosion; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to EV/VVPSS; 
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• VV radioactive products and tritium released into EV/VVPSS surrounding 
area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high overpres-
sure inside the vessel; 
• Tritium and activated dust contained inside the VV mobilized towards the 
port cell or building through the broken VV penetration and/or through the 
bypass generated in the LiPb. 
Redundant detection of blanket box, helium loop and LiPb loop parameters 
could be able to actuate automatic actions to get safe conditions in case of anoma-
lies. The first action is the soft or fast plasma shutdown. In this case, the leak before 
break conditions can play an important role in preventing catastrophic failures. 
 
LFB2: Leak of Helium from the FW cooling circuit inside blanket box 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the leak of helium 
from the FW cooling circuit inside breeder blanket box because loss of leak-tight-
ness of a sealing weld.The consequences of the initiator, preventing and mitigating 
measures can be the same of the previous PIE LBB1. Clearly the transient of the 
accident chain should occur in longer time. 
 
LMO1: LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of the liquid metal loop 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the large loss of LiPb 
from cooling circuit inside the PHTS because large rupture of a manifold feeder. 
As consequences of the initiator the following chain of accidents can occur: 
• Tritium and radioactive products contained in LiPb released into building; 
• Eventual exothermic reaction between the LiPb and the air; 
• Environmental release through building leaks; 
• Environmental release through HVAC if not promptly isolated; 
• Decrease of LiPb inventory inside the primary loop; 
• Possible LiPb solidification in components not well heated up (e.g. storage 
tank); 
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• Loss/Reduction of capability to remove plasma heat and heat produced by 
the neutron reaction in the breeder; 
• Expansion of the LiPb volume contained inside the blanket box; 
• Increase of the thermo-mechanical stress on the blanket box structures; 
• Collapse of one, or more than one, of the blanket box structure if the faulted 
loop is not promptly isolated and the plasma is not safely shutdown; 
• Release of LiPb and helium (if also the FW fails) coolant inside the VV; 
• Ingress of air inside the VV through the by-pass opened through the external 
and internal breaks in the LiPb circuit; 
• Risk of H2 explosion, due to the H2 production for the oxidation of the liquid 
metal; 
• Possible air-dust reaction too with risk of explosion; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to EV/VVPSS; 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into EV/VVPSS surrounding 
area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high overpres-
sure inside the vessel 
• Tritium and activated dust contained inside the VV mobilized towards the 
port cell or building through the broken VV penetration and/or through the 
bypass generated in the LiPb circuit. 
Redundant detection of blanket box, primary loop and LiPb circuit parameters 
could be able to actuate automatic actions to get safe conditions in case of anoma-
lies. The first action is the soft or fast plasma shutdown. In this case, the leak before 
break conditions can play an important role in preventing catastrophic failures. 
As the FW is cooled by an independent primary loop the damage and collapse 
of the blanket box could be prevented if safe mitigations are promptly activated. 
 
LMO2: Leak Out-VV because small rupture of the liquid metal loop 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the leak of LiPb from 
the liquid metal circuit inside the PHTS room because a small rupture of a manifold 
feeder. 
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The consequences of the initiator, preventing and mitigating measures can be 
the same of the previous PIE LBO1. Clearly the transient of the accident chain 
should occur in so longer time that all the consequential events inside the VV can 
be prevented. In any case, this event has to be considered because the following 
events: 
• Hot liquid metal released in the room; 
• LiPb reaction with the air producing H2; 
• Possible H2 explosion inside the building in case explosive H2-air concen-
tration is achieved; 
• Release of tritium and activated corrosion products contained in the LiPb 
loop released into the room; 
• Release of tritium to the environment through HVAC if it is not promptly 
isolated; 
• Release of tritium and activated corrosion products to the environment 
through building leaks. 
The assessment of this PIE should define if the LiPb loop should be enclosed in 
secondary containment fulfilled by inert gas. 
 
LMO3: Rupture of the SG tubes of the liquid metal loop 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the large ingress of 
secondary water in the LiPb loop because of rupture of tubes in a SG. As conse-
quences of the initiator the following chain of accidents can occur: 
• Ingress of secondary water in the LiPb circuit; 
• LiPb-water reaction inside the loop with H2 production;  
• Over pressurization of breeder box and LiPb loop; 
• Collapse of the blanket box structure and/or rupture of the out-vessel LiPb 
circuit; 
• Loss of LiPb and water coolant into VV in case of blanket box rupture. The 
suction effect of the vacuum conditions inside the plasma chamber could 
facilitate the emptying of the LiPb from the box and the loop and facilitate 
the release of secondary coolant water inside the VV; 
• LiPb-water reaction inside the VV with H2 production (large amount of 
LiPb can react); 
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• Risk of H2 explosion; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to the EV/VVPSS; 
• Possible loss of leak-tightness of a VV port plug due to thermo-mechanic 
stress (e.g. window); 
• Release of VV activated products and tritium into port cell through the VV 
leak (after pressure equalization); 
• Tritium and radioactive products contained in primary loop released into 
secondary loop (contamination of secondary loop). 
Redundant detection of blanket box, primary loop and LiPb circuit parameters 
could be able to actuate automatic actions to get safe conditions in case of anoma-
lies. The first action is the soft or fast plasma shutdown. Furthermore, as the FW is 
cooled by an independent primary loop the damage and collapse of the blanket box 
could be prevented if safe mitigations are promptly activated. 
 
LDO1: LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of the divertor primary cooling 
loop 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the large loss of water 
from the divertor primary cooling circuit inside the PHTS because large rupture of 
a manifold feeder. As consequences of the initiator the following chain of accidents 
can occur: 
• PHTS pressurization; 
• Tritium and radioactive products contained in coolant released into primary 
building; 
• Environmental release through building leaks; 
• Environmental release through HVAC if not promptly isolated; 
• Decrease of water pressure and inventory inside the primary loop; 
• Loss/Reduction of capability to remove plasma heat and heat produced by 
the neutron reaction from the breeder; 
• Increase of the thermo-mechanical stress on the divertor structures; 
• In-vessel LOCA from divertor cassette; 
• Loss of water coolant into VV; 
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• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to EV/VVPSS; 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into EV/VVPSS room sur-
rounding area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high overpres-
sure inside the vessel. 
Redundant detection of primary loop parameters could be able to actuate auto-
matic actions to get safe conditions in case of anomalies. The first action is the soft 
or fast plasma shutdown. In this case, the leak before break conditions can play an 
important role in preventing catastrophic failures. 
 
LDO2: Leak Out-VV because small rupture of the divertor primary cooling 
loop 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the leak of water 
from the divertor primary cooling circuit inside the PHTS because a small rupture 
of a manifold feeder. The consequences of the initiator, preventing and mitigating 
measures can be the same of the previous PIE LDO1. Clearly the transient of the 
accident chain should occur in longer time. 
 
LDO3: LOCA Out-VV from the HX divertor primary cooling loop 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the large loss of water 
from the divertor primary cooling circuit inside the secondary loop because rupture 
of tubes in the HX with the secondary loop. As consequences of the initiator the 
following chain of accidents can occur: 
• Release of primary water into secondary loop; 
• Tritium and radioactive products contained in primary loop released into 
secondary loop (contamination of secondary loop); 
• Release of radioactive products through secondary loop leaks; 
• Equalization of pressure between the two loops; 
• Decrease of water pressure and inventory inside the primary loop; 
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• Loss/Reduction of capability to remove plasma heat and heat produced by 
the neutron reaction from the divertor; 
• Divertor rupture because thermal and/or mechanical (disruption) stress; 
• In-vessel LOCA; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to EV/VVPSS 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into EV/VVPSS room sur-
rounding area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high overpres-
sure inside the vessel. 
Redundant detection of primary loop parameters could be able to actuate auto-
matic actions to get safe conditions in case of anomalies. The first action is the soft 
or fast plasma shutdown. Even if the induced in-vessel consequences are similar to 
the ones identified for the LDO1 PIE, here the transient to get criticality of the di-
vertor structure is slower. 
 
LDV1: LOCA in-vessel because large rupture of the divertor cassette 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the large loss of water 
from the divertor primary cooling circuit inside the VV because large rupture of a 
divertor cassette. As consequences of the initiator the following chain of accidents 
can occur: 
• Loss of water coolant into VV; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to EV/VVPSS; 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into EV/VVPSS room sur-
rounding area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of leak-tightness of a VV port plug due to thermo-mechanic 
stress (e.g. window); 
• Release of VV activated products and tritium into port cell through the VV 
leak (after pressure equalization) 
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LDV2: Leak in-vessel because small rupture of the divertor cassette 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the leak of water from 
the divertor primary cooling circuit inside the VV because a small rupture of the 
divertor cassette. The consequences of the initiator, preventing and mitigating 
measures can be the same of the previous PIE LDV1. Clearly the effects of the 
accident chain should be milder. 
 
LFO1: LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of the FW primary cooling loop 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the large loss of 
helium from the FW primary cooling circuit inside the PHTS because large rupture 
of a manifold feeder (ex-vessel LOCA). As consequences of the initiator the fol-
lowing chain of accidents can occur: 
• PHTS pressurization (eventual asphyxiation problems for personnel); 
• Tritium and radioactive products contained in coolant released into primary 
building; 
• Environmental release through building leaks; 
• Environmental release through HVAC if not promptly isolated; 
• Decrease of helium pressure and inventory inside the primary loop; 
• Loss/Reduction of capability to remove plasma heat and heat produced by 
the neutron reaction from the FW segments; 
• Over-heating and over-pressurization of primary loop; 
• FW rupture because thermal and/or mechanical stress (plasma disruption 
can aggravate the thermo-mechanic load on the structures); 
• In-vessel LOCA from FW of blanket modules; 
• VV pressurization; 
• He pressure relief to EV/VVPSS; 
• VV radioactive products and tritium (LiPb produced in the LiPb loop and 
permeated in the helium loop) released into EV/VVPSS and VV surround-
ing area through containment leaks; 
• Ingress of air inside the VV through the by-pass opened through the external 
and internal breaks in the He circuit; 
• Possible air-dust reaction too with risk of explosion; 
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• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high overpres-
sure inside the vessel; 
• Tritium and activated dust contained inside the VV mobilized towards the 
cooling room through the broken VV penetration and/or through the bypass 
generated in the He circuit. 
Redundant detection of primary loop parameters could be able to actuate auto-
matic actions to get safe conditions in case of anomalies. The first action is the soft 
or fast plasma shutdown. In this case, the leak before break conditions can play an 
important role in preventing catastrophic failures. 
As the BZ is cooled by an independent primary loop the damage and collapse 
of the FW could be prevented if safe mitigations are promptly activated. 
If the LiPb is cooled even when the plasma is shutdown for a period long 
enough, some solidification issues can occur, especially in not well-isolated com-
ponents. Special attention must be deserved for the LiPb storage tank design, in 
order to foresee safety component to prevent the LiPb solidification. 
 
LFO2: Leak Out-VV because small rupture of the FW primary cooling loop 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the leak of helium 
from the FW primary cooling circuit inside the PHTS room because a small rupture 
of a manifold feeder. The consequences of the initiator, preventing and mitigating 
measures can be the same of the previous PIE LFO1. Clearly, the transient of the 
accident chain should occur in longer time. 
 
LFO3: LOCA Out-VV from the SG of the first wall primary cooling loop 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the large loss of he-
lium from the FW primary cooling circuit inside the secondary water loop because 
rupture of tubes in the SG. As consequences of the initiator the following chain of 
accidents can occur: 
• Release of primary helium into secondary loop; 
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• Tritium and radioactive products contained in primary loop released into 
secondary loop (contamination of secondary loop); 
• Release of radioactive products through secondary loop leaks; 
• Equalization of pressure between the two loops; 
• Decrease of helium pressure and inventory inside the primary loop; 
• Loss/Reduction of capability to remove plasma heat and heat produced by 
the neutron reaction from the FW; 
• FW rupture because thermal and/or mechanical stress (plasma disruption 
can aggravate the thermo-mechanic load on the structures); 
• In-vessel LOCA from FW of blanket modules; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to EV/VVPSS; 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into EV/VVPSS and VV sur-
rounding area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high overpres-
sure inside the vessel. 
Redundant detection of primary loop parameters could be able to actuate auto-
matic actions to get safe conditions in case of anomalies. The first action is the soft 
or fast plasma shutdown.  
Even if the induced in-vessel consequences are similar to the ones identified for 
the LFO1 PIE, here the transient to get criticality of the FW structure is slower. 
Furthermore, as the BZ is cooled by an independent primary loop the damage and 
collapse of the FW could be prevented if safe mitigations are promptly activated. 
 
LFV1: LOCA in-vessel because large rupture of the FW structure 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the large loss of he-
lium from the FW primary cooling circuit inside the VV because large rupture of 
the FW structure. As consequences of the initiator the following chain of accidents 
can occur: 
• Loss of helium coolant into VV; 
• Loss of liquid LiPb inside VV (complete rupture of the FW is postulated); 
• Possible failure of the LiPb external loop because the suction forces pro-
duced by the VV and possible subsequent reaction between LiPb and air; 
 203 
 
 
• Risk of H2 explosion, due to the H2 production for the oxidation of the liquid 
metal; 
• VV pressurization; 
• Pressure relief to the EV/VVPSS; 
• VV radioactive products and tritium released into EV/VVPSS surrounding 
area through containment leaks; 
• Possible loss of VV penetration leak-tightness because the high overpres-
sure inside the vessel.  
 
LFV2: Leak of FW cooling circuit inside VV 
The reference event for this PIE (Bertinetti et al., 2016) is the leak of helium 
from the FW primary cooling circuit inside the VV because a small rupture of the 
FW structure. The consequences of the initiator, preventing and mitigating 
measures can be the same of the previous PIE LFV1. Clearly the effects of the ac-
cident chain should be milder. 
 
6.2.4 Considerations  
Twenty-four relevant events have been recognized by the FFMEA on HTSs of 
the DEMO DCLL (18 event related to the cooling loops of the FW/blanket circuits, 
5 related to the divertor cooling loops and 1 event to the general loss of power 
supply) (Pinna et al., 2017). All the PIEs are leading to safety relevant disturbance 
resulting in personnel exposure and environmental releases. Between these events, 
the most serious events, which should deserve the first attention in terms of deter-
ministic analysis, could be the following: 
• FD1 Loss of flow in the primary cooling loop of the divertor because 
pump trip 
• FF1 Loss of flow in one primary cooling loop of the FW and blanket 
structures because compressor trip 
• FM1 Loss of LiPb flow in the liquid metal circuit because electromag-
netic/mechanical pump trip: the LiPb flow is lost in all blanket mod-
ules supplied by the LiPb circuit 
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• HB99 Loss of heat sink in all FW, BZ and divertor primary cooling circuits 
because trip of both HP and LP turbines due to loss of condenser 
vacuum 
• HF1 Loss of heat sink in one cooling train of the blanket module (either 
BZ structure or FW) 
• LDO1 LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of the divertor primary cooling 
loop in the water manifold feeder inside PHTS Vault  
• LDO3 LOCA Out-VV from the divertor primary cooling loop (DV-PHTS) 
because rupture of tubes in the Heat Exchanger with the secondary 
loop 
• LDV1 LOCA in-vessel because large rupture of the divertor cassette 
• LFO1 LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of the FW primary cooling 
loop in the Helium manifold feeder inside PHTS Vault  
• LFO3 LOCA Out-VV from the first wall primary cooling loop because rup-
ture of tubes in a Steam Generator 
• LMO1 LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of the liquid metal loop 
• LFV1 LOCA in-vessel because large rupture of the FW structure: Com-
plete rupture of the FW 
• LMO3 Rupture of the SG tubes of the liquid metal loop. 
Deterministic analyses shall demonstrate capability of the plant to manage the 
possible accident sequence and mitigate the consequences.  
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7 Conclusions 
New generation reactors challenge the traditional safety assessment methodol-
ogy, metrics, tools and standards. The major objective of this work is to develop a 
methodology able to drive the safety demonstration of an innovative system along 
the design development. A risk-informed iterative approach is pursued: the reactor 
preliminary design evolves thanks to preliminary risk assessment results and the 
updated design must undergo a more specific safety demonstration. The entire pro-
cess must guarantee the achievement of the predefined safety goals and satisfy the 
risk tolerability criteria.  
New generation systems present a wide spectrum of different technologies, ma-
terials and design with respect to the standardization of the Light Water Reactors; 
therefore, their safety demonstration has to rely on an updated framework of risk 
metrics, tolerability criteria and safety objectives, always chasing the satisfaction 
of the fundamental safety objective.  
Since the proposed methodology is specifically developed for systems at the 
very preliminary design stage, technology neutral risk metrics can be used (see par-
agraph 2.2.2). Even if they lack of specificities and indications to guarantee con-
sistent, uniform and unique interpretation of rules, with a consequent slowdown of 
the entire process, their arrangement to new system is facilitated for any technology. 
When the design of the analyzed system will be more detailed, technology specific 
criteria can be developed, as it occurred for the boiling temperature criteria for SFRs 
(IRSN, 2015).   
Moreover, a risk-informed approach (see paragraph 2.2.2) may represent a com-
promise between the purely deterministic and conservative approach (i.e. the tradi-
tional regulative structure) and the risk-based approach, which is based on scenarios 
frequency and consequences evaluations using the best estimate values, which is 
more realistic but not suitable for conceptual design because of its low conservatism 
and of the uncertainties characterizing the results of the PSA of innovative systems. 
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In addition, a risk-based approach has never been completely accepted in the nu-
clear field.  
On the other hand, the deterministic approach needs to be guided in the wide 
spectrum of phenomena characterizing new generation installations, which are of-
ten still research topics and are possibly very different for LWRs ones. The risk-
informed strategy suits particularly well to innovative systems, since it helps the 
identification of the major risk contributors, criticalities and needs for additional 
safety provisions. In fact, it considers a major number of events sequences and pri-
oritize them on the basis of risk importance, previous/similar operating experience, 
experts’ elicitation. Moreover, it always considers the source of uncertainties that 
can highlight the need of more stringent requirements or regulatory actions, even if 
the list of uncertainties can be incomplete for conceptual INS.   
Furthermore, performance-based requirements (see paragraph 2.2.2) are flexi-
ble enough to be adequate to new technologies, concentrating all the efforts for the 
fulfillment of the final goal. They enhance a continuous improvement of the system, 
but lack of unique means to understand if the objective is achieved, slowing the 
safety demonstration. In particular, risk informed and performance-based require-
ments help the safety assessment to give feedbacks on the design and drive its de-
velopment. The methodology definition is fundamental to guarantee a systematic 
and as complete as possible analysis, based on functional safety. This aspect has 
been consistently assessed in the IEC 61508 (2005), a milestone for safety driven 
design. Some attempts to import the key implications of the functional safety have 
already been experienced (e.g. through the IEC 61513), but the will to maintain the 
rigid traditional safety approach led to a misrepresentation of the 61508 nature and 
constitutes another proof that the stiff process developed for LWRs is difficult to 
be applied to new generation concepts.  
The main objective of the proposed methodology is to guarantee that the design 
evolution is always guided by safety analyses, in particular, a comprehensive un-
derstanding of safety related design vulnerabilities and the resulting implications 
for the risk. Its application to the case studies, in particular the identification of a 
list of questions about components, phenomena, procedures, physical and chemical 
variables and the preliminary sketch of the safety architecture, demonstrates the 
practical nature of the proposed approach, whose results have  to be continuously 
updated coherently with the design evolution. 
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   For example for the MSFR, the implementation of the methodology led to the 
definition of a list of relevant initiating events (PIEs), which will be further ana-
lyzed through deterministic analyses. They represent the most challenging condi-
tions for the plant and will drive the dimensioning of the protection systems and the 
physical barriers, in agreement with the outputs of the quantitative studies. Addi-
tionally, the implementation of the LODs tool to some PIES, judged particularly 
interesting for the system, helped to preliminary assess whether the foreseen safety 
provisions are sufficient to cope with the accidental scenario or if additional 
measures have to be defined.  
The implementation of these tools at a very early design stage aims at plenty 
fulfilling the safety and reliability criteria identified by the GIF IV and is coherent 
with the common practice in non-nuclear field.  
A major criticality of the safety demonstration of the new generation systems is 
the uncertainties management; both the input data and the results are not punctual 
and evolves continuously. The proposed and applied approach could not prescrip-
tive/proscriptive neither technology-specific as the one of LWRs; its technology-
neutral (in fact the method has been applied to very different reactors) and perfor-
mance-based characteristics try to take advantage of their own flexibility to manage 
the constantly variable domain of analysis, especially for conceptual design. Con-
sequently, a difficulty in the application of this method is the non-unique guidelines: 
for example, for the PIEs selection different approaches have been proposed: the 
first one purely deterministic (based only of the severity of the consequences) and 
the second one risk-informed (introducing a very preliminary evaluation of the fre-
quencies).  
The safety demonstration framework defined in this work has a nature at the 
same time risk-informed and deterministic. For example, the LOD method took ad-
vantage of the risk-informed characteristics, in fact the low frequency of the initia-
tor can stand as a LOD itself. On the other hand, the deterministic analysis and the 
quantitative results are essential for the definition of the safety margins and the 
demonstration of their satisfaction.  
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8 Appendix A – Lessons learned: 
MSFR Design open points  
 
The objective of this section is to list the design open points raised from the 
MSFR safety analysis, especially from the application of the FFMEA and the MLD 
methods.  
The list is composed of questions raised during the application of the method-
ology as well as suggestions to enhance the safety of the concept. These open points 
have been classified according to their type: systems, components, procedures, 
physical and chemical variables and phenomena. Moreover, the link between the 
safety demonstration and design evolution is highlighted (Allibert et al., 2018). 
All the considerations regard the design as defined in the deliverable 1.1 of 
SAMOFAR project (Allibert et al., 2017). 
It is important to highlight that the question about the definition of physical 
barriers is not only linked to the design, but also to safety considerations. It is re-
ported in Appendix B.  
 
 Phenomena 
Are there any dangerous chemical reactions between the fuel salt and all 
the other fluids inside the core cavity?  
In theory, chemical reaction will not occur between the fuel salt and the inter-
mediate salt (both the salts should be fluorides, therefore compatible) and all the 
other fluids in the core cavity and in the fuel recirculation circuits; however further 
analyses would be performed, when the intermediate salt will be definitively chosen 
(different options are still taken into account for the intermediate salt).  The reaction 
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of the fuel with the other fluids that might be in the core cavity should also be ana-
lyzed (e.g. with the lead located in the decay tank for FPs). 
 
In many accidents/incidents, the role of the natural circulation of the fis-
sile salt/fertile salt and intermediate salt is not clear and demonstrated.  
According to the current design, the natural circulation of the fuel salt cannot 
be activated since a sufficient difference between the heights of hot and the cold 
barycenters is not sufficient; in fact, in the current design they are at the same level.  
Some design arrangement could be made if the natural convection in the fuel circuit 
is considered necessary. As well, the possibility to have natural convection in the 
fertile and intermediate circuits has to be determined and its efficiency should be 
studied once the design of these circuits will be defined. Moreover, from the neu-
tronics point of view, the effects of the instauration of natural convection should be 
analyzed, since it would imply a decrease of reactivity with respect to the case of 
fixed fuel salt (no circulation).   
 
 Parameters and variables issues  
Is the pressure of the fuel circuit higher, equal or lower than the pressure 
of the inert gas in the reactor vessel?  
From the safety point of view, the overpressure of the reactor vessel with respect 
to the core cavity could be preferred because, in case of accidents, volatile FPs are 
kept inside the core cavity for a certain transient time (pressures equilibrium).  How-
ever, in case of a breach in the upper reflector at the pump level, the overpressure 
in the reactor vessel could lead to an unwanted gas entrance increasing the risk of 
pump cavitation, therefore the stop of the fuel salt flowrate. The pressure should 
also be set in order to reliably detect a reactor vessel leak (to be further investi-
gated). 
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 Systems  
Is a depressurization system for the reactor vessel needed and further de-
fined and developed? 
If the pressure of the reactor vessel in normal conditions is lower than or equal 
to the pressure of the core vessel, in case of accident (involving a loss of contain-
ment of the core vessel), the gaseous FPs and the gas of the fission products removal 
system would exit from the core cavity to the reactor vessel increasing its pressure. 
In that case, before adding a depressurization system for the reactor vessel, the plau-
sible pressure levels that can be reached must first be assessed. The strategy should 
be to try to ensure confinement as close as possible to the source term (and avoid 
its spreading in the facility). 
 
The heating systems for the intermediate salt should be defined and de-
signed. 
In case of fuel salt drain, the intermediate salt would lose its heat source and 
may solidify: a heating system for the intermediate salt should be designed, in order 
to highlight sensible areas (i.e. the areas where the intermediate salt can easily so-
lidify). This is important to ensure the intermediate salt draining (e.g. for mainte-
nance actions) and to properly transfer the heat when the fuel will be re-injected in 
the core to restart the reactor. 
 
The fertile salt must be maintained at liquid state in order to be drained 
in the controlled routine draining tanks: are there any heating systems or is 
the intermediate salt sufficient to maintain the fertile salt at the liquid state? 
Is the decay heat sufficient to maintain the fertile salt at the liquid state?   
In case of fuel salt drain or loss, the fertile salt would lose its main heat source 
and it may solidify if its decay heat is not sufficient to maintain it at the liquid state. 
This is important for the fertile salt draining in the routine storage tank, e.g. for 
maintenance actions. The decay heat of the blanket salt should be studied in order 
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to understand if it is sufficient to maintain the salt at the liquid state or if it is exces-
sive and the blanket should be cooled down.  
If the storage tank for the gas of the fission products removal system is 
different from the expansion vessel, a system to isolate the storage tank 
should be designed. 
If the core cavity is damaged and the fuel salt is drained, the flow of the gas 
(He) of the FPs removal system should be interrupted and its storage should be 
isolated, in order to avoid the release of gas in the reactor vessel. Therefore, a sys-
tem to isolate the purification gas storage tank should be foreseen, if the storage 
tank is not the expansion vessel, located in the upper reflector.  
 
Is the cooling system for the structures separated from the cooling system 
for the fissile and fertile salt (3 independent and separated circuits)? 
The question is about the number of independent circuits required to cool down 
the fuel salt, the fertile salt and the structures. If there are different separated cir-
cuits, the loss of one of them would not imply the loss of the cooling of the other 
systems. On the other hand, 3 different circuits would increase the complexity of 
the system (it is plausible that collectors or several heat exchangers would be nec-
essary). If a unique circuit is chosen for the design, it would be necessary to choose 
between the configurations in series or in parallel (see question below): this solution 
could simplify the design, but the consequences of a breach in the unique circuit 
would be more severe. Furthermore, one single intermediate circuit cools down four 
recirculation sectors, therefore a total of four intermediate circuits for the fuel salt 
is foreseen: further design studies should be performed to define the appropriate 
number of cooling systems for the structures, as well as for the fertile salt. 
 
Different options for the disposition of the heat exchangers (HX) between 
the fertile/fissile salt and the intermediate salt and the HX for walls cooling 
(In series or in parallel)  
The two propositions for the disposition of the heat exchangers are shown in 
fig. 8-1.  
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Figure 8-1 The heat exchangers are disposed in series (left), the heat exchangers are disposed in parallel 
(right) 
The first proposition is more advantageous from the thermodynamics point of 
view because the outlet temperatures from the HXs with the fertile blanket and with 
the walls are supposed to be much lower than the outlet temperature from the active 
core.  
The second proposition is more advantageous from the regulation point of view: 
the core reactivity is regulated through the temperature of the heat exchangers, and 
mainly through the HXs between the fissile salt and the intermediate fluid; this 
proposition allows a direct control of the intermediate salt temperature, without tak-
ing into account the heat exchange with the other heat sources (i.e. walls and fertile 
blanket).   
It is also important to define the locations of the HXs and of the collectors for 
the intermediate fluid.  
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A system to evaluate the level of fuel in the expansion vessel would be 
useful to detect problems of the expansion vessel system. 
It is important to monitor the fuel volume dilation in the expansion vessel. In 
case of loss of containment in the upper part of the core cavity and excessive fuel 
dilation, the fuel salt could exit from the expansion vessel.  
The cooling system of the EDS should be defined. 
The two options are listed in SAMOFAR D1.1 (Allibert et al., 2017), even if 
the hypothesis of a set of heat pipes is more likely than the one with water pool. In 
the case of a set of heat pipes, the complexity of the system would increase, but the 
probability of an aggressive chemical reaction of a leakage of fuel salt or interme-
diate salt falling down in the water pool would be zeroed, lowering the chemical 
hazard. Another option, with a gas (air or inert salt) as cooling fluid, is also under 
analysis.  
 
Is there an in-core Decay Heat Removal System (DHRS)?  
If it is possible to shut down the core and maintain the fissile salt inside the core 
cavity, would a DHRS exist or would a smaller part of the intermediate fluid mass 
flow be used to evacuate the decay heat?  
 
 Components and materials  
8.4.1 Fuel circuit pump 
Different options for the circulation pump: 1) mechanical or 2) magnetic 
driven pump. 
In option 1), we consider that mechanical pumps would be used to ensure the 
fuel circulation in the fuel circuit. In this option, openings must be provided in the 
sector lid in order to let the pump shaft pass through. 
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In option 2), we consider that magnetic driven pumps would be used for the fuel 
circulation. In this option, the pump shaft rotation is magnetically driven and the 
openings in the sector lids (if any) are not necessary. Option 2 would be preferable 
from leak-tightness point of view. 
 
8.4.2 Component of the upper closure of the core cavity 
The lid and the sampling system location at the top of the expansion vessel 
could represent a weak point. 
The lid located over the expansion vessel closes the upper reflector (and there-
fore the core cavity) when the sampling device is not functioning. The question is 
about the dimension of the lid with respect to the dimensions of the upper reflector: 
if the upper reflector is much thicker than the lid, it is plausible that the lid could 
constitute a weak point for the leak-tightness of the core cavity containing the fuel 
salt.  
In addition, the lid as well as the sampling device will be in contact with the 
gaseous FPs and it could be in contact with the fuel. It could be useful to quantify 
the irradiation damage on these systems, whose walls can be thinner than the upper 
reflector ones and made of different materials.  
To improve the confinement of the radioactive matter, the opening for fuel sam-
pling should be reduced as much as possible. During the substitution of the sam-
pling device with the lid (and vice versa), the core cavity should be isolated in order 
to guarantee the leak-proof containment of the fuel salt and of the FPs. Therefore, 
a closure (gate/lock) to isolate the core cavity and the reactor vessel should be de-
signed, for ensuring the confinement of the radioactive matter during the substitu-
tion operations.  
Finally, another option for the sampling of the fuel salt is under study where the 
sampling is performed through pipes entering the fuel circuit (in the same way as 
the normal draining pipes). This option could reduce the risks of loss of fuel circuit 
leak-tightness. 
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The design of the upper reflector could help the fuel reinjection in the 
core cavity, for example a slope of the walls can be foreseen in function of 
the volume of the expansion vessel and all the other free volumes present in 
the core cavity. 
If the fuel salt will exit from the core cavity in its upper part (e.g. in case of 
breach in the upper part of the reactor and excessive fuel dilation), it could solidify 
outside the core cavity if it will not be helped to re-enter, for example with a slope 
of the walls (it could help maintenance actions).  
 
8.4.3 Components of the fission product removal system 
The components of the fission products removal system should be deter-
mined. 
The fission products removal system is supposed to remove both solid and gas-
eous FPs online. The configuration of the system is still conceptual, for example 
the presence of fluids (e.g. lead) is foreseen for the salt cleaning, but specific anal-
yses of materials compatibility are necessary. Moreover, the components of this 
system have not been specified.  
 
Different options for gas circulation in fission products removal system: 
1) liquid ring pump before the decay tank; 2) Compressor after the decay 
tank; 3) both. 
In option 1), a liquid ring pump will be located between the gas separation 
chamber and the decay tank. This option allows the compression of the gas before 
entering the decay tank and a more compact decay tank dimensioning. However, 
this option implies a higher pressure in the decay tank than in the separation cham-
ber.  
In option 2), there will not be any pump between the gas separation chamber 
and the decay tank but a compressor after the decay tank. This option allows having 
a lower pressure in the decay tank than in the gas separation chamber that would 
make the gas flow passively between the two components thanks to the pressure 
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difference. However, as the gas is not compressed when entering the decay tank, 
this one has to be larger than in option 1. The compressor after the decay tank is 
used to control the gas pressure in the pipes between the decay tank and the bubble 
injector. 
In option 3), we consider both a liquid ring pump between the gas separation 
chamber and the decay tank to limit the decay tank volume and a compressor after 
the decay tank to control the gas pressure in the pipes and at the bubble injectors. 
 
Is there a purification system for the lead filter in the fission products 
removal system? Or will it be changed regularly?  
A lead filter will be necessary to remove mainly metallic FPs. Its efficiency will 
be reduced with time, therefore a cleaning system has to be designed or the filter 
has to be substituted after a certain period of time (almost every 3 years). In the first 
case the system will be more complex and another fluid could be necessary, but the 
efficiency of the filter will be quite constant. In the second case the system will be 
simpler but the efficiency of the filter will decrease during the system life.   
 
The diameter of the bubble injectors (for reactivity control and fission 
products removal system) should be defined. 
The diameter is important because the injector could be obstructed or damaged 
if solid pieces would be present in the core cavity due to previous incidents/acci-
dents or if small parts of the fuel solidify. In case of an incident where the fuel salt 
would go inside the injector, the probability that fuel would solidify is higher if the 
diameter of the pipes for gas injection is small. If the pipes have a large diameter, 
the fuel may contaminate a larger portion of the fission products removal system / 
reactivity control system before its solidification.  
The location of the pipe could also be modified so that the pipes could remain 
inside the core vessel and limit the impact of a pipe rupture. In this case, a pipe 
rupture would not imply a draining of the salt anymore. 
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The presence/absence of a blockage valve inside the injector should be 
determined. 
If the pipes connecting the purification gas storage tank to the injector are ex-
ternal to the core cavity, a breach in the pipe will be similar to a breach in the lower 
reflector; therefore, the fuel will be lost in the collector before, and then in the EDS. 
In order to avoid the fuel loss, a blockage valve could be useful to guarantee the 
core cavity integrity (even if a channel for the inlet of purification salt will be lost).  
 
The existence of a valve to isolate fission products removal system has to 
be verified. 
This is important in order to block the continuous injection of purification gas 
in case of accident, especially if the accident involves the loss of integrity and leak-
tightness of the core cavity.  
 
8.4.4 Components of the intermediate circuit and the cooling cir-
cuit for the structures 
Valves to isolate the cooling circuit for the structures can be necessary. 
In case of breach in the cooling system for the structures, a blockage valve could 
be very useful in order not to lose a large quantity of intermediate salt. The im-
portance of these valves increases in the case of a unique cooling circuit for the fuel 
salt, for the fertile salt and for the structures. Indeed, if a single circuit is used, a 
loss of heat sink would imply a loss of cooling for the fuel as well as for the struc-
tures and the fertile salt. 
 
Valves to isolate the intermediate circuit at the level of the reactor vessel 
walls can be necessary to limit the spreading of radioactive matter if the in-
termediate is contaminated by the fuel. 
These valves will be important especially if the fuel salt or gaseous FPs exit 
from the recirculation sectors and go in the intermediate circuits (e.g. in case of a 
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breach in the HX). In order to contain the radioactive matter inside the reactor ves-
sel, some valves should be foreseen to block the intermediate salt before going in 
the BoP area of the system, therefore before entering in the HX between the inter-
mediate salt and the BoP fluid.  
 
 Procedures 
8.5.1 Procedures related to the draining systems 
Is the EDS used only for accidental situations or can be used for inci-
dental situations or small deviation from normal operation?  
In the reference MSFR design described in SAMOFAR deliverable 1.1, the 
EDS is supposed to be used only in case of emergency. The use of the EDS would 
imply that the reactor is strongly damaged. Another option is to use the EDS not 
only for accidental conditions but also for incidental conditions or maintenance op-
erations. The purpose of this second option is to make the EDS behave as storage 
tank and the so called “storage tanks” as draining tank for start-up and shutdown.  
 
In case of small deviations from normal operation, is it possible to use 
controlled routine draining tanks instead of EDS?  
The question is about the procedure of management of deviations from normal 
operations (both small and large ones). If the EDS is used only in case of severe 
accidents, how can the small deviations be managed? Are the routine draining tanks 
used for draining the salt in order to allow maintenance? Are some small deviations 
monitored? Moreover, which deviations can be considered small and where is the 
limit between small and large deviations?  
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It is necessary to define when the EDS will be triggered, in function of the 
temperature and the pressure and if there are other methods to face incident 
not including the EDS triggering.  
This question is linked to the previous ones and it is about the physical/chemical 
parameters triggering the EDS and their thresholds: for example, the maximum 
temperature above which the EDS is activated (the same for the pressure and for 
the other connected parameters, if any).  
 
If the deviations (incident and accident) will be always faced with EDS, 
it could be worth to allow the recovery of the fuel salt. 
If all the deviations (small and large ones) will be managed by the EDS, it may 
be useful to design a system to recover the fuel salt and to re-inject it in the core 
cavity or to send it to the storage tanks or to the reprocessing unit if necessary.  
 
It can be useful that the routine storage tanks are in overpressure when 
they are not used. 
In case of rupture of the valve separating the recirculation sectors from the rou-
tine draining tanks when they are not in function, the overpressure of the routine 
draining tank could avoid the exit of the fuel salt from the core cavity and its prob-
able solidification in the pipe connecting the recirculation sectors and the routine 
draining tanks.  
 
8.5.2 Procedures related to salt sampling 
In the case that the valve separating the pressurized sampling device from 
the expansion vessel does not work and the failure is detected, the fuel salt 
should be drained in the routine storage tanks before removing the pressur-
ized sampling device for maintenance (specific procedures).  
If the valve separating the pressurized sampling device (as well as the condenser 
lid) from the expansion vessel fails to close during the substitution operation and if 
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the failure is detected, a procedure for the fuel salt drain should be activated, be-
cause the stuck open valve is equivalent to have a breach in the upper reflector and 
the function of ensuring the integrity and leak-tightness of the core cavity will be 
lost. 
The procedures to move the fuel/fertile salt samples (inside the reactor 
building and from the reactor building to the reprocessing unit) should be 
defined. 
The online sampling of the fuel salt and of the fertile salt is postulated, but the 
procedure of transferring the salts from the core cavity to the reprocessing unit is 
not defined yet. 
 
8.5.3 Procedures related to reactivity control 
What is the procedure in case of a small insertion of positive/negative 
reactivity? Is the reactor shutdown, monitored by temperature or by the bub-
bling system for reactivity control? 
The question is about how to manage reactivity in the core cavity, especially 
during transients, such as the shutdown. Knowing that there are different systems 
to control the reactivity, which is the most efficient (therefore which one will be 
used) in the different unsteady situations?   
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9 Appendix B – Physical barriers def-
inition for MSFR 
Defence in depth is a safety philosophy that drives the design, construction, 
inspection, operation, and regulation of all nuclear facilities. Its objective is to pro-
tect the health and safety of people, to protect the environment and to ensure the 
availability and reliability of the facility. It is implemented through a number of 
measures, such as physical barriers, safety systems redundancy and diversification, 
strong physical security, and emergency response preparedness. In particular, mul-
tiple, successive barriers are designed to avoid accidental radioactive material re-
leases. 
According to IRSN definition (IRSN, 2015), “a severe accident is one in which 
the reactor fuel is significantly damaged due to a more or less complete core melt. 
This core melt is the consequence of a large temperature increase of the materials 
comprising the core, itself resulting from prolonged loss of core heat extraction by 
coolant fluid. This failure can occur only as a consequence of a large number of 
dysfunctions, so that its probability of occurrence is very small”.  
For solid-fuelled reactors (in particular LWRs), a severe accident implies: 
• The loss of the first confinement barrier (the cladding); 
• The loss of 2 over 3 safety functions (the heat extraction and the control of 
the reactivity chain); 
• The third function (confinement of radioactive materials) is put on risk. 
 
As a consequence, a severe accident may jeopardize the integrity of many 
or all of the barriers to the release of radioactive material (IAEA, 2009). More-
over, the risk of barriers degradation is one of the criteria used by the regulators to 
select the accidental events to be reported: “any event or abnormal condition that 
resulted in the condition of the nuclear installation, including its principal safety 
barriers, being seriously degraded” (IAEA, 2006b).   
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The given-above definition of a severe accident is well suited to LWRs, but 
difficult to be applied to other concepts. For instance, in SFRs or LFRs, the structure 
may in some conditions collapse before the core melting and, in VHTRs, fuel melt 
is considered highly improbable, or even impossible. Finally, for MSRs, the normal 
core state is liquid and the core melt accident has no equivalent. In 2015, for gen-
eration IV nuclear concepts, IRSN formulated a new definition of a severe accident 
(IRSN, 2015): “A severe accident in a nuclear reactor is an accident during which 
the nuclear fuel radioelement confinement function is significantly degraded, re-
gardless whether the fuel is inside the reactor, being handled or in a storage area” 
(Vitkova et al., 2006). Some considerations about the application of this definition 
to new generation concepts can be found in paragraph 2.2.3. 
Since in the case of a liquid-fuelled reactor, there is no direct equivalent of a 
solid-fuelled reactor accident with core melting and relative physical barriers, the 
aim of this chapter is to propose a definition of containment barriers useful for liq-
uid-fuelled reactors, and for MSFR in particular.  
 Safety related characteristics of MSFR 
The MSFR has unique features that make the standard safety definitions diffi-
cult to apply. The objective of this paragraph is to summarize the characteristics of 
MSFR that are related to safety.  
Liquid fuel 
Most MSFR peculiarities (Allibert et al., 2018) derive from the fact that it uses 
a liquid fuel in the form of a molten salt that plays the role of coolant as well. Some 
of the consequences are listed below: 
• Heat is produced directly in the heat transfer fluid;  
• Possibility to reconfigure passively the geometry of the fuel; 
• Possibility to drain the fuel; 
• Possibility to reprocess and load fuel during reactor operation. 
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Fuel circulation 
In the MSFR, as in many MSR concepts, the fuel is circulating. Due to the rel-
atively high speed and the turbulences in the core, the fuel is continuously mixed, 
therefore: 
• Fuel composition is relatively homogeneous; 
• Fuel irradiation is relatively uniform without need for loading plans. 
 
Constraints on fuel circuit structure materials 
The constraints on the fuel circuit structures are quite different from those of a 
LWR primary circuit, for instance: 
• The fuel circuit is at low pressure (atmospheric pressure); 
• The structures have to stand high temperatures; 
• Heat exchangers, pumps and fuel circuit instrumentations are in contact with 
the fuel and under radiation (relatively low as they are located out of the 
core region); 
• No structures are located in the core. 
 
Reactivity control 
The reactivity reserves in core are quite low for several reasons including: 
• The daily/frequent fuel composition adjustment thanks to the fuel repro-
cessing and loading during reactor operation (even if it can involve incorrect 
fuel composition in case of mixing problems);  
• The absence of absorber rods (a “geometric” control rod is still under con-
sideration for start-up and shut-down) (IAEA, 2009). 
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Containment characteristics 
In the MSFR, the fuel location is more dispersed than in a solid-fuelled reactor 
and the first confinement barrier is therefore challenging to be defined. The choice 
of the confinement barriers is impacted by: 
• The absence of cladding;  
• A significant part of fissile inventory located outside the core in the fuel 
recirculation sectors;  
• The fuel and blanket sampling that are made during reactor operation for 
reprocessing, as well as the injections of reprocessed salt; 
• The connections between the fuel circuit and the draining tanks and the 
possibility to lose a part of the salt during the transfers.  
 
Concept under development 
The safety analysis of the MSFR is limited by the available knowledge on the 
plant and the reactor operation. Indeed: 
• The design is in development; 
• Start-up and shutdown procedure are still under development; 
• Inspection and maintenance procedures are not defined. 
 
 Bibliographic survey  
The MSFR present a set of characterizing safety aspects that make difficult the 
definition of the physical multiple barriers and of the severe accident. Hence, this 
paragraph aims to find some directives in the IAEA reports (see paragraph 9.2.1) 
and some analogies with other NPP systems (see paragraph 9.2.2) in order to drive 
our analysis. Moreover, some propositions have already been done and represent 
the starting point for a more detailed one (see paragraph 9.2.3).  
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9.2.1 Rules for the definition of the containment barrier from 
IAEA reports 
The fundamental safety objective of nuclear safety is to protect people and the 
environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation (IAEA, 2006).  
The primary means of preventing accidents in a nuclear power plant and miti-
gating the consequences of accidents is the application of the concept of DiD. A 
relevant aspect of the implementation of defence in depth for a nuclear power plant 
is the provision in the design of a series of physical barriers, as well as a combina-
tion of active, passive and inherent safety features that contribute to the effective-
ness of the physical barriers in confining radioactive material at specified locations 
(IAEA, 2016).  
The aim of this paragraph is to list the prescriptions found in the IAEA safety 
requirements and IAEA Safety Guides that are useful to drive the definition of the 
safety barriers in the MSFR. 
1) Barriers shall be independent as far as is practicable (IAEA, 2016).  
2) The number of barrier that will be necessary will depend upon the initial 
source term in terms of the amount and isotopic composition radionuclides, 
the effectiveness of the individual barriers, the possible internal and external 
hazards and the potential consequences of failures (IAEA, 2016).  
3) The design shall provide for multiple physical barriers (IAEA, 2016).  
4) The construction shall be of high quality so as to minimize the failures and 
the deviations from normal operation and to prevent that a small deviation 
leads to a cliff-edge effect (IAEA, 2016).  
5) The design shall prevent challenges to the integrity of physical barriers, the 
failure of one or more barriers, the failure of a barrier as a consequence of 
the failure of another barrier, the accident conditions escalation (IAEA, 
2016), the by-pass of a barrier (IAEA, 2016b). 
6) If one level of barrier were to fail, the subsequent level would be available 
(IAEA, 2006b).  
7) Risk assessment will determine whether barriers incorporated in the design 
fulfil the safety functions required of them (IAEA, 2016b).  
 227 
 
 
8) Special attention has been paid for internal and external events that can chal-
lenge more than one barrier (IAEA, 2016b)  
9) The selection of the main barriers should be described and justified (IAEA, 
2004).  
10) For each group of PIE the plant response should be assessed as well as the 
status of the barriers (IAEA, 2004).  
11) Deterministic safety analyses are required to demonstrate that barriers to the 
release of radioactive material will prevent an uncontrolled release to the 
environment for all plant states (IAEA, 2009b).  
12) The accidents where major barriers such as the containment may be ineffec-
tive should be identified, and it should be ensured that analyses are per-
formed for these transients (IAEA Safety Standard, SSG-2, 2009). All cred-
ible failure mechanisms of the different barriers should be analysed (IAEA, 
2009b).  
13) Acceptance criteria should be set in terms of the variable or variables that 
directly govern the physical processes that challenge the integrity of a bar-
rier (IAEA, 2009b).  
14) Deterministic safety analyses are to demonstrate that, in normal operational 
conditions and accident conditions, a sufficient number of barriers are re-
tained (IAEA, 2009b).  
15) Probabilistic safety analyses may be used to determine the probability of 
damage for each barrier (IAEA, 2009b). 
 
9.2.2 Analogy with physical barriers in other NPP 
In this paragraph (Allibert et al., 2018), the physical barriers for different nu-
clear reactors are listed.  
PWR: 
• First barrier: Fuel cladding tubes/fuel matrix;  
• Second barrier: Primary circuit; 
• Third barrier: Reactor containment building.  
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CANDU (Canadian Heavy Water reactors): 
• First barrier: Pellets; 
• Second barrier: Fuel cladding; 
• Third barrier: Heat transfer system; 
• Forth barrier: Containment building (Hurst, 1997; Nuclear Power Plant 
Safety Systems, 2016).  
 
SFR:  
• First barrier: Cladding of the fuel;  
• Second barrier: Closed primary coolant loop; 
• Third barrier: Containment building (Walter et al., 2012). 
 
VHTR:  
• First barrier: Silicon carbide layer of the fuel coated particle;  
• Second barrier: Primary circuit;  
• Third barrier: Containment building (Bassi et al., 2005)  
 
LFR: 
• First barrier: Fuel and the fuel cladding;  
• Second barrier: Lead coolant; 
• Third barrier: Reactor vessel;  
• Forth barrier: Containment vessel (Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, 
2016) 
 
PBMR (Pebble Bed Modular Reactor): 
• First barrier: Kernel (Fahrenholtz et al., 2014);  
• Second barrier: Reactor vessel;  
• Third barrier: Reactor housing. 
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The number of needed confinement barriers can vary depending on the concept 
characteristics and the operational procedures. For instance, the safe storage of 
spent fuel is in general achieved by maintaining a minimum of two independent 
barriers between the fuel and the environment. For solid-fuelled reactors, the fuel 
cladding is considered the primary barrier. The second barrier is the confinement 
system, which is different for each type of storage. For wet storage, a hydraulic 
containment is guaranteed by the pool and effluents are managed by the ventilation 
system containment. Mechanical seals provide confinement boundary sealing sur-
face for the dry storage (Vitkova et al., 2006).  
 
9.2.3 Propositions for MSFR barrier found in other references 
In this paragraph (Allibert et al., 2018), there are propositions for MSR barriers 
found in previous studies.  
• Marya Brovchenko PhD thesis: the first barrier is defined as the fuel casing 
and is composed of a critical area (the fuel circuit) and a subcritical area (the 
draining system). It is important to notice that the reactor design has evolved 
since this definition and that the EDS is now separated from the routine 
draining system. Then, the reactor vessel constitutes the second barrier and 
includes also the reprocessing and storage units. Finally the reactor building 
is the third barrier (Brovchenko, 2013).  
 
• ORNL MSRE: the primary containment is defined as the system of piping 
and vessels. “The sealed reactor and drain-tank cells are the secondary con-
tainment for the fuel salt during operation”. No containment barriers are 
clearly defined during maintenance. It is only mentioned “most maintenance 
does not entail opening the containment described above” (Haubenreich, 
1968). 
 
• In D2.5 EVOL report (Brovchenko et al., 2014), with a previous design of 
the  MSFR, the confinement barriers are identified with:  
o First containment barrier: it is the fuel casing that includes critical 
and subcritical spaces where the fuel salt is located during normal 
reactor operation; in particular, we refer to all the fuel circuit devices 
that are in contact with the salt when the reactor is generating power. 
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The challenges for the first barrier are a small neutron flux, locally 
high temperature (up to 700°) corrosion from the salt (pink in the 
following fig. 9-1); 
o Second containment barrier: it is the reactor vessel. In its lower part 
it contains a large pool partly filled with water that surrounds the 
subcritical part of the fuel casing. On the top of the pool there is a 
sealed water circuit where, via natural convection, the water flows 
towards air heat exchangers distributed along the vessel periphery, 
that ensure the passive cooling of the salt in the draining tank. Sur-
rounding the critical part, the second barrier includes the HX walls 
between the intermediate circuit and the BoP (light blue in the fol-
lowing fig. 9-1);  
o Third containment barrier: it is the reactor containment structure 
(maybe the reactor building) (grey in the following fig. 9-1).  
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Figure 9-1 MSFR schematic representation (Brovchenko et al., 2014) 
 
 Propositions  
 
The components in contacts with the fuel or holding it are different if the reactor 
is in different operational states. The idea of this paragraph is to define the MSFR 
safety barriers in function of the different normal operational states. The operational 
states taken in to account are:  
• Power production and situations where the fuel is in the fuel circuit; 
• Maintenance operations where the fuel is in the storage tanks. 
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Several proposals are made for the barriers based on the reference MSFR design 
(Allibert et al., 2017) or with minor modifications of this one. They are listed below. 
 
9.3.1 Proposal 1  
For normal operation condition (power production & maintenance / start-up 
/shutdown), the two proposed barriers are: 
• First barrier: Fuel casing;  
• Second barrier: Reactor building. 
This proposal is based on the current MSFR design (Allibert et al., 2017). The 
two barriers must be entire and independent.  
The first barrier, named “fuel casing”, is constituted of the reactor vessel with 
perforations for the intermediate circuit pipes, the upper wall/lid with a removable 
part allowing the fuel sampling, the collector, the draining shaft and the EDS. To 
ensure integrity and continuity of the first barrier in case of accident (e.g. rupture 
of HX plate/channel), valves should be provided to isolate the part of the interme-
diate circuit entering the fuel casing.  
The second barrier is constituted by the reactor building and contains the in-
termediate circuit, the BoP and other auxiliary systems.  
The barriers are coincident in the reactor states of power production, mainte-
nance, start-up and shutdown. The proposal 1 is illustrated in the following fig. 9.2.  
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Figure 9-2 Proposal 1 of the physical barriers (Allibert et al., 2018) 
The problem of this kind of barriers definition is linked to the fact that the first 
barrier is huge and every time that maintenance will be necessary, the first barrier 
needs to be opened: this involves serious issues in terms of management, procedures 
definition and restrictions.  
If technological issues are present so that recirculation sectors cannot be closed, 
proposal 1 could be the final choice, while if there are not, other proposals can be 
more satisfactory mainly in terms of management and maintenance (see paragraph 
9.3.2 and paragraph 9.3.3) (Allibert et al., 2018).  
 
9.3.2 Proposal 2  
With respect to proposal 1 (par. 9.3.1), proposal 2 foresees to seal the fuel circuit 
containment structures in order to confine the radioactive materials inside the fuel 
circuit. This barrier would be analogous to the PWR fuel rod cladding as it is the 
first physical component in contact with the active fuel and it holds the fuel. To 
limit the presence of radioactive matter in a more restricted area presents benefits 
for both maintenance operations and decommissioning, while in case of accident it 
would be more difficult for the radioactive gases to find an escaping pathway.   
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Moreover, proposal 2 is more similar to the PWR barriers definition. Indeed, 
the loss of the first barrier is, in this case, more similar to the loss of the cladding in 
PWR, which does not compromise the safety aspects of the reactor. On the other 
hand, in proposal 1, the loss of the first barrier would have a much more severe 
impact from both safety and process points of view than the equivalent event in 
PWR and other Gen IV reactors. 
For normal operation condition (power production), the proposed physical bar-
riers are: 
• First barrier: Fuel circuit containment structures;  
• Second barrier: Fuel casing; 
• Third barrier: Reactor building.  
This proposal is based on the current MSFR design (Allibert et al., 2017). The 
three barriers must be entire and independent. 
The first barrier, named “fuel circuit containment structures”, includes the 
core cavity, the upper and lower reflectors and the lid allowing to close the upper 
parts of all the sectors. In addition, the elements playing a role in the integrity and 
leak-tightness of this barrier have to be taken into account. Those are the interme-
diate circuit pipes, the HX plates/channels, the pumps shaft, the sampling device, 
the removable lid, etc. 
The second barrier, named “fuel casing”, is constituted of the reactor vessel, 
the upper wall/lid, the collector, the draining shaft and the EDS.  
To ensure the independence between the first and the second barrier, a remov-
able lid should be provided in the upper part of the fuel casing (that is a part of the 
second barrier) and it must be independent from the removable lid of the expansion 
vessel (that is a part of the first barrier). 
To keep integrity of the second barrier in case of loss of the first barrier (e.g. 
rupture of HX plate/channel), valves should be provided to isolate the part of the 
intermediate circuit entering the fuel casing. 
The third barrier is the reactor building and contains the intermediate circuit, 
the BoP and other auxiliary systems as in proposal 1.  
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For normal operation condition (maintenance / start-up /shutdown), the pro-
posed physical barriers are: 
• First barrier: Standard draining tank + filling/empting circuit; 
• Second barrier: Fuel casing; 
• Third barrier: Reactor building. 
 
During maintenance operation, start-up or shutdown, the fuel is located in stor-
age tanks and in the pipes connecting them to the core. This is why these structures 
are considered as the first barrier. The two other barriers are the same as for the case 
of power production.  
The proposal 2 (during power production) is illustrated in the following fig. 9.3.  
 
Figure 9-3 Proposal 2 of physical barriers (Allibert et al., 2018) 
As a possible variation of proposal 2, it can be worth defining a unique first 
barrier for the power production in normal operation conditions and for the mainte-
nance/shutdown/start-up always in normal operation conditions. This new first bar-
rier would contain all the fuel circuit structures and the standard draining tanks with 
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their filling/empting circuits. This idea is useful to highlight the fact that even dur-
ing maintenance the integrity and leak-tightness of the fuel circuit must be ensured; 
therefore, the whole zone where the active fuel is present must be entire during all 
the phases of normal operations (Allibert et al., 2018).   
Moreover if this kind of barrier definition is accepted, the use of routine storage 
tanks in incidental situations (small deviations) can allow to remain inside the 
unique first barrier (Allibert et al., 2018).  
 
9.3.3 Proposal 3  
This proposal 3 implies an important modification of the geometry and it is 
proposed as a compromise between reducing the radioactive area and considering 
the EDS as a part of the first containment barrier. The idea is to place the collector 
and EDS under the fuel circuit containment structure without including the routine 
storage tanks. This option has the advantage of securing maintenance operation on 
the EDS when the fuel is in the storage tanks (no risk of leakage to the EDS). 
For normal operation condition (power production), the proposed physical bar-
riers are: 
• First barrier: Fuel circuit containment structures + EDS  
• Second barrier: Reactor vessel; 
• Third barrier: Reactor building.  
The three barriers must be entire and independent. 
The first barrier includes the fuel circuit containment structures as described 
in proposal 2 and the EDS (including collector and draining shaft). In order to en-
sure the leak-tightness of this barrier, the collector should be sealed to the core ves-
sel.  
The second barrier, named “reactor vessel”, is constituted by a reactor vessel 
with an upper closure and it contains systems for thermal power generation (fuel 
circuit), systems for managing incident/accident situations (EDS) and systems for 
maintenance operation (standard draining tanks).  
The third barrier is the reactor building and contains the intermediate circuit, 
the BoP and other auxiliary systems as in proposal 1 and 2. 
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For normal operation condition (maintenance / start-up /shutdown), the pro-
posed physical barriers are: 
• First barrier: Standard draining tank + filling/empting circuit; 
• Second barrier: Reactor vessel; 
• Third barrier: Reactor building. 
 
During maintenance operation, start-up or shutdown the fuel is located in stor-
age tanks and in the pipes connecting them to the core as in proposal 2 (Allibert et 
al., 2018). The proposal 3 is illustrated in the following fig. 9.4.  
 
 
Figure 9-4 Proposal 3 of the physical barriers (Allibert et al., 2018) 
Also in this case, a possible variation of proposal 3 is not to have two different 
barriers definitions for the power production in normal operation conditions and for 
the maintenance/shutdown/start-up always in normal operation conditions, for the 
same reasons explained for proposal 2.  
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Some problems could appear if the EDS is considered a part of the first barrier: 
in that case, the integrity and leak-tightness of the EDS must be ensured as well as 
the rest of first barrier; this requirement may be difficult to fulfil especially because 
of the dimensions and the shape of the EDS.  
 Other reflexions 
It can be observed that the BoP is the only circuit in the reactor building with 
an important overpressure likely to induce a significant and sustained loading on 
the last confinement barrier; in fact, the salt circuits are not under high pressure and 
as there is no identified risk of a significant exothermic reaction between the salts 
and other fluids (studies are on-going). Therefore, it can be worth trying to locate 
the BoP out of the reactor building, or at least to consider design measures to avoid 
pressure related incidents/accidents impacting on several barriers.  Locating the 
BoP outside the reactor building would notably imply a stronger focus on isolation 
capabilities on the intermediate loop, as well as evaluation of the intermediate salt 
radioactivity. 
The fact that the EDS will be or not a part of the first barrier should be linked 
to the final role of this component: in fact, if it is intended to be used only in acci-
dental situations it can be considered as an emergency system, therefore it may be 
outside the first barrier; while if it is intended to be used also during small deviations 
from normal operations and/or during incidental situations it is worth including it 
in the first barrier (Allibert et al., 2018).  
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